FSI scholars approach their research on the environment from regulatory, economic and societal angles. The Center on Food Security and the Environment weighs the connection between climate change and agriculture; the impact of biofuel expansion on land and food supply; how to increase crop yields without expanding agricultural lands; and the trends in aquaculture. FSE’s research spans the globe – from the potential of smallholder irrigation to reduce hunger and improve development in sub-Saharan Africa to the devastation of drought on Iowa farms. David Lobell, a senior fellow at FSI and a recipient of a MacArthur “genius” grant, has looked at the impacts of increasing wheat and corn crops in Africa, South Asia, Mexico and the United States; and has studied the effects of extreme heat on the world’s staple crops.
Hisham Zerriffi
Liu Institute for Global Issues
6476 NW Marine Dr.
Vancouver BC V6T 1Z2
Hisham Zerriffi is an Assistant Professor and the Ivan Head South/North Research Chair in the Liu Institute for Global Issues at the University of British Columbia. Prior to joining the UBC Faculty, Dr. Zerriffi was a Postdoctoral Fellow with the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development. At PESD, he led a new project on the role of institutions in the deployment and diffusion of small-scale energy technologies. The centerpiece of this on-going study is a comparative analysis of different organizational and business models used to provide rural electricity on a local level.
Dr. Zerriffi received his Ph.D. from the Engineering and Public Policy Department at Carnegie Mellon University. His dissertation, "Electric Power Systems Under Stress: An Evaluation of Centralized Versus Distributed System Architectures" examined the reliability and economic implications of implementing large-scale distributed energy systems as a way to mitigate the effects of persistent stress on electric power systems. He has a B.A. in Physics (with minors in Political Science and Religion) from Oberlin College, Oberlin, OH and a Masters of Applied Science in Chemistry from McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada. Before joining CMU he was a Senior Scientist at the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research.
Council on Foreign Relations publishes new book on America's climate change policy
Climate change is one of the most complex problems on today's policy agenda. Serious efforts to control the emissions that cause global warming will require societies to incur costs now while the uncertain benefits accrue in the distant future. Climate Change: Debating America's Policy Options, provides a balanced and comprehensive account of the issues involved in climate change policy. Written by David G. Victor, a leading expert on environmental policy, this report is an unmatched teaching tool that can be used by educators, students, journalists, policymakers, and interested citizens to galvanize serious debate. Seeking to raise public awareness about the complexities of climate change, Victor presents three alternative policy options in the form of presidential speeches, along with a memo that explains the multidimensional nature of this critical issue. You can link to the Council on Foreign Relations website and read the entire book below.
Electricity reform in South Africa is at a critical juncture, says Anton Eberhard
South Africa will experience routine electricity blackouts in a few years unless new electricity policy and investment decisions are formulated and implemented this year.
This is the inexorable conclusion that emerges from scenario and modelling exercises undertaken separately by the National Electricity Regulator, Eskom and large energy-intensive industries.
Growing electricity demand will outstrip existing national supply capacity next year or the year thereafter, assuming a prudent reserve margin to allow for maintenance and unscheduled plant shutdowns.
Hydro-electricity imports, mainly Cahora Bassa in Mozambique, will provide respite for about another year. Thereafter, we need further generation capacity or significant energy savings and demand-side measures.
Eskom has started re-commissioning old moth-balled coal-fired power stations to meet this challenge. Camden, the first plant, will be relatively easy to re-commission and work has commenced. Grootvlei will be more difficult and Komati, the last plant that Eskom plans to re-commission, will be the most uncertain and expensive.
If successful, these old generating stations will give us a breather until around 2008. And then we need new generation capacity.
2008 might seem years away, but investment decisions, environmental impact assessments, plant construction and commissioning take many years. For a hydro-electric or pumped storage scheme, this could take ten years. A coal-fired power station could take six years or more, and gas turbines - two to four years.
If our economy grows faster, or we are not able to implement effective demand-side measures, new power generation capacity might be needed even earlier.
Government is aware of this situation. The President confirmed, in his state of the nation address in parliament in May, that a tender for new capacity will be awarded early in 2005.
The Department of Minerals and Energy has appointed technical advisors to prepare and manage this tender. However, their work schedule indicates that the contract with a new Independent Power Producer will only be concluded early in 2006, and this will only happen if the bid manages to comply with National Treasury's Public Private Partnership regulations. The DME will have to show that Eskom cannot build a new plant more cheaply - an interesting possibility given Eskom's competitive cost of capital and the potential for transfer-pricing with its current portfolio of extremely low-cost generating plant.
Given these tight time constraints, it is not unlikely that we shall have to resort to buying, on an emergency basis, a series of highly expensive, paraffin-burning open-cycle gas turbines.
There is a dangerous assumption that the current tender process for new generation capacity answers concerns about supply security. It does not.
