Gazprom: Gas Giant Under Strain
This study, which is part of a larger research project on state-controlled hydrocarbon resources, looks at the strategy, evolution and performance of Gazprom, Russia's largest state company. It explores the critical role that Gazprom plays in the Russian economy, as well as its growing and evolving role as an instrument of state.
Section 1 provides an overview of the Russian oil and gas sectors, with special attention to the history of gas as a Soviet ministry's the period when nearly all of Gazprom's legacy assets in gas fields and pipelines were developed.
Section II focuses on Gazprom as an organization, including its structure, revenues, and its activities within Russia, Western Europe and overseas. As the study makes clear, Gazprom is far more than the world's largest gas company. It is a monopoly controlled by the Kremlin, serving both economic and political agendas, as well as a multidimensional investment enterprise seeking a larger role on the world stage.
Section III looks at the "yin and yang" of Gazprom and the state, and the reasons for early privatization efforts following the demise of the Soviet Union, as well as the current "re-nationalization" of the oil and gas sectors as world prices have risen.
Wired Magazine interviews Jeremy Carl on Clean Coal
Coal is dirty. But coal is driving the U.S., Chinese and Indian economies. And therefore, coal is not going away. Renewable energy sources like solar and wind generate only 1 percent of the world's electricity. Do the math: Making coal burn cleaner might be the most pressing environmental problem that no one talks about.
Despite recent estimates that pollution from China's booming coal industry reaches U.S. shores in as little as five days, the green-tech investment boom that has funded the rise of biofuels has bypassed coal. Even the head of the World Coal Institute recently proclaimed the last 10 years "a lost decade" for clean coal, saying it's time to play catch-up.
Stanford's Jeremy Carl, a research fellow in the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development, couldn't agree more. He spoke on the phone with Wired News to discuss China, the holy grail of clean coal and how many coal plants he'd trade for Kyoto's accomplishments.
Stanford research fellow Jeremy Carl says, "Coal is as dirty as it gets," but warns against throwing the possibly cleaned-up baby out with the dirty bathwater.
Wired News: Why'd you get into clean coal?
Jeremy Carl: I looked at the numbers. It's a question of where the big sources of emissions are and where we can attack them.
WN: Can you give us an idea of the scale of coal power? Can you put coal in context as an energy source?
Carl: Only oil makes a bigger contribution to global energy. In terms of energy in the industrial world, it's about 40 percent of electricity production.
WN: How dirty is coal?
Carl: Coal is as dirty as it gets. Coal has every element in the periodic table. And depending where in the world you get it from, "coal" can mean 100 different substances. If you sent the sort of coal you might use in a typical Indian plant to a supermodern boiler in Japan, it would shut the place down.
WN: But there's got to be good things about coal.
Carl: It's cheap. And coal doesn't have the kind of extreme risk that nuclear power has. You're not going to build a dirty bomb out of coal. And unlike other fossil fuels, it is really widely distributed, so there is less of a coal OPEC.
WN: And that distribution would seem to make resource wars less likely to break out over coal?
Carl: Yes.
WN: Is there an energy source that could replace coal?
Carl: Natural gas is the only viable replacement, and it's not clear that the natural-gas supply could scale up to replace coal.
WN: So, how can we can make coal cleaner?
Carl: The most-well-known is flue-gas desulfurization, which takes sulfur dioxide out of smoke stacks, and came out of concerns about acid rain. There are other pollution-control devices for nitrogen oxide and mercury filters.
WN: What about up-and-coming technologies like carbon capture and sequestration? Can you tell us about that?
Carl: You're taking carbon from a smokestack and pressure-injecting it into a geological formation of some sort. We actually already do this process at an industrial level. We know how this works.
WN: Seems like we're spending a lot of time on the backend scrubbing pollutants out. Should we be designing in a cleaner process on the front end?
Carl: A lot of people point to integrated gasification-combined-cycle (IGCC) plants, which gasify coal before burning it, as the holy grail because they get you a cleaner process. It gives you a more concentrated stream of carbon that you can sequester underground more cheaply. The capital cost is very high, though, and we don't have a lot of experience in designing them.
WN: We hear a lot about China's coal industry. Can you compare it with the U.S. industry, which ranks second in the world?
Carl: We mine about (1.1 billion tons) of coal per year. China was at about 1.4 billion tons seven years ago. Now they are at 2.4 billion tons. So, they essentially took the second-biggest coal industry in the whole world and replicated it in seven years. And if you look at the Chinese plans, they plan to ramp it up even more in the future.
WN: Given the obvious environmental impacts of these plants, why don't we have better answers for these problems than the Kyoto Protocol (which the United States didn't sign, and which exempted China and India from emissions restrictions)?
