Promoting Clean Development Competing Market Mechanisms Post-2012
(Excerpt) According to climate scientists, averting the worst consequences of climate change requires that the increase in global temperature should be limited to 2°C (or 3.6°F). to achieve that objective, global emissions of green house gases (GHGs)—the main human cause of global warming—must be reduced to 50 percent of 1990 levels by 2050.
The key to successful climate change abatement at those scales lies in leveraging the collective actions of developed and developing countries. Cumulatively, developed countries have been responsible for most human emissions of GHGs. that picture will be quite different in the future as emissions from the developing world take over the top mantle. Given this dynamic, there is a general agreement internationally that developed countries will lead emissions reductions efforts and that developing countries will follow with “nationally ap- propriate mitigation actions.” turning that agreement into environmentally beneficial action requires close international coordination between the developed and developing countries in allocating the responsibility for the necessary reductions and following up with credible actions. However, the instruments employed so far to promote the necessary collective action have proved to be insufficient, unscalable, and questionable in terms of environmental benefit and economic efficiency.
Currently, the most important and visible link be- tween developed and developing countries’ efforts on climate change is the Clean development Mechanism (CdM). the CdM uses market mechanisms—the “carbon markets”—to direct funding from developed countries to those projects in developing countries that lead to reductions in emissions of warming gases. In reality, the experience with the CdM has been mixed at best since its inception in 2006. while the CdM has successfully channeled funding to many worthy projects that reduce emissions of warming gasses, it has also spawned myriad projects with little environmental benefits. overall, the CdM has led to a significant overpayment by developed countries for largely dubious emissions reductions in developing countries.
Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism's Performance and Potential
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol is the first global attempt to address a global environmental public goods problem with a market-based mechanism. The CDM is a carbon credit market where sellers, located exclusively in developing countries, can generate and certify emissions reductions that can be sold to buyers located in developed countries. Since 2004 it has grown rapidly and is now a critical component of developed-country government and private-firm compliance strategies for the Kyoto Protocol. This Article presents an overview of the development and current shape of the market, then examines two important classes of emission reduction projects within the CDM and argues that they both point to the need for reform of the international climate regime in the post-Kyoto era, albeit in different ways. Potential options for reforming the CDM and an alternative mechanism for financing emissions reductions in developing countries are then presented and discussed.
PESD work on the role of carbon offsets in climate change mitigation attracts international attention
Michael Wara and David G. Victor's recent work "A Realistic Policy on International Carbon Offsets" addresses problems with the world's largest offset program, the UN's Clean Development Mechanism. Wara and Victor argue that much of the CDM investment doesn' actually meet the UN's crucial additionality standards, and they outline ways to fix the problem.
David Victor Discusses Climate Policy, Offsets, and Incentives in the Wall Street Journal
In the News: Wall Street Journal on July 23, 2008
Income from carbon offsets has become French chemical manufacturer Rhodia SA's most profitable business. The WSJ estimates payouts to the firm from projects in Brazil and South Korea could total $1 billion over seven years, raising questions about the incentive structure of the CDM. David G. Victor argues that carbon markets are not sending the appropriate signals to the developing world.
Michael Wara and David Victor Address the Role of Offsets in California's Cap and Trade Plan
In the News: Science Magazine
California's plan to cut carbon emissions 10% by 2020 relies on offsets as a part of a cap and trade scheme. Michael Wara points out the challenges that face the state as it designs its offset program, and David G. Victor sheds light on difficulties faced by the world's largest offset program, the UN's CDM protocol.
Michael Wara Discusses Coal and the CDM
In the News: Wall Street Journal on July 11, 2008
The CDM Executive Board recently approved several gas-fired power plants under the UN's carbon offset scheme, opening the door for subsidizing coal generation and stoking controversy. Michael Wara questions the additionality of such projects and argues subsidies are better spent on other clean-energy development.
