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Much existing literature champions renewables implementation on India’s Sagar Island as an unqualified rural electrification success story.  Photovoltaic (PV) and wind systems put in place by the West Bengal Renewable Energy Development Agency (WBREDA) have clearly brought benefits to many of the island’s residents. 

The highly-touted community management system governing the projects has been successful at instilling local pride and overcoming the traditionally thorny problem of tariff non-collection.  At the same time, an on-the-ground look at the Sagar Island experience identifies some deeper liabilities of the business model guiding the renewables projects.  Two of the ostensible strengths of the Sagar Island implementation – the harmonious tariff collection associated with community management and the resources, competence, and assertiveness of WBREDA itself – can at the same time be considered weaknesses limiting the scope, sustainability, and replicability of the projects. 

This working paper considers these questions through a case study of a typical Sagar Island facility, the Mritunjoynagar PV power plant.  It finds that Mritunjoynagar’s inability to recoup its full operating and maintenance costs by providing appropriate incentives for profit maximization limits the expansion of the project and threatens its long-term sustainability, or at least the relevance of its business model in the absence of a highly-visible champion like WBREDA to ensure continued support.  For WBREDA and other agencies to sustain and replicate similar projects—and their attendant benefits—throughout India, they must adjust their economic model, as WBREDA is beginning to implicitly acknowledge in exploring a franchise model for future efforts.

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Program on Energy and Sustainable Development Working Paper #77
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Sam Shrank
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David G. Victor
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David G. Victor is a professor at Stanford Law School and directs the Freeman Spogli Institute's Program on Energy & Sustainable Development; he is also adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

What to do about Mexico's oil company, Pemex, may seem like a parochial issue of interest only to Mexicans and a few oil industry executives. But the matter should be of concern to anybody who is wondering when oil will come down off its near-record highs.

Pemex generates two fifth's of the Mexican government's income and is a lucrative employer, but it is ailing from neglect. For years the government has milked Pemex of cash without giving it the wherewithal to invest in and develop new sources of oil. When President Felipe Calderon proposed last week to reform Pemex and encourage more private investment in oil exploration and refining, his leftist opponents shut down the country's legislature in protest. Pemex, they claimed, is a cherished national treasure that must not be pushed into private hands.

Mexico is hardly the only country that treats its state oil companies as ATMs for governments, unions, cronies and others who siphon the rich benefits for themselves. A large fraction of the world's oil patch is struggling with the problem that bedevils Calderon: how to make state-owned oil companies (which control about three quarters of the world's oil reserves) more effective at finding and producing oil. Veneuzuela's oil output is flagging. Russia's state-owned gas company, Gazprom, is on the edge of a steep decline in production. And in different ways many of the world's state-owned oil companies are struggling to keep pace with rising demand. Simply privatizing them is politically difficult, and thus most of the world's oil-rich governments are struggling to find ways to make state enterprises perform better.

Even among state oil companies, Pemex's performance is notably poor. Used as a cash cow for the government, Pemex has never been able to keep enough of its profits to invest in exploration and better technology, the lifeblood of the best oil companies. Until a few years ago, Pemex invested essentially nothing in looking for new oil fields. It relied, instead, on the aging Cantarell field, which was discovered in the 1970s not by Pemex but by fisherman who were angry that the seeping oil was fouling their nets and assumed that Pemex was to blame. Pemex brought the massive field online with relatively simple technology. A scheme in the late 1990s extended the life of the field, but that effort has run out of steam. On the back of Cantarell's decline, total output from Pemex is sliding; some even worry that Mexico could become a net importer of oil in the next decade or two. They're probably wrong, but even the idea makes people nervous.

At times over the last few decades (including today) Pemex has been blessed with a dream team of smart managers, but even they have not been able to reverse the tide of red ink. That's because the company's troubles run so deep that even the best management can't fix them. Indeed, the most striking thing about Calderon's proposed reforms is that they don't go nearly far enough to make Pemex a responsive company, even though they are on the outer edge of what's probably politically feasible in Mexico.