Carl: I'll give you a speculative, personal answer. It has to do with the politics of the type of people who were negotiating Kyoto. And the pressure put on by environmental groups that were uncomfortable with coal. There was just so much pressure on the symbolic importance of getting a deal done.
WN: What would you have rather seen?
Carl: I think there has been some really good criticism that says, "Was the U.N. really a good forum for this? Or would it have been better to have taken the 10 countries who consume 60 percent of global energy and do something with real teeth in it?" I think that would have been a much better approach.
I would have happily traded every emissions gain from Kyoto for eight clean coal plants sequestering carbon in different countries. Because then we could have a real discussion that says, "This works. Now let's see who has to bear the cost."
WN: Why would that be such a big deal?
Carl: Because right now we're having a conversation with China and India where we're trying to get China and India to build clean coal plants by saying, "Here's this thing that's never been tried before at a mass scale. You should build one." And that's not going to work.
Making Small Work: Business Models for Electrifying the World
Despite over a century of investment in electric power systems, there are roughly 1.6 billion people who lack access to electricity service, mainly in rural areas. While there are some open questions regarding the precise cause and effect relationships between rural electrification and human welfare, it is generally considered an important social, economic, and political priority to provide electricity to all.
Rural electrification is a challenging task because it involves delivery of a service to populations that are remote and dispersed and whose consumption is low. This means it is generally more expensive while at the same time the customer base is generally poorer and less able to pay the full cost of service. Combine these factors with utilities that are often poorly managed and have limited finances, and it is often not feasible to expect extension of the grid to unserved rural populations in the near future. Such conditions are also challenging for the development of new renewable energy technology markets.
This paper discusses the role that electricity plays in the development process and its importance in rural areas; the contest between centralized and distributed solutions and their relative competitiveness; the previous experience and research on distributed generation and which business models fare successful; and broader lessons that can be extracted from the work.
Political Economy of Power Sector Reform: The Experiences of Five Major Developing Countries
Over the last fifteen years the world's largest developing countries have initiated market reforms in their electric power sectors from generation to distribution. This book evaluates the experiences of five of those countries - Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa - as they have shifted from state-dominated systems to schemes allowing for a larger private sector role. As well as having the largest power systems in their regions and among the most rapidly rising consumption of electricity in the world, these countries are the locus of massive financial investment and the effects of their power systems are increasingly felt in world fuel markets. In-depth case studies also reveal important variations in reform efforts. This accessible volume explains the origins of these reform efforts and offers a theory as to why - despite diverse backgrounds - reform efforts in all five countries have stalled in similar ways.
Cambridge University Press prints "Political Economy of Power Sector Reform"
Over the last 15 years the world's largest developing countries have initiated market reforms in their electric power sectors from generation to distribution. This book evaluates the experiences of five of those countries - Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa - as they have shifted from state-dominated systems to schemes allowing for a larger private sector role. As well as having the largest power systems in their regions and among the most rapidly rising consumption of electricity in the world, these countries are the locus of massive financial investment and the effects of their power systems are increasingly felt in world fuel markets. In-depth case studies also reveal important variations in reform efforts. This accessible volume explains the origins of these reform efforts and offers a theory as to why - despite diverse backgrounds - reform efforts in all five countries have stalled in similar ways.
-The first study to cover the big emerging economies of China and India whose development will be crucial to world energy markets
-Comprehensive up-to-date reviews and assessments allow readers to learn easily about diverse reform experiences
-Rigorous case study analysis follows sound political science methods without jargon
Contact Rose Kontak or the publisher for purchase.
Victor, Cullenward discuss climate change in Boston Review
Almost every facet of modern life - from driving to the grocery store to turning on a light - relies on inexpensive and abundant fossil fuels. When burned for power, these fuels yield emissions of carbon dioxide that accumulate in the atmosphere. They are the leading cause of global warming.
Assuring ample energy services for a growing world economy while protecting the climate will not be simple. The most critical task will be curtailing emissions from coal; it is the most abundant fossil fuel and stands above the others in its carbon effluent. Strong lobbies protect coal in every country where it is used in abundance, and they will block any strategy for protecting the climate that threatens the industry. The only practical approach is to pursue technologies that burn coal much more cleanly.
Such new technologies exist on the drawing board, but governments and regulators are failing to bring designs into practice with deliberate speed. Instead, most of the policy effort to tackle global warming has focused on creating global institutions, such as the Kyoto Protocol, to entice change. Although noble, these global efforts usually fall hostage to the interests of critical countries. After negotiating the Kyoto treaty, for example, the United States refused to sign when it found that it could not easily comply with the provisions. Australia did the same, and Canada is also poised to withdraw. Nor have treaties like Kyoto crafted a viable framework for engaging developing countries; these countries' share of world emissions is rising quickly, yet they are wary of policies that might crimp economic growth.