Reducing Greenhouse Gases: Improving the Clean Development Mechanism
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is a means for industrial nations, known as Annex 1 countries, to meet their greenhouse gas emissions reductions targets by taking credit for reductions from projects they fund in developing countries. The idea is that projects to reduce emissions will cost less to develop and implement in the developing countries where technology is further behind. Industrialized countries can achieve more reductions via investment in the developing countries, achieving greater emissions reductions for less sunk cost. At least this is the idea under the Kyoto Protocol. A researcher at the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development (PESD), Michael Wara says this, in fact, is not how the CDM is working.
Wara lectures at Stanford Law School, teaching the popular class International Environmental Law. A graduate of Stanford Law School, Wara also has a PhD in Ocean Sciences from the University of California, Santa Cruz. His doctoral work on the interaction between climate change and oceanatmosphere dynamics in the tropics echoes in his current research on the CDM. He understands the science of greenhouse gases and how they affect Earth and its climate. One of those greenhouse gases is HFC-23, a byproduct of manufacturing refrigerants. HFC-23 is one of the gases countries targeted to reduce under the CDM; it can be eliminated rather easily and has been seen as the “low hanging fruit” of the CDM. In fact, more than half the greenhouse gas reductions of CDMs to date have been reached via reducing HFC-23 in developing counties. For the reductions, the project sponsor countries receive credits to put toward meeting their own reductions targets. These credits are called Certified Emission Reductions or CERs.
This is where Wara noticed a big discrepancy between what was credited through the CDM and what was actually happening on the ground. The CERs are not just feel-good pieces of paper that countries collect as proof of their doing good but are certifications of equivalent reductions of one metric tonne CO2 emissions. Carbon is the standardizing greenhouse gas and so regardless of what greenhouse gas is reduced with the CDM the sponsoring country is credited with CERs. But these “carbon credits” have a value—carbon is a traded commodity on many global markets. Wara could directly compare the CDM effect versus the credits issued. Since the cost of implementing the reductions was known or could be calculated, and since the credits were standardized to a greenhouse gas being traded on an open market, Wara could quantitatively critique the CDM.
Wara’s finding showed a major flaw in the CDM design. Looking at the large percentage of greenhouse gas reductions met within the CDM by eliminating HFC-23, the value of the credits created by these reductions were more than four times as valuable as the cost of implementing the reductions. This is not small change, as billions of dollars worth of CERs have been credited for the projects. What is more, the credits for eliminating the HFC-23 byproduct of manufacturing refrigerant were far more valuable than the refrigerant itself, creating incentives to build these manufacturing plants in order to cash-in on the CERs. Exposing these loopholes has brought attention to Wara’s work. He has presented his findings at numerous conferences and published his report (Nature 445, 595-596 (8 February 2007) doi:10.1038/445595a) and derivatives broadly. Wara continues to study the CDM and the global market for greenhouse gases and the post-Kyoto regime for reducing their emissions.
A Realistic Policy on International Carbon Offsets
As the United States designs its strategy for regulating emissions of greenhouse gases, two central issues have emerged. One is how to limit the cost of compliance while still maintaining environmental integrity. The other is how to "engage" developing countries in serious efforts to limit emissions. Industry and economists are rightly concerned about cost control yet have found it difficult to mobilize adequate political support for control mechanisms such as a "safety valve;" they also rightly caution that currently popular ideas such as a Fed-like Carbon Board are not sufficiently fleshed out to reliably play a role akin to a safety valve. Many environmental groups have understandably feared that a safety valve would undercut the environmental effectiveness of any program to limit emissions of greenhouse gases. These politics are, logically, drawing attention to the possibility of international offsets as a possible cost control mechanism. Indeed, the design of the emission trading system in the northeastern U.S. states (RGGI) and in California (the recommendations of California's AB32 Market Advisory Committee) point in this direction, and the debate in Congress is exploring designs for a cap and trade system that would allow a prominent role for international offsets.