For example, Calderon proposes a new system of "citizen bonds" that will help bring capital to the company (and because they would be owned by the public, these bonds would help blunt the legal block to any reform—Mexico's Constitution requires that its hydrocarbons be owned by the people). Money alone, though, won't reverse Pemex's fortunes. Part of the problem is that risk taking, which is essential to success in oil, is strongly discouraged. My colleagues at Stanford, in a study released last week, have shown that a system of tough laws that control procurement make managers wary of projects that could fail. Although such laws are designed to help stamp out corruption, a noble goal, they are administered by parts of the Mexican government that know little about the risky nature of the oil business.

Pemex's ability to control its own investment capital is probably more important to its success than anything else. The firm, though, has been hobbled because the government keeps all profits for use in the federal budget and the finance ministry has the final word on all Pemex investments. Solving that problem would require distancing government from the oil company. Given that the government is dependent on Pemex cash, that is politically risky. In fact, the real foundation for Calderon's reforms announced last week actually happened long ago when he first took office and spearheaded an effort to change Mexico's tax system. Much of the Mexican economy doesn't pay taxes to the government, which explains why its need for cash from Pemex is particularly desperate. Those tax reforms, however, are too modest to make a fundamental difference in the government's dependence on Pemex.

Calderon's reforms seem unlikely to solve the politically hardest task: reigning in the Pemex workers' union, which favors projects that generate jobs and benefits for its members. The union is well-connected to Mexico's left-leaning political parties, which helps explain why those same parties are so wary of "privatization." In fact, Calderon's proposals would not privatize the companies, but the union and the left know that cry will rally the people to prevent change.

Elsewhere in the world a thicket of similar, interlocking problems loom over the oil patch. Kuwait has a procurement system much like Mexico's, with a similarly perverse effect on the incentives for workers in that country's oil company to take risks and perform at world standard. Even in Brazil, whose state oil company is one of the best performing, has a hard time keeping the government at bay when it comes to taxing oil output. Two massive new oil finds over the last six months have kindled discussions in Brazil about raising the tax rate and channeling ever more of the oil output for government purposes. In Venezuela, where Chavez has taken a good oil company and run it into the ground, the burden of public projects is so great that the oil company can no longer focus on actually producing oil efficiently, and production is in decline.

The odds are that Calderon will make some reforms but won't transform Pemex. And that outcome, multiplied through state-owned oil companies around the world, suggests that oil output will increase only sluggishly. With demand still strong, oil prices are set to stay high for some time.

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Russia's Gazprom is among the largest companies in the world, and by far the world's largest producer of natural gas, with close to a 20% share. Driven by its political masters, it continues to consolidate control over Russia's vast oil and (especially) gas resources, and many Western observers are worried by its international expansion into downstream assets. In a new study of the energy giant, Nadejda Victor details the ways in which Gazprom's actions are distorted by political demands and by the inefficiency of the Russian economy, suggesting that it is headed for a production crisis if business and investment considerations don't start to take a higher priority.
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Since 2002, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has dramatically reshaped the national oil company, PDVSA, to align it with his goals. PESD researcher David Hults probes current-day PDVSA through three lenses: as a large and growing source of government income, as an instrument of state objectives, and on the merits of its business plan.
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Seeking to electrify the world as a charity venture is counterproductive, argues PESD affiliate faculty Hisham Zerriffi. What's needed is close attention to which electrification business models actually yield sustainable results, a question Zerriffi tackles in detail through case studies of Brazil, Cambodia, and China.
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Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), the national oil company (NOC) of Venezuela, is a major energy producer. Vertically integrated, the company conducts large-scale domestic exploration and production activities in both oil and natural gas, operates domestic and international refining facilities, and sells gasoline products to consumers both at home and abroad.

The Venezuelan government has relied on PDVSA to fund and implement a heavily interventionist strategy with several aims. The influx of large hydrocarbon revenues has funded Venezuelan government projects to improve social conditions, particularly for the poor. These revenues have also enabled the government to cement patronage networks and nationalize those economic sectors that might otherwise threaten its rule.

