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Abstract

Mark C. Thurber, David R. Hults

National oil companies (NOCs) often behave in strikingly different ways from one another and from private, international oil companies (IOCs). Given that NOCs control about three-quarters of world oil reserves by equity share, their variation in corporate strategy has important implications for the world oil market. The recently released book Oil and Governance: State-owned Enterprises and the World Energy Supply, which we co-edited (along with our colleague, David Victor) and contributed to, explores the variation among NOCs through 15 detailed case studies and several cross-cutting pieces. Building off the research in that book, our aim in this essay is to discuss the differences among NOCs in their approach to risk

As described by Nolan and Thurber in Chapter 4 of our book, the notion of risk encapsulates both the likelihood of a negative outcome (e.g., of drilling a dry hole) and the loss that such an outcome would entail (e.g., the investment in an exploration well). Risks are pervasive in the oil industry because of the enormous sums of money on the line and the significant uncertainty around whether investments will prove successful. In this article we suggest that the goals of the state and its tools of governance may cause an NOC to tend towards one of three types of behavior: risk avoidance, risk taking, or risk management. Each of these three approaches to risk, we find, can be useful or counterproductive for the state depending on the context.

It can be useful for an NOC to avoid risk, as Sonangol has done, if its government is highly dependent on oil revenue, but this approach usually means that it must allow IOCs to shoulder risks if the oil sector is to thrive. Intelligent risk taking by the NOC, on the other hand, can help build domestic technological capability and may be a reasonable approach if the government has less need to maximize hydrocarbon revenue in the short term. Finally, commercial risk management by the NOC may be an appropriate model where the NOC has developed some competitive advantages and its government has few remaining expectations for the NOC apart from revenue generation. There is no “right” or “wrong” approach to risk for NOCs in a general sense. The goal of each government and its NOC should be to make sure that the way the NOC takes, avoids, or manages risk is of benefit to both the country and the NOC itself.

 

Link to article (free trial subscription available) => http://www.worldoil.com/June-2012-Risk-attitudes-shape-national-oil-company-strategies.html

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World Oil
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Mark C. Thurber
Mark C. Thurber
David Hults
David Hults
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The International Energy Agency has released its flagship publication on global energy markets. PESD research directly contributed to a special section in this year’s outlook focusing on coal.

PESD Working Papers that helped inform the analysis include:

  1. Industrial Organization of the Chinese Coal Industry by Kevin Tu
  2. The Future of South African Coal: Market, Investment, and Policy Challenges by Anton Eberhard
  3. Remaking the World’s Largest Coal Market: The Quest to Develop Large Coal Power Bases in China by Dr. Huaichuan Rui, Richard K. Morse, and Gang He
  4. The World’s Greatest Coal Arbitrage: China’s Coal Import Behavior and Implications for the Global Coal Market by Richard K. Morse and Gang He

 

For more information: http://www.iea.org/weo/

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Mike Cooper
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Platts Coal Trader International
Vol. 11, Issue 67, Pages 5-6

Australia faces serious challenges over the next 20 years in maintaining its hard-won place as a leading coal exporting country and capturing new market share, according to a research paper published by Stanford University's Program on Energy and Sustainable Development April 5.

Following earlier papers on China, Indonesia and South Africa's coal industries, the latest PESD paper, entitled Australia's Black Coal Industry: Past Achievements and Future Challenges, has been written by coal industry expert Bart Lucarelli.

The paper sketches the development of Australia's export coal industry, from its shaky start in the aftermath of the Second World War amid a glut of cheap oil, to the "phenomenal success story" of today.  The renaissance of Australia's coal industry was assisted by the discovery of vast deposits of high-quality coking coal and thermal coal in Queensland's Bowen Basin and the

Hunter Valley of New South Wales respectively, along with new mining technologies and the economic expansions of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, Lucarelli said.

During the Australian coal industry's competitive phase - 1987 to 2003 - export coal prices were relatively stable, but the growth rate of Australia's coal industry slowed as Indonesia became a significant coal exporter.  Since 2003, Australia's coal industry has been in a "volatile price phase," as export coking and thermal coal prices have soared to record highs with the entry of China and latterly India into the international seaborne market, while weather events have affected supplies from coal exporting countries.

Looking to the next 20 years, Lucarelli forecasts serious challenges to the preeminence of Australia's export coal industry in the shape of infrastructure constraints, regulatory risks and under-investment in railways and ports by government-owned companies.  "The most pressing and immediate technical challenge to the black coal industry of Australia is the shortage of rail and port infrastructure to support its further growth," said Lucarelli in the research paper.

