International Development

FSI researchers consider international development from a variety of angles. They analyze ideas such as how public action and good governance are cornerstones of economic prosperity in Mexico and how investments in high school education will improve China’s economy.

They are looking at novel technological interventions to improve rural livelihoods, like the development implications of solar power-generated crop growing in Northern Benin.

FSI academics also assess which political processes yield better access to public services, particularly in developing countries. With a focus on health care, researchers have studied the political incentives to embrace UNICEF’s child survival efforts and how a well-run anti-alcohol policy in Russia affected mortality rates.

FSI’s work on international development also includes training the next generation of leaders through pre- and post-doctoral fellowships as well as the Draper Hills Summer Fellows Program.

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PESD Affiliate Mark Howells, along with Joe Aldy and Leo Schrattenholzer, have edited a special issue of the journal Energy Policy on the role of energy in Africa's social and economic development. The issue includes papers that examine an African interaction with the rest of the planet's liquid fuels market, the effect of various drivers on energy and technology transitions within Africa, as well as new quantitative models for projecting aspects of those energy transitions.
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Hisham Zerriffi
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Small scale power generation technologies (distributed generation) have the potential to significantly contribute to solving the rural electricity access problem in the developing world. This paper presents results from case studies in Brazil (part of a larger three country study) and shows that differences in business models and the influence of institutions are important factors for understanding success and failure in rural electrification and the contribution rural electrification can play in rural development. 

 

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Sam Shrank
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Much existing literature champions renewables implementation on India’s Sagar Island as an unqualified rural electrification success story.  Photovoltaic (PV) and wind systems put in place by the West Bengal Renewable Energy Development Agency (WBREDA) have clearly brought benefits to many of the island’s residents.

 

The highly-touted community management system governing the projects has been successful at instilling local pride and overcoming the traditionally thorny problem of tariff non-collection.  At the same time, an on-the-ground look at the Sagar Island experience identifies some deeper liabilities of the business model guiding the renewables projects.  Two of the ostensible strengths of the Sagar Island implementation – the harmonious tariff collection associated with community management and the resources, competence, and assertiveness of WBREDA itself – can at the same time be considered weaknesses limiting the scope, sustainability, and replicability of the projects. 

This working paper considers these questions through a case study of a typical Sagar Island facility, the Mritunjoynagar PV power plant.  It finds that Mritunjoynagar’s inability to recoup its full operating and maintenance costs by providing appropriate incentives for profit maximization limits the expansion of the project and threatens its long-term sustainability, or at least the relevance of its business model in the absence of a highly-visible champion like WBREDA to ensure continued support.  For WBREDA and other agencies to sustain and replicate similar projects—and their attendant benefits—throughout India, they must adjust their economic model, as WBREDA is beginning to implicitly acknowledge in exploring a franchise model for future efforts.

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Much existing literature champions renewables implementation on India’s Sagar Island as an unqualified rural electrification success story.  Photovoltaic (PV) and wind systems put in place by the West Bengal Renewable Energy Development Agency (WBREDA) have clearly brought benefits to many of the island’s residents. 

The highly-touted community management system governing the projects has been successful at instilling local pride and overcoming the traditionally thorny problem of tariff non-collection.  At the same time, an on-the-ground look at the Sagar Island experience identifies some deeper liabilities of the business model guiding the renewables projects.  Two of the ostensible strengths of the Sagar Island implementation – the harmonious tariff collection associated with community management and the resources, competence, and assertiveness of WBREDA itself – can at the same time be considered weaknesses limiting the scope, sustainability, and replicability of the projects. 

This working paper considers these questions through a case study of a typical Sagar Island facility, the Mritunjoynagar PV power plant.  It finds that Mritunjoynagar’s inability to recoup its full operating and maintenance costs by providing appropriate incentives for profit maximization limits the expansion of the project and threatens its long-term sustainability, or at least the relevance of its business model in the absence of a highly-visible champion like WBREDA to ensure continued support.  For WBREDA and other agencies to sustain and replicate similar projects—and their attendant benefits—throughout India, they must adjust their economic model, as WBREDA is beginning to implicitly acknowledge in exploring a franchise model for future efforts.

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Program on Energy and Sustainable Development Working Paper #77
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Sam Shrank
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New evidence that the climate system may be especially sensitive to the build-up of greenhouse gases and that humans are doing a poor job of controlling their effluent has animated discussions around the possibility of offsetting the human impact on climate through ‘geoengineering'. Nearly all assessments of geoengineering have concluded that the option, while ridden with flaws and unknown side effects, is intriguing because of its low cost and the ability for one or a few nations to geoengineer the planet without cooperation from others.

I argue that norms to govern deployment of geoengineering systems will be needed soon. The standard instruments for establishing such norms, such as treaties, are unlikely to be effective in constraining geoengineers because the interests of key players diverge and it is relatively easy for countries to avoid inconvenient international commitments and act unilaterally. Instead, efforts to craft new norms ‘bottom up' will be more effective. Such an approach, which would change the underlying interests of key countries and thus make them more willing to adopt binding norms in the future, will require active, open research programmes and assessments of geoengineering.