This study provides a descriptive account of how the company operates under the considerable mandates of the Venezuelan state including a brief history of PDVSA, chronicling its development from nationalization, a snapshot of PDVSA as a company today, describing its production, refining, and other operations. Following these preliminaries, the study concentrates on PDVSA's framework today, suggesting three models: PDVSA as a government revenue-provider, implementer of political objectives, and viable business. The paper also outlines PDVSA's role as an important revenuecollecting actor for the Venezuelan government and how PDVSA has become an implementing agent for the state, delivering revenues to government-selected beneficiaries and making business decisions in support of government objectives. Finally, the paper addresses PDVSA as a business.

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Program on Energy and Sustainable Development Working Paper #70
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David Hults

Program on Energy and Sustainable Development
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Research Associate

Ngai-Chi Chung manages PESD's efforts on investigating the developing industry of carbon storage. His focus is on investigating the commercial viability of carbon storage projects and the business models, and the management of financial and regulatory risks behind the carbon storage projects.

Ngai-Chi Chung joined PESD in October 2007. He has a B.S. with distinction in Civil Engineering and a M.S. in Management Science and Engineering from Stanford University. He has worked as an Associate Consultant for Marakon Associates, with client experience including a major U.S. automotive manufacturer and a major European energy utility.

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Despite over a century of investment in electric power systems, there are roughly 1.6 billion people who lack access to electricity service, mainly in rural areas. While there are some open questions regarding the precise cause and effect relationships between rural electrification and human welfare, it is generally considered an important social, economic, and political priority to provide electricity to all.

Rural electrification is a challenging task because it involves delivery of a service to populations that are remote and dispersed and whose consumption is low. This means it is generally more expensive while at the same time the customer base is generally poorer and less able to pay the full cost of service. Combine these factors with utilities that are often poorly managed and have limited finances, and it is often not feasible to expect extension of the grid to unserved rural populations in the near future. Such conditions are also challenging for the development of new renewable energy technology markets.

This paper discusses the role that electricity plays in the development process and its importance in rural areas; the contest between centralized and distributed solutions and their relative competitiveness; the previous experience and research on distributed generation and which business models fare successful; and broader lessons that can be extracted from the work.

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Program on Energy and Sustainable Development Working Paper #63
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Hisham Zerriffi
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The BP Foundation has awarded a five-year, $7.5 million grant to Stanford University's Program on Energy and Sustainable Development to support research on modern energy markets. The foundation is funded by BP, one of the world's largest energy companies.

The gift follows the BP Foundation's initial grant of $1.8 million over three years, which was pledged in 2004 in support of the program.

"BP's support has allowed our program to study the world's most pressing energy problems, such as global warming, energy poverty and the prospects for the world oil market," said program director and Stanford law Professor David G. Victor. "In addition to BP Foundation support, we learn from BP's experience as an energy company because they operate in all the markets where we do research--such as in China and India."

"BP Foundation believes the work undertaken at Stanford deals directly with global issues that are key to meeting the world's growing energy needs," said Steve Elbert, chairman of the BP Foundation. "The drive to research and implement strategies to further understand today's energy markets is important work, and we are proud to partner again with Stanford."

The Program on Energy and Sustainable Development, part of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, concentrates on the legal, political and institutional dimensions of how societies derive value from energy. The BP Foundation grant is part of a rapid expansion of Stanford's research and teaching on energy issues, much of which focuses on the technical aspects of energy systems.

All of the program's research is public and published openly, including on its website. The gift from the BP Foundation, as well as all similar gifts to support the program's research, includes special provisions that assure the research program's independence in setting its research agenda.

The agreement with Stanford is one in a series of BP partnerships with universities in the United Kingdom, the United States and China, representing a total commitment of more than $600 million. The program at Stanford complements work on similar topics at Princeton University, Tsinghua University and Imperial College, among others.

Founded in 2001, the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development focuses on the "political economy" of modern energy services--the interaction of political, institutional and economic forces that often dominate energy markets. It collaborates with the Stanford Law School and other university departments and schools, including economics, engineering and earth sciences. About half of the program's resources are devoted to research partnerships in key developing countries, including Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa. Program researchers have examined the emergence of a global business in natural gas, reforms of electric power markets and the supply of modern energy services to low-income rural households in developing countries.

The program's other major sponsor is the Electric Power Research Institute in Palo Alto, Calif., a research consortium that includes most of the world's largest electric companies.

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