‘Chronic infrastructure shortages' Governments in Queensland and New South Wales have proposed projects for expanding their rail and port networks to support a significant increase in Australian coal exports, which are forecast to grow to 540 million mt by 2020 from 240 million mt in 2010.  "Part of the reason that chronic infrastructure shortages are likely to persist has to do with the type of technology being implemented - large rail and fixed land port systems," Lucarelli explained.  Large port and rail projects are required for economies of scale, but involve long lead times, high upfront costs and complex regulatory clearances. 

"A second reason for the chronic shortage of infrastructure has been the reliance on state-owned entities to make the necessary investments in the rail and port systems," Lucarelli said. Government-owned rail and port companies tend to be less nimble and entrepreneurial in their decision-making than the private sector, though some port and rail companies have been privatized recently - most notably Queenslandbased rail company QR National and the port of Brisbane.  Regulatory uncertainty stemming from the Australian government's stop-start policy on curbing carbon emissions and its proposed Mineral Resource Rent Tax on coal-mining profits are additional factors clouding the expansion of Australia's coal industry.  "Potential coal mining projects most at risk due to regulatory uncertainty are the massive new steam coal projects planned for the Galilee, Gunnedah and Surat basins," Lucarelli said.  Illustrating the potential for expansion within Australia's coal industry, Lucarelli said that if only two of the advancedstage projects in the Surat Basin in Queensland started production on schedule, they could add 110 million mt/year of thermal coal exports by 2015.  This is almost as much thermal coal as Australia exported for the whole of 2008, at 115 million mt. 

 

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Frank Wolak
Frank Wolak
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Any mention of climate policy was noticeably missing from President Obama's recent state of the union address. This is unfortunate because every day of inaction on climate policy by the United States government is another day that American consumers must pay substantially higher prices for products derived from crude oil, such as gasoline and diesel fuel. Moreover, a substantial fraction of the revenues from these higher prices goes to governments of countries that the US would prefer not to support.

So, what is the cost of a single day of delay? US crude oil consumption is approximately 20m barrels per day and roughly 12m barrels per day are imported. An oil price that, because of climate policy uncertainty, is $20 a barrel higher than it would otherwise have been implies that US consumers pay $400m per day more, of which $240m per day is paid to foreign oil producers. Dividing these figures by the United States population implies that every US citizen is paying about $1 per day more for oil - and more than half of that may be going to an unfriendly foreign government.

Why does this climate policy price premium exist? It is not due to a dearth of readily available technologies for producing substitutes for conventional oil. A number currently exist that are economic at oil prices significantly below current world prices of $80-90 per barrel. Several even have the potential to scale up to replace a large fraction of US oil consumption.

Tar sands and heavy oils, gas-to-liquids and coal-to-liquids are all available to produce substantial amounts of conventional oil substitutes at average costs at or below $60 per barrel. If these technologies were currently in place throughout the US, the world price of oil would not exceed that price, because any attempt by conventional oil suppliers to raise prices beyond that level would immediately be met by additional supply from producers of oil substitutes.

But if these technologies are financially viable at current world oil prices, then why don't they exist in the US? That's because they require massive up-front expenditures to construct the necessary production facilities. These fixed costs, plus the variable costs of production, must be recovered from sales over the lifetime of the project - and future climate policy can substantially increase the variable costs of these technologies.

Climate policy uncertainty impacts of the economic viability of these technologies because of the increased carbon intensity of the gasoline and diesel fuel substitutes they produce. Almost double the greenhouse gas emissions result per unit of useful energy produced and consumed relative to conventional oil. Therefore, if the US decided to set a significant price for carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions at some future date, either through a cap-and-trade mechanism or carbon fee, investors in these technologies would immediately realise a massive loss - because they would have to pay the price fixed for all of the CO2 emissions that result from producing and consuming these oil substitutes.

To understand this point, suppose that a technology exists to convert coal to an oil substitute that is financially viable at an oil price of $60 per barrel and that this technology produces double the CO2 per unit of useful energy relative to oil. At a $90 per barrel oil price, this technology could be unprofitable for a modest price of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions because of its substantially higher carbon intensity. For instance, at a $100 per ton price of CO2 emissions - which is roughly twice the highest price observed in the European Union's emissions permit trading scheme - the total cost per barrel of oil equivalent, including the cost of the additional emissions, could easily exceed $90 per barrel.

A solution to this investment impasse is a stable, predictable price of carbon into the distant future. Although there is currently a regional cap and trade mechanism for CO2 emissions in the Northeast US, permit prices in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) have been extremely modest - less than $5 per ton of CO2. California also plans to implement a cap-and-trade mechanism in 2012. No significant coal-mining activity takes place in the participating RGGI states or in California. But such regional cap-and-trade programmes are unlikely to set prices for CO2 emissions for a long enough time and with sufficient certainty to encourage investment in facilities to produce conventional oil substitutes. In other words, despite regional experiments with cap-and-trade, it is the national climate policy uncertainty that remains the major factor in preventing these investments.

