We show that the negative demand shock due to the COVID-19 lock-down has reduced net-demand system demand less the amount of energy produced by intermittent renewables and net imports that must be served by controllable generation units. Introducing additional intermittent renewable generation capacity will also reduce the net-demand, which implies the lock-down can provide insights about how electricity markets will perform with a large share of renewable generation capacity.
We report on an economic experiment that compares outcomes in electricity markets subject to carbon-tax and cap-and-trade policies. Under conditions of uncertainty, price-based and quantity-based policy instruments cannot be truly equivalent, so we compared three matched carbon-tax/cap-and-trade pairs with equivalent emissions targets, mean emissions, and mean carbon prices, respectively.
Californians like to think of themselves as environmentally conscious and forward-thinking. The state’s energy and environmental policies reflect these sentiments. With the passage of SB 100, California has one of the nation’s most ambitious renewable energy goals for its electricity supply industry. The California Solar Initiative rebate program has led to more rooftop solar capacity in the state than the total rooftop solar capacity installed in the next eight highest-capacity states.
Small businesses are typically committed to providing a positive customer experience and therefore may exhibit a response to dynamic electricity prices different from residential or industrial customers. We conduct a field experiment to determine the extent to which small businesses respond through re-configuration of typical routines throughout the experiment period versus through adjustments to specific dynamic pricing events.
An increasing number of wholesale electricity markets employ locational pricing mechanisms where energy prices account for some or all aspects of the transmission network configuration. A major concern of regulators is that suppliers may have the ability to exercise unilateral market power by impacting the extent to which transmission constraints bind. We extend the residual demand curve as a measure of the ability to exercise unilateral market power from a single price market to residual demand hypersurfaces in locational pricing markets.
We extend the competitive benchmark pricing model of Borenstein et al. (2002) to locational-pricing markets. We further extent this model to account for transmission network security constraints as well as technical constraints on thermal power plants that introduce non-convexities in their operating cost functions. We apply both models to assess the performance of the Italian wholesale electricity market for the year 2018.
Electricity tariff reforms will be an essential part of the clean energy transition. Existing tariffs rely on average cost pricing and often set a price per unit that exceeds marginal cost. The higher price encourages over-adoption of residential solar panels and under-adoption of electric alternatives to fossil fuels. However, an efficient tariff based on fixed charges and marginal cost pricing may harm low-income households. We propose an alternative methodology for setting fixed charges based on the predicted willingness-to-pay of each household.
The electricity supply industry in a low-carbon world will have over 50 percent share of intermittent renewables. This large share of intermittent renewables will require investments in both grid-scale and distributed storage, active demand-side participation by customers, and automated distribution network monitoring and on-site load-shifting techologies. Market design should support business models that lead to adoption of these pricing policies and technologies.
Using hourly offer curves for the Italian day-ahead market and the real-time re-dispatch market for the period January 1, 2017 to December 31, 2018, we show how thermal generation unit owners attempt to profit from differences between a simplified day- ahead market design that ignores system security constraints as well as generation unit operating constraints, and real-time system operation where these constraints must be respected.
The variability of solar and wind generation increases transmission network operating costs associated with maintaining system stability. These ancillary services costs are likely to increase as a share of total energy costs in regions with ambitious renewable energy targets. We examine how ecient deployment of intermittent renewable generation capacity across locations depends on the costs of balancing real-time system demand and supply.
Wholesale electricity market design requires an explicit regulatory process to set the market rules for compensating and charging market participants for their actions. This has led to market designs tailored to the initial conditions in the industry and the political forces driving the restructuring process in that region. The experience of the past 25 years with wholesale market design has led to increasing standardization, particularly within the United States and within Europe. This paper identifies the key features of successful electricity market designs.
The different incentives generation unit owners face for locating and operating their units in the wholesale market regime versus the vertically-integrated monopoly regime has wide-ranging implications for the design and operation of the transmission network in the two regimes. This logic implies different measures of grid reliability in the two regimes—engineering reliability in the vertically-integrated monopoly regime and economic reliability in the wholesale market regimes.
California’s decision to allow Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) to shut off electricity to hundreds of thousands of Californians because high winds and dry conditions may cause a downed powerline to start a wildfire is a third-world solution to a first-world problem.
Economists traditionally argue that forward commodity markets allow more effi- cient risk-sharing and information aggregation. However, there is little empirical evidence that commodity markets provide economic benefits to producers and con- sumers of the commodity. This paper demonstrates that the introduction of finan- cial trading to California’s electricity market on February 1st, 2011 improved price discovery and lowered production costs.
This report provides recommendations on the six topic areas in the transformation and modernization theme “Competition, participation and structure of the electricity market.” These are: (1) investment, reliability charges, and contracts; (2) generation diversification, of Non-Conventional Renewable Energy Sources (NCRES) and greater number of agents; (3) new services and agents: storage systems and aggregators; (4) restrictions, nodal prices and infrastructure; (5) market structure; and (6) pathways to de-carbonization and implications for market design.
Recent behavioral models of reference-dependent or context-dependent preferences have posited that consumers form reference points or consideration sets based on expectations. We investigate this hypothesis empirically within the retail gasoline market. Given that gasoline consumers have been shown to form price expectations based on past price lev- els, reference- or context-dependence would likely cause gasoline demand to become more price-sensitive when prices are high relative to the recent past (i.e., higher than expected).
We investigate the relationship between accumulated experience completing wind power projects and the cost of installing wind projects in the U.S. from 2001-2015. Our modeling framework disentangles accumulated experience from input price changes, scale economies, and exogenous technical change; and accounts for both firm-specific and industry-wide accumulated experience.
In April 2015, Singapore introduced an anonymous futures market for wholesale electricity. Using data on prices and other observable characteristics of all competitive retail contracts signed from October 2014 to March 2016, a larger average quantity of open futures contracts that clear during the term of the retail contract a month before the retail contract starts delivery predicts a lower price for the retail contract. This outcome is consistent with increased futures market purchases by independent retailers causing lower retail prices.
Capacity markets provide guaranteed payments to electricity generation unit own- ers for having the “firm capacity” to produce electricity. Historically, these markets are plagued by the weak incentives they provide for plants to be available during high-demand hours. The reliability payment mechanism in the Colombian electricity market provides market-based incentives for plants to produce during periods of system scarcity. This market has served as a model for the design of capacity markets in a number of jurisdictions in North America and Europe.
By making available the almost unlimited energy stored in prehistoric plant matter, coal enabled the industrial age – and it still does. Coal today generates more electricity worldwide than any other energy source, helping to drive economic growth in major emerging markets. And yet, continued reliance on this ancient rock carries a high price in smog and greenhouse gases.
Producers and consumers will make the investments and innovations necessary to transition to a low carbon electricity supply industry only if they are compensated for their efforts. In the absence of explicit government support for these activities, this outcome will occur only if wholesale and retail prices provide this compensation. Efficient wholesale and retail pricing provides compensation for the cost-effective deployment of these innovations. Multi-settlement locational marginal pricing markets set efficient short-term wholesale electricity prices.
Progressive Democrats assert that the Green New Deal is the best way to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions.
But this claim ignores the fact that subsidizing “green” energy technologies, such as wind and solar, is less effective than taxing the greenhouse gas emissions produced by brown energy sources, such as oil, natural gas and coal.
We report results from a large field experiment that with a few hours prior notice provided Danish residential consumers with dynamic price and environmental signals aimed at causing them to shift their consumption either into or away from certain hours of the day. The same marginal price signal is found to cause substantially larger consumption shifts into target hours compared to consumption shifts away from target hours.