Meaningful research may also require actual trial deployment of geoengineering systems so that norms are informed by relevant experience and command respect through use. Standard methods for international assessment organized by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) are unlikely to yield useful evaluations of geoengineering options because the most important areas for assessment lie in the improbable, harmful, and unexpected side effects of geoengineering, not the ‘consensus science' that IPCC does well.

I also suggest that real-world geoengineering will be a lot more complex and expensive than currently thought because simple interventions-such as putting reflective particles in the stratosphere-will be combined with many other costlier interventions to offset nasty side effects.

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Oxford Review of Economic Policy
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David G. Victor
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The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is a means for industrial nations, known as Annex 1 countries, to meet their greenhouse gas emissions reductions targets by taking credit for reductions from projects they fund in developing countries. The idea is that projects to reduce emissions will cost less to develop and implement in the developing countries where technology is further behind. Industrialized countries can achieve more reductions via investment in the developing countries, achieving greater emissions reductions for less sunk cost. At least this is the idea under the Kyoto Protocol. A researcher at the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development (PESD), Michael Wara says this, in fact, is not how the CDM is working.

Wara lectures at Stanford Law School, teaching the popular class International Environmental Law. A graduate of Stanford Law School, Wara also has a PhD in Ocean Sciences from the University of California, Santa Cruz. His doctoral work on the interaction between climate change and oceanatmosphere dynamics in the tropics echoes in his current research on the CDM. He understands the science of greenhouse gases and how they affect Earth and its climate. One of those greenhouse gases is HFC-23, a byproduct of manufacturing refrigerants. HFC-23 is one of the gases countries targeted to reduce under the CDM; it can be eliminated rather easily and has been seen as the “low hanging fruit” of the CDM. In fact, more than half the greenhouse gas reductions of CDMs to date have been reached via reducing HFC-23 in developing counties. For the reductions, the project sponsor countries receive credits to put toward meeting their own reductions targets. These credits are called Certified Emission Reductions or CERs.

This is where Wara noticed a big discrepancy between what was credited through the CDM and what was actually happening on the ground. The CERs are not just feel-good pieces of paper that countries collect as proof of their doing good but are certifications of equivalent reductions of one metric tonne CO2 emissions. Carbon is the standardizing greenhouse gas and so regardless of what greenhouse gas is reduced with the CDM the sponsoring country is credited with CERs. But these “carbon credits” have a value—carbon is a traded commodity on many global markets. Wara could directly compare the CDM effect versus the credits issued. Since the cost of implementing the reductions was known or could be calculated, and since the credits were standardized to a greenhouse gas being traded on an open market, Wara could quantitatively critique the CDM.

Wara’s finding showed a major flaw in the CDM design. Looking at the large percentage of greenhouse gas reductions met within the CDM by eliminating HFC-23, the value of the credits created by these reductions were more than four times as valuable as the cost of implementing the reductions. This is not small change, as billions of dollars worth of CERs have been credited for the projects. What is more, the credits for eliminating the HFC-23 byproduct of manufacturing refrigerant were far more valuable than the refrigerant itself, creating incentives to build these manufacturing plants in order to cash-in on the CERs. Exposing these loopholes has brought attention to Wara’s work. He has presented his findings at numerous conferences and published his report (Nature 445, 595-596 (8 February 2007) doi:10.1038/445595a) and derivatives broadly. Wara continues to study the CDM and the global market for greenhouse gases and the post-Kyoto regime for reducing their emissions.

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This study was presented by PESD research fellows Jeremy Carl and Varun Rai and PESD Director David Victor at the conference The Future of India's Foreign Policy, hosted by the Center for the Advanced Study of India (CASI) at the University of Pennsylvania on April 22 and 23, 2008.

The study explores the role of energy in Indias foreign policy strategy and examines the wide gap between Indias need for a strategic energy policy and the government of India’s inability to put such a policy into practice. As a stark departure from the idealized vision, Indias energy supply chains that have grown increasingly creaky and unreliable. Only halting progress has been made towards reform and, without fundamental reform, it is likely that Indias global energy strategy will continue to be a failure.

In particular, the authors examine the relationship between Indias energy policy and its foreign policy by highlighting both themes and vignettes in three different areas of the energy system: oil & natural gas, coal, and electricity. They find that fickle domestic political coalitions dominate energy policymaking in India and that these unstable coalitions, when combined with the weak administrative capacity of the Indian state, leave Indias foreign policy apparatus incapable of making credible commitments in the energy sector.