If prospective investors in the major fossil fuel-producing regions of the US knew the cost of the CO2 emissions associated with these alternative technologies over the lifetime of each alternative fuel project, they would be able to decide which projects are likely to be financially viable at that carbon price. Particularly for coal-to-liquids, much of this investment would take place in the US because of the massive amount of available domestic coal reserves. This investment would also provide much-needed new domestic high-wage jobs.

New sources of supply of conventional oil substitutes would reduce oil prices, create new jobs in the United States and reduce the amount of money sent to governments, whose interests are counter to the US. Finally, this price of carbon would raise much-needed revenues for the US government and stimulate investment in lower carbon energy sources, such as wind, solar and biofuels. A modest, yet stable long-term price of carbon might even stimulate so much investment in conventional oil substitutes and low-carbon energy sources that the long-term net effect of this carbon price could be lower average energy prices across all sources.

The investments in these technologies need not result in higher aggregate CO2 emissions. For example, coal-to-liquids produces a concentrated CO2 emissions stream that is ideally suited to the deployment of carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) technology. Consequently, a carbon price high enough to make CCS financially viable, yet reasonable enough to make this technology competitive with conventional oil, would address both concerns.

If there are concerns that committing to a modest carbon price may be insufficient to address climate concerns, this commitment could be stipulated only for investment projects initiated within a certain time window. The US government could reserve the right to increase this CO2 emissions price for projects initiated after that period. This logic has not escaped the Chinese government, where General Electric and Shenhua, a major Chinese coal producer, recently announced a joint coal gasification project, which is financially viable because the Chinese government can provide the necessary climate policy certainty.

The choice is stark: either we can continue to wait to implement the perfect climate policy, and in the meantime pay higher prices for oil, and watch countries like China that are able to provide climate policy certainty to investors move forward with this new industrial development; or we could commit to a modest climate policy and so unleash the new technologies and new jobs made possible by this more favourable investment environment.

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Executive Summary

Natural gas can offer substantial environmental, energy security, and convenience advantages over competing fuels such as coal and oil.   Gas is relatively abundant in the world, but the adoption and use of gas are hindered by its requirement for costly transport infrastructure. Because the pipelines or liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities for moving gas are expensive to construct, investors depend on many years of reliable operation to recover their upfront capital outlays. Moreover, as gas cannot be stored as easily or cheaply as oil, governments must ensure that these expensive pipelines and LNG facilities will find consumers who are willing to pay prices for gas sufficient to enable long-term cost recovery. Bringing new gas to market thus means solving a high-stakes coordination problem that spans the upstream (development of the gas field itself), midstream (construction of transport infrastructure), and downstream (provision of gas to end use customers and ensuring consumer demand) parts of the gas value chain.

In their use of price subsidies to stimulate domestic gas demand, governments have in a number of cases deterred the development of gas supply and created shortages. At the same time, full price liberalization tends to face political resistance from domestic consumers of gas. Some governments have finessed this issue by creating markets with both planned and liberalized components.   Another challenge faced by gas-rich governments is how to mitigate risks faced by both prospective gas suppliers and prospective gas consumers in a nascent market, especially given the need to build and pay for costly gas transport infrastructure. In this paper, we discuss ways that governments can manage a delicate balancing act on gas, providing a predictable investment climate and regulatory framework to foreign investors while at the same time developing and serving a robust domestic market for gas. 

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Joe Chang
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As the world's fifth largest coal exporter and a key swing supplier between the Atlantic and Pacific coal markets, South Africa is a crucial player in global markets.  While the country has long been Europe's major supplier of coal, South African exports have begun to shift east and are steadily becoming a major source of coal supply for the Asian coal boom.  This strategic positioning sets the stage for South Africa to become an even more important player in determining how the world trades and prices coal. 

In the coming decade South Africa will face a number of difficult decisions around how to meet increasing domestic coal demand while dealing with climate concerns, increasing exports, and building the infrastructure that would enable the country to significantly expand market share in the global coal trade.  In many ways, the fate of South Africa's coal sector now hangs in the balance.

This paper explores the interplay between South Africa's domestic and export thermal coal markets and what might shape their development in the future. The paper first examines the industrial organisation and political-economy of the coal sector in South Africa.  An overview is provided of coal mining companies, how the current market structure emerged historically, the development of rail and port facilities, and coal costs and prices. Policy and legislative developments are also described. Finally scenarios are developed for local and export coal markets.