Breaking the deadlocks that have appeared in the Kyoto process requires, first and foremost, a serious plan by the United States to control its emissions. The United States has a strong historical responsibility for the greenhouse-gas pollution that has accumulated in the atmosphere, but little has been done at the federal level. (A few states are implementing some policies, and they, along with rising political pressure, might help to catalyze a more aggressive federal approach.) It will be difficult, however, for the United States (and other industrial countries) to sustain much effort in cutting emissions unless its economic competitors in China and the other developing countries make some effort as well. Without a strong policy framework to contain emissions throughout the world, levels of greenhouse-gas pollution will reflect only the vagaries in world energy markets. We need a proper strategy for moving away from harmful emissions.
A few years ago, many analysts thought that market forces were already shifting away from coal. They predicted the growth of natural gas, a fuel prized for its cleanliness and flexibility. That vision was good news for the climate because electricity made from natural gas leads to half of the carbon-dioxide emissions of electricity from coal. But natural-gas prices, which tend to track oil prices, have skyrocketed over the past few years, and, unsurprisingly, the vision for the growth of natural has dimmed. Natural-gas plants, which accounted for more than 90 percent of new plants built in the 1990s, are harder to justify in the boardroom. Most analysts now see a surge in the use of coal. One hundred new coal-fired plants are in the planning stages in the United States. Absent an unlikely plunge in gas prices, coal is here to stay.
Despite the challenges of handling coal responsibly, the potential of research and deployment of advanced technologies to help the United States and the major developing countries find common interest on the climate problem is great. In advanced industrialized countries, the vast majority of coal is burned for electricity in large plants managed by professionals - exactly the setting where such technology is usually best applied. In the United States, for example, coal accounts for more than four fifths of all greenhouse-gas emissions from the electricity sector.
Most of the innovative effort in coal is focused on making plants more efficient. Raising the temperature and pressure of steam to a "supercritical" point can yield improvements in efficiency that, all told, can reduce emissions about 20 to 25 percent. Boosting temperature and pressure still again, to "ultra-supercritical" levels, can deliver another slug of efficiency and lower emissions still further. Encouraging investments in this technology is not difficult: most countries and firms are already searching for gains in efficiency that can cut the cost of fuel; a sizeable fraction of new Chinese plants are supercritical; India is a few steps behind, in part because coal is generally cheaper in that country, but even there the first supercritical unit is expected soon. Across the advanced industrialized world, supercritical is the norm, at least for new plants. A few companies are taking further steps, investing in ultra-supercritical units. Two such plants are going up outside Shanghai, using mainly German technology, evidence that the concept of "technology transfer" is becoming meaningless in the parts of the world economy that are tightly integrated. Markets are spreading the best technologies worldwide where their application makes economic sense. In other countries, technologies to gasify coal - which also promise high efficiency - are also being tested.
But power-plant efficiency alone won't account for the necessary deep cuts in emissions. Already the growth in demand for electricity is outstripping the improvements in power plants such that the need for more plants and fuel is rising ever higher, as are emissions. This is spectacularly true in fast-growing China.
A radical redesign of coal plants will be needed if governments want to limit emissions of carbon dioxide. Here, the future is wide open. One track envisions gasifying the coal and collecting the concentrated wastes. Another would use more familiar technologies and separate carbon dioxide from other gases. All approaches require injecting the pollution underground where it is safe from the atmosphere. This is already done at scale in oil and gas production, where injection is used to pressurize fields and boost output. The consequences of injecting the massive quantities of pollution from power plants, however, are another matter. Regulatory systems are not in place or tested, and public acceptance is unknown.
While these technologies can work, they won't be used widely before they progress on two fronts. First, they must become commercially viable. Despite the huge potential of adopting them, it is striking how little money is being spent on advanced coal technologies. The U.S. government has created some financial incentives to build advanced coal plants, but much of that investment is slated for plants that are not actually designed to sequester CO2. In fact, the uncertainty of American policy gives investors in power plants an incentive to build conventional high-carbon technology, because it is more familiar to regulators and bankers. Worse yet, increased emissions today might actually improve a negotiating position in the future when targets for controlling emissions are ratcheted down from whatever is business as usual. Some private firms, such as BP and Xcel, are putting their own money into carbon-free power - but the totality of the private effort is small compared with the size of the problem. There are good mechanisms in place for encouraging public research and private investment in such technologies; the real shortcoming is in the paucity of the effort.