This article reviews the actual experience in the world's largest offset market-the Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)-and finds an urgent need for reform. Well-designed offsets markets can play a role in engaging developing countries and encouraging sound investment in low-cost strategies for controlling emissions. However, in practice, much of the current CDM market does not reflect actual reductions in emissions, and that trend is poised to get worse. Nor are CDM-like offsets likely to be effective cost control mechanisms. The demand for these credits in emission trading systems is likely to be out of phase with the CDM supply. Also, the rate at which CDM credits are being issued today-at a time when demand for such offsets from the European ETS is extremely high-is only one-twentieth to one-fortieth the rate needed just for the current CDM system to keep pace with the projects it has already registered. If the CDM system is reformed so that it does a much better job of ensuring that emission credits represent genuine reductions then its ability to dampen reliably the price of emission permits will be even further diminished.
We argue that the U.S., which is in the midst of designing a national regulatory system, should not to rely on offsets to provide a reliable ceiling on compliance costs. More explicit cost control mechanisms, such as "safety valves," would be much more effective. We also counsel against many of the popular "solutions" to problems with offsets such as imposing caps on their use. Offset caps as envisioned in the Lieberman-Warner draft legislation, for example, do little to fix the underlying problem of poor quality emission offsets because the cap will simply fill first with the lowest quality offsets and with offsets laundered through other trading systems such as the European scheme. Finally, we suggest that the actual experience under the CDM has had perverse effects in developing countries-rather than draw them into substantial limits on emissions it has, by contrast, rewarded them for avoiding exactly those commitments.
Offsets can play a role in engaging developing countries, but only as one small element in a portfolio of strategies. We lay out two additional elements that should be included in an overall strategy for engaging developing countries on the problem of climate change. First, the U.S., in collaboration with other developed countries, should invest in a Climate Fund intended to finance critical changes in developing country policies that will lead to near-term reductions. Second, the U.S. should actively pursue a series of infrastructure deals with key developing countries with the aim of shifting their longer-term development trajectories in directions that are both consistent with their own interests but also produce large greenhouse gas emissions reductions.
PESD fellow working paper examines Clean Development Mechanisms
Michael Wara shows while inducing significant participation by developing countries, the Clean Development Mechanism has failed to realize its full environmental potential. Reductions are much smaller than claimed, politicization is prominent, and the scheme has done little to encourage the profound changes in energy technology needed to address climate change.
Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism's Performance and Potential (WP #56)
Global warming is one of the most difficult and important challenges facing the international community. To date, the most substantial effort to address this problem is the Kyoto Protocol. Although not adopted by the United States or Australia, this international agreement was adopted and ratified by every other large developed country and entered into force on February 16th, 2005. The Protocol is likely the largest ever international effort to combat a global environmental commons problem.
The Clean Development Mechanism ("CDM") is a market based trading mechanism
created by the Kyoto Protocol that functions by delivering a subsidy to the developing world in return for lower emissions of greenhouse gases. The subsidy offsets the cost of reducing GHG emissions, thereby encouraging less developed countries to emit less GHG than they otherwise would. As such, it represents the first attempt to address a global atmospheric commons problem using a global market. During the past 18 months, the CDM took on roughly the shape that it will likely have during the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.
The goal of this paper will be to describe in some detail what that broad outline looks like and also what it can teach us about the design of future treaty architectures aimed at the control of GHG emissions and global warming.
Nuclear power for India is good for us all, says PESD director David Victor
Stanford, California - If the deal to supply India with nuclear technologies goes through, future generations may remember it for quite different reasons than the debate over nuclear proliferation.
Nuclear power emits no carbon dioxide, the leading cause of global warming. And India, like most developing countries, has not been anxious to spend money to control its emissions of this and other so- called greenhouse gases.
India is embracing nuclear power for other reasons - because it can help the country solve its chronic failure to supply the electricity needed for a burgeoning economy. But in effect, the deal would marry their interest in power with ours in protecting the planet.
India is growing rapidly. In recent years its economy has swelled at more than 7 percent per year, and many analysts believe it is poised to grow even faster in the coming decade.
The economic growth is feeding a voracious appetite for electricity that India's bankrupt utilities are unable to satisfy. Blackouts are commonplace. Farmers, who account for about two-fifths of all the power consumed, can barely rely on getting power for half of every day. In industrial zones, the lifeblood of India's vibrant economy, unstable power supplies are such trouble that the biggest companies usually build their own power plants.