The challenge is not only to manage the current tender process within tight time-constraints. We need to make decisions this year about procuring much more capacity than the approximately 1000 MW anticipated in the current tender.
A likely planning scenario indicates that this year, 2004, we need to make investment decisions on a new pumped-storage scheme, a new pulverised coal-fired plant and a green-field coal fluidized-bed combustor or a combined-cycle gas turbine. In short, we need to start placing orders for a range of new power plant. In ensuing years we shall need to continue to order new plant.
These challenges raise the question of whether a part-time committee of government officials, assisted by consultants, is the most appropriate and sustainable mechanism to continue to procure new power? It also provokes debate about what market structure is appropriate to encourage the most efficient and cost-effective investment decisions?
Following the 1998 While Paper on Energy Policy, and a number of subsequent studies, Cabinet decided, in May 2001, to restructure the power sector by unbundling Eskom's electricity transmission division into an independent company and selling-off 30% of Eskom's generation plants. New capacity would be provided by private investors and an electricity trading market would be established comprising a power exchange and a parallel market for bilateral power contracts and financial hedges. None of this happened.
What is emerging is a quite different market model. In her budget speech, the Minister of Minerals and Energy stated that "the state has to put security of supply above all and above competition especially". The Minister of Public Enterprises has indicated that Eskom will not be privatised and that a strong state-owned utility is important for social and economic development.
Eskom is thus likely to continue to dominate the market. It may even be permitted to build new generation plant. Private sector investment will be permitted only on the margins in the form of Independent Power Producers. They will sign long-term power purchase agreements with Eskom (or with an independent transmission company or system operator, if these are eventually separated form Eskom).
Government will now need to clarify whether the emerging market model for the electricity sector is its preferred model or is merely a temporary measure to secure emergency supplied. This is not a trivial question - for it strikes at the heart of the cost and efficiency issues in the power sector, and will have long-term consequences for electricity prices in this country.
Few remember the controversial electricity price-hikes by Eskom in the late 1970s and 1980s when it made investment mistakes that resulted in huge unused power generation capacity. History demonstrates the potential weaknesses of the old industry model where state-owned monopoly utilities simply pass the costs of poor investment decisions to consumers.
The current tender process is also full of risk. A small number of officials and technical advisors will decide how much new power is needed, using which fuel sources, when and where. While a degree of (once-off) competition might be possible through the tender bids, long-term power purchase agreements could tie-up non-competitive electricity prices for decades.
Plans for a new market structure, where investors have to compete to sell their power in a power exchange or a contract market, have been sacrificed in the face of security of supply concerns.
Periods of supply uncertainty and shortages are never a good time to design and implement new competitive market structures. The long period of large capacity surpluses that provided a window of opportunity for major reform has disappeared. Now we have to patch the current system and prepare for the future.
The default IPP/ single-buyer model that is emerging now requires the establishment of a robust and sustainable institutional structure (probably best attached to the power system operator) that will be responsible for long term planning, security of supply and procurement of generation capacity.
We can avoid future black-outs. But we need to act now.
Energy Policy Reforms and Agriculture in India: A General Equilibrium Exploration
This workshop was held as part of an ongoing study by IRADe and PESD to extend a general equilibrium model of the Indian economy to determine the impact of energy and agricultural policies on agricultural prices and production.
New Dehli, INDIA
State-Level Electricity Reforms: Impacts on Technology, Institutions and Environment
Inaugural workshop of the joint IIM/A-Stanford study on electricity sector reforms in India.
Indian Institute of Management/Ahmedabad, INDIA
A new currency--carbon credits--are emerging, write David Victor and Joshua House
In an article in the Harvard International Review, David Victor and Joshua House give an overview of carbon credits and describe the implications.
August 2004 Workshop on Energy Transitions
This conference was convened by the Energy Research Centre (ERC) at the University of Cape Town and the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development (PESD) at Stanford University. Held at the University of Cape Town, it took stock of what is known about the impact of modern energy services on the poor. The workshop focused mainly on the South African experience, but within the context of several other studies taking shape in countries such as China and India. It brought together invited experts from academia, government and industry to share research findings and potential future research direction was mapped.
University of Cape Town, South Africa
Nadejda M. Victor
Dr. Nadejda Victor
Sr. Associate
Technology & Management Services, Inc.
U.S. Department of Energy
National Energy Technology Laboratory
PO Box 10940, MS 922-178C
Pittsburgh, PA 15236-0940
Nadejda Makarova Victor is a Research Fellow at the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development at Stanford University. Her current research efforts focus on the political and economic implications of the shift to natural gas, the role of Russia in world oil and gas markets, and analysis of the different technologies of H2 production, storage and transportation. In addition, Dr. Victor is involved with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) study on Energy and Sustainable Development evaluation. She is also consulting at IIASA, where she focuses on economic development indicators and the long-lasting debate over SRES emissions scenarios.