The second problem is that countries such as China, India, and other key developing nations won't spend the extra money to install carbon-free coal. Yet these countries' share of global coal consumption has soared almost 35 percent over the past ten years.
The inescapable conclusion is that the advanced industrialized countries must create a much larger program to test and apply advanced coal technologies. Electricity from plants with sequestration might eventually cost half more than from plants without the technology. That's not free, but it is affordable and is less than the changes in electric rates that many Americans already experience and accept.
State and federal regulators need to create direct incentives - such as a pool of subsidies - to pay the extra cost until the technology is proven and competitive with conventional alternatives. That subsidy, along with strict limits on emissions, will set a path for cutting the carbon from U.S. electricity without eliminating a future for coal. They must also extend the same incentives to the major developing countries, which have no interest in paying higher rates for electricity because their priorities do not rest on controlling CO2. Yet these countries' involvement now is essential. Averting emissions has a global benefit regardless of where the emissions are controlled. And developing countries are especially unlikely to shoulder more of the burden themselves, in the more distant future, unless they are first familiar with the technologies.
Solving the climate problem will be one of the hardest problems for societies to address - it entails complicated and uncertain choices with real costs today, and benefits in the distant future. Yet the stakes are high and the consequences of indecision severe. Serious action must contend with existing political constituencies and aim at existing resources that are most abundant. The technologies needed to make coal viable will not appear automatically. An active policy effort - pursued worldwide and initially financed by the industrialized world - is essential.
Originally published in the January/February 2007 issue of Boston Review.
Rural Electrification in China: History and Institution
China has been highly successful in electrifying rural areas in the past half century. Institutional structure and its reform are important for investment and, therefore, development of rural electrification. Over time, there have been three major institutional changes initiated by the central government; When the People's Republic was founded in 1949, it was short of capital, technology and management professionals to promote rural electrification, so rural electricity had a separate administrative system from the urban areas.
From 1949 to 1977, China established a comprehensive vertical system of rural electricity administration under strict central planning. At the end of the 1970s, with the adoption of economic reform policy, the central government handed over the management of the local electricity system to local government. County level has proved the most effective implementation unit for both planning and project implementation of the rural electricity system. From 1998 to 2002, the central government has been separating local electricity supply from local governments to facilitate the commercial operation of the utility market. After 2002, the rural electricity system was merged with the urban system, forming an integrated national electricity administrative system in China.
Rural Electrification in China 1950-2004: Historical processes and key driving forces
The historical process of rural electrification in China can be divided into three stages. The first stage lasted from 1950 until the end of 1970s, when policies of economic reform and liberalization were introduced. Rural electrification was slow, yet impressive progress was made under strict central planning. The second stage encompasses the last two decades of the 20th century, during which time rural industrialization proceeded full force, with investment mainly from local rather than central government. The third stage began at the turn of the century and included large scale consolidation and upgrading of rural grids, funded by a variety of sources. This further improved the quality of electricity service and extended access to remote rural corners of the country. The process of rural electrification has now neared its end, having become almost fully integrated into the power sector in China.
The Obsolescing Bargain Redux: Foreign Investment in the Electric Power Sector in Developing Countries
As part of PESD's ongoing research on power sector reform, the program has focused on the special role of independent power projects (IPPs). Many countries institute reform with the goal of attracting private (usually foreign) investors in new generating capacity. IPPs, rather than across-the-board reform, are usually the mechanism employed; yet the IPP market has been highly volatile in the last decade and has evaporated in most countries in recent years.
Private investment in electricity generation in developing countries grew dramatically during the 1990s, only to decline equally dramatically in the wake of the Asian financial crisis and other troubles in the late 1990s. The Program on Energy and Sustainable Development at Stanford University has undertaken a detailed review of the IPP experience in developing countries. The study has sought to identify the principal factors that explain the wide variation in outcomes for IPP investors and hosts. It also aims to identify lessons for the next wave in private investment in electricity generation.
This article presents the conclusions and analysis of the study of the experience of investment in greenfield IPPs in developing countries. The term "independent power producer" has been used to refer to several types of enterprises, but for this paper, "IPP" refers to a privately developed power plant that sells electricity to a public electricity grid, often under long term contract with a state utility. For this study and report, the lead actors in every IPP are private investors usually foreign, but often with local partners. The classic foreign-sponsored, project-financed IPP has taken root in more than fifty emerging countries that display wide variation in economic, political and social environments. The wide variation in settings for IPPs affords a special opportunity for researchers to probe systematically the critical factors that contribute to outcomes for host countries and for investors.