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Anton Eberhard
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The world watches closely as China, the world's top energy consumer, announces its plans for the next five years: a series of comprehensive economic reform, development, and transformation guidelines that will shape how the country - and to a large extent the world - uses energy and addresses climate change.

How will China balance economic growth with environmental concerns? How will it manage its transformation from an investment-based and export-led economy to one having a robust domestic demand, all the while ensuring energy efficiency and sustainability? And what role will China play in developing renewable and clean tech solutions for the rest of the world? These are questions that have a profound impact on the world energy and climate landscape for years to come.

In this EWG discussion, we will highlight some of the proposed energy, efficiency and climate goals and policies, look back on China's progress and challenges in achieving its last five-year plan, and consider broader implications on the road ahead.

Stanford University

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China's coal market is now in the midst of a radical restructuring that has the potential to change how coal is produced, traded and consumed both in China and the rest of the world.  The restructuring aims to integrate the coal and power sectors at giant "coal-power bases" that combined would churn out more coal annually than all the coal produced in the entire United States. 

Coal-power integration is now a focal point of the Chinese government's energy policy, driven by the dramatic "coal-power conflict".  Coal prices are market-based, but power prices are tightly controlled by the government.  This has caused massive losses for Chinese power generators in 2008 and 2010 and triggered government intervention in the coal market with attempts to cap the price of coal.  The pervasive conflict between coal and power is now driving the Chinese government to remake these markets.

Coal-power base policy aims to establish upwards of 14 major coal-power bases, each producing over 100 mt of coal with consuming industries on-site.  The plan envisions that roughly half of China's coal production would be produced at a handful major coal-power base sites that are controlled by key state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the central government.    

PESD's new research analyzes China's coal-power base reforms and how they will impact Chinese and global coal markets.  Several key findings are:

First, the implementation of coal-power bases would enhance central government's control over the coal sector and over coal prices.  The government could control coal pricing in a large share of the market and mitigate power sector losses by mandating lower coal transaction prices within integrated SOEs.  Using this kind of internal transfer pricing at below market prices for up to half of China's coal would represent a meaningful shift in how coal is priced in China.  If a large share of China's coal were transacted in this manner, it might create an unofficial two-tiered pricing structure in the coal market.

Second, coal-power base policy would bring about modernization and mechanization of a larger share of China's coal production, in theory bringing larger economies of scale to the sector.  While up-front capital investment per ton produced will certainly increase, the marginal cost of coal production should decrease, all other things equal. 

Third, the massive rebalancing of China's coal market implied by coal-power bases is poised to have important impacts on the globally traded coal market.  Since 2009, China's import behavior has become a dominant factor determining the price of globally traded coal.  In simple terms, when Chinese domestic prices are higher than global prices, the country imports.  The development of coal-power bases could radically alter coal price formation in China and directly impact China's appetite for imports, and therefore has the potential to alter coal price formation globally.

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Richard K. Morse
Gang He
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PESD Director Frank Wolak spoke at the 3-day City Leader Program event on Thursday, September 9th which gathered 50 cities' mayors from China.  Frank Wolak presented on the topic of Visionary & Executive Leadership: Investment Management & Decision Making for Future Economic Development with a presentation titled "Managing an Increasing Renewable Generation Share Through Active Demand-Side Participation".

This year's event was hosted in collaboration with Cisco and held on Stanford campus.

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Wolak spoke at the 3-day City Leader Program event on Thursday, September 9th which gathered 50 cities' mayors from China.  Frank Wolak presented on the topic of Visionary & Executive Leadership: Investment Management & Decision Making for Future Economic Development with a presentation titled "Managing an Increasing Renewable Generation Share Through Active Demand-Side Participation".

This year's event was hosted in collaboration with Cisco and held on Stanford campus.

The Jerry Yang and Akiko Yamazaki Environment and Energy Building

Stanford University
Economics Department
579 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford, CA 94305-6072

(650) 724-1712 (650) 724-1717
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Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Holbrook Working Professor of Commodity Price Studies in Economics
Senior Fellow, by courtesy, at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research
frank_wolak_033.jpg
MS, PhD

Frank A. Wolak is a Professor in the Department of Economics at Stanford University. His fields of specialization are Industrial Organization and Econometric Theory. His recent work studies methods for introducing competition into infrastructure industries -- telecommunications, electricity, water delivery and postal delivery services -- and on assessing the impacts of these competition policies on consumer and producer welfare. He is the Chairman of the Market Surveillance Committee of the California Independent System Operator for electricity supply industry in California. He is a visiting scholar at University of California Energy Institute and a Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).

Professor Wolak received his Ph.D. and M.S. from Harvard University and his B.A. from Rice University.

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