Previously, Dr. Victor was a Research Associate in the Economics Department at Yale University under Prof. William Nordhaus, where she developed a new spatially referenced economic database. At the same time she was involved in research at the Program for the Human Environment at Rockefeller University. There she analyzed the technical changes bearing on the environment, rates and patterns of technical change in the information and computer industries, and R&D in the energy sector.
Before she moved to the U.S. in 1998, Dr. Victor was a Research Scholar at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg, Austria. Her IIASA research included analysis of the long-term development of economic & energy systems, energy modeling at regional and global scales, scenarios of infrastructure financing, trade in energy carriers and environmental impacts. She had extensive collaboration with international organizations, including the World Energy Council (WEC) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). She holds a Ph.D. and a B.A. in Economics from Moscow State University.
In op-ed, Victor and House advocate independent management of U.S. oil reserve
STANFORD -- With oil prices heading toward $50 a barrel, what would happen if the markets really blew?
Ever since the late 1970s, Washington's answer to such an event has relied on oil stockpiled mainly by the federal government, to be released if market instability warranted it. Today, the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve contains 666 million barrels -- nearly 65 days of imports -- worth nearly $30 billion at current prices. Our industrialized allies have similar stocks, India has started one and China, whose oil imports are rising rapidly, is expected to create a reserve soon. Through the International Energy Agency in Paris, the major oil importers have agreed, in principle, to coordinate their stockpiles.
Unfortunately, reserves in the United States and most democracies are nearly feckless as a policy instrument. The legislation that created the U.S. reserve gave the power to buy and sell stocks to a federal agency, now the Department of Energy, that, in effect, passes the decision on to the president. White House control automatically converts every key decision into a highly political act.
In July 2000, President Clinton's order to transfer some strategic reserves to fill a newly created Northeast Home Heating Oil Reserve had obvious political implications for Al Gore's presidential bid. In 1996, Congress required the sale of more than $220 million of stockpiled oil to help pay down the budget deficit, another political move, though one that, in hindsight, looked wise when oil prices tanked two years later.
The uncertainty of reliable production in Russia and Iraq, coupled with the general threat of new terrorist attacks, makes for many worrisome scenarios. But a cloud of political suspicion would hang over any management decision. If President Bush released stockpiled oil to stabilize prices in an election year, no matter how justified his action, he surely would be accused of political pandering. And if he rightly refused to release oil because speculative trading doesn't meet the standard of "severe energy supply interruption," as called for in the 1975 legislation setting up the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, would he face charges that he was rewarding his oil buddies with record profits?
One way to take the politics out of governing the Strategic Petroleum Reserve would be to mechanize decision-making, such as by setting a price trigger for sales and fills. President Reagan's Council of Economic Advisors, among others, considered this option and wisely demurred. In the 1980s, the international spot market for oil was not fully developed; prices were mainly driven by opaque long-term contracts, not market dynamics. Price triggers act similarly to price controls, increasing the risk of creating true scarcities in oil supply. Such automatic triggers would have smoothed small gyrations in the oil market but failed when most needed to dampen large price swings.
There's a better way: independent management of the strategic reserve. In contrast to an automatic mechanism, an independent authority would be able to detect subtle economic and political shifts that determine our true vulnerability to oil shocks. More important, such an authority would depoliticize Strategic Petroleum Reserve decision-making, which would enable us to use the stockpile for its originally intended purpose of providing a credible bulwark against the most severe chaos in oil markets.
The president could create an independent board to manage the reserve within existing legislation, but that would not completely remove a political taint. New legislation would better accomplish the job. Congress and the president should look to the Federal Reserve as a model. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve needs its own resources, with politicians supplying broad guidelines for action and periodic review rather than direct control. Such a change would not only affect the United States but would also require remaking the International Energy Agency into something closer to a central bankers' forum.
New management for America's oil reserve would spark new thinking about the optimal size and operation of strategic stocks. Until now, most public debate has focused on the reserve's size. The International Energy Agency suggests that its member countries keep a petroleum stockpile roughly equivalent to 90 days of domestic consumption. In truth, the optimal size of strategic reserves is not a single quantity but depends on political and economic conditions. A competent independent authority would make it possible to carry a smaller stockpile -- at lower cost. Because today's oil prices are formed in highly liquid markets, the standard of "severe supply interruption" is largely meaningless. The better standard is our willingness to absorb price shocks. For that there is no simple answer, yet independent economic authorities can make the wisest choices.
More than 30 years after our first oil shock, the Strategic Petroleum Reserve still wears polyester and bell-bottoms. A dose of market reform and political independence can bring its fashion up to date and create a truly useful tool for protecting the U.S. economy.