So most analysts expect that the demand for electricity will rise at about 10 percent a year. (For comparison, U.S. power demand notches up at just 2 percent annually.)
Over the past decade, about one third of India's new power supplies came from natural gas and hydro electricity. Both those sources have been good news for global warming - natural gas is the least carbon- intensive of all the fossil fuels, and most of India's hydroelectric dams probably emit almost no greenhouse gases.
However, the bloom is coming off those greenhouse-friendly roses. New supplies of natural gas cost about twice what Indians are used to paying, and environmental objections are likely to scupper the government's grand plans for new hydro dams.
That leaves coal - the most carbon-intensive of all fossil fuels. Already more than half of India's new power supplies come from coal, and that could grow rapidly.
Traditionally, the coal sector was plagued by inefficiencies. State coal mines were notoriously dangerous and inefficient. Coal-fired plants in western provinces, far from the coal fields and vulnerable to the dysfunctional rail network, often came within days of shutting operations due to lack of coal.
All that is changing. Private and highly efficient coal mines are grabbing growing shares of the coal market. Upgrades to the nation's high-tension power grid is making it feasible to generate electricity with new plants installed right at the coal mines.
These improvements make coal the fuel to beat.
So the deal struck with President George W. Bush matters. At the moment, India has just 3 gigawatts of nuclear plants connected to the grid. Government planners envision that nuclear supply will grow to 30 GW over the next generation, but that will remain a fantasy without access to advanced nuclear technologies and, especially, nuclear fuels - such as those offered under the deal with the Bush administration.
By 2020, even after discounting for the government's normal exuberance in its forecasts, a fresh start for nuclear power could increase nuclear generating capacity nearly ten-fold.
By displacing coal, that would avoid about 130 million tons of carbon dioxide per year (for comparison, the full range of emission cuts planned by the European Union under the Kyoto Protocol will total just 200 million tons per year).
The effort, if successful, would eclipse the scheme under the Kyoto Protocol, known as the Clean Development Mechanism, that was designed to reward developing countries that implement projects to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases. The largest 100 of these CDM projects, in total, won't reduce emissions as much as a successful effort to help India embrace safe nuclear power.
The benefits in slowing global warming are not enough to make the deal a winner. Care is needed to tame the risks of proliferation, especially those connected from India's system of breeder reactors that make more weapons-capable fuel than they consume. And complementary efforts, led by Indians, are needed to fix the trouble in India's electricity sector that have so far discouraged private investors.
None of this will be easy. There are no silver bullets in cooling the greenhouse.
What is important is that the deal is not just a one-off venture, as the administration's backers, on the defensive, have suggested. It could frame a new approach to technology sharing and managing a more proliferation proof fuel cycle that, in turn, will multiply the benefits of a cooler climate.
Coal-rich China is among the many other countries that would welcome more nuclear power and whose emissions of carbon dioxide are growing fast - even faster than India's.
Quite accidentally, it seems, the Bush administration has stumbled on part of an effective strategy to slow global warming. Now it should marry that clever scheme overseas with an effective plan here at home.
Carbon intensity of electricity generation and CDM baseline: case studies of three Chinese provinces
A difficult and persistent issue in the discussion of Clean Development Mechanism is estimating a carbon emissions baseline, against which tradable permits may be certified. This paper examines the proposition of adopting sectoral, as opposed to project level, baselines by conducting case studies of the electricity industry in three Chinese provinces. We find that complicated central planning, financial and institutional factors have been behind the declining trend of carbon intensity in electricity generation and its provincial variations. Government planned electricity development which incorporates many of these factors and the associated industry carbon intensity may serve as a second best baseline. However, the limitation of the baseline we examine in this study plus difficulties numerous studies have revealed in baseline setting suggests that using baselines based on counterfactuals of what would happen will in the end either miss good emission reduction opportunities, or compromise the integrity of the regime.