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Program on Energy and Sustainable Development Working Paper #75
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Jeremy Carl
Varun Rai
David G. Victor
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David G. Victor
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David G. Victor is a professor at Stanford Law School and directs the Freeman Spogli Institute's Program on Energy & Sustainable Development; he is also adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

What to do about Mexico's oil company, Pemex, may seem like a parochial issue of interest only to Mexicans and a few oil industry executives. But the matter should be of concern to anybody who is wondering when oil will come down off its near-record highs.

Pemex generates two fifth's of the Mexican government's income and is a lucrative employer, but it is ailing from neglect. For years the government has milked Pemex of cash without giving it the wherewithal to invest in and develop new sources of oil. When President Felipe Calderon proposed last week to reform Pemex and encourage more private investment in oil exploration and refining, his leftist opponents shut down the country's legislature in protest. Pemex, they claimed, is a cherished national treasure that must not be pushed into private hands.

Mexico is hardly the only country that treats its state oil companies as ATMs for governments, unions, cronies and others who siphon the rich benefits for themselves. A large fraction of the world's oil patch is struggling with the problem that bedevils Calderon: how to make state-owned oil companies (which control about three quarters of the world's oil reserves) more effective at finding and producing oil. Veneuzuela's oil output is flagging. Russia's state-owned gas company, Gazprom, is on the edge of a steep decline in production. And in different ways many of the world's state-owned oil companies are struggling to keep pace with rising demand. Simply privatizing them is politically difficult, and thus most of the world's oil-rich governments are struggling to find ways to make state enterprises perform better.

Even among state oil companies, Pemex's performance is notably poor. Used as a cash cow for the government, Pemex has never been able to keep enough of its profits to invest in exploration and better technology, the lifeblood of the best oil companies. Until a few years ago, Pemex invested essentially nothing in looking for new oil fields. It relied, instead, on the aging Cantarell field, which was discovered in the 1970s not by Pemex but by fisherman who were angry that the seeping oil was fouling their nets and assumed that Pemex was to blame. Pemex brought the massive field online with relatively simple technology. A scheme in the late 1990s extended the life of the field, but that effort has run out of steam. On the back of Cantarell's decline, total output from Pemex is sliding; some even worry that Mexico could become a net importer of oil in the next decade or two. They're probably wrong, but even the idea makes people nervous.

At times over the last few decades (including today) Pemex has been blessed with a dream team of smart managers, but even they have not been able to reverse the tide of red ink. That's because the company's troubles run so deep that even the best management can't fix them. Indeed, the most striking thing about Calderon's proposed reforms is that they don't go nearly far enough to make Pemex a responsive company, even though they are on the outer edge of what's probably politically feasible in Mexico.

For example, Calderon proposes a new system of "citizen bonds" that will help bring capital to the company (and because they would be owned by the public, these bonds would help blunt the legal block to any reform—Mexico's Constitution requires that its hydrocarbons be owned by the people). Money alone, though, won't reverse Pemex's fortunes. Part of the problem is that risk taking, which is essential to success in oil, is strongly discouraged. My colleagues at Stanford, in a study released last week, have shown that a system of tough laws that control procurement make managers wary of projects that could fail. Although such laws are designed to help stamp out corruption, a noble goal, they are administered by parts of the Mexican government that know little about the risky nature of the oil business.

Pemex's ability to control its own investment capital is probably more important to its success than anything else. The firm, though, has been hobbled because the government keeps all profits for use in the federal budget and the finance ministry has the final word on all Pemex investments. Solving that problem would require distancing government from the oil company. Given that the government is dependent on Pemex cash, that is politically risky. In fact, the real foundation for Calderon's reforms announced last week actually happened long ago when he first took office and spearheaded an effort to change Mexico's tax system. Much of the Mexican economy doesn't pay taxes to the government, which explains why its need for cash from Pemex is particularly desperate. Those tax reforms, however, are too modest to make a fundamental difference in the government's dependence on Pemex.

Calderon's reforms seem unlikely to solve the politically hardest task: reigning in the Pemex workers' union, which favors projects that generate jobs and benefits for its members. The union is well-connected to Mexico's left-leaning political parties, which helps explain why those same parties are so wary of "privatization." In fact, Calderon's proposals would not privatize the companies, but the union and the left know that cry will rally the people to prevent change.

Elsewhere in the world a thicket of similar, interlocking problems loom over the oil patch. Kuwait has a procurement system much like Mexico's, with a similarly perverse effect on the incentives for workers in that country's oil company to take risks and perform at world standard. Even in Brazil, whose state oil company is one of the best performing, has a hard time keeping the government at bay when it comes to taxing oil output. Two massive new oil finds over the last six months have kindled discussions in Brazil about raising the tax rate and channeling ever more of the oil output for government purposes. In Venezuela, where Chavez has taken a good oil company and run it into the ground, the burden of public projects is so great that the oil company can no longer focus on actually producing oil efficiently, and production is in decline.

The odds are that Calderon will make some reforms but won't transform Pemex. And that outcome, multiplied through state-owned oil companies around the world, suggests that oil output will increase only sluggishly. With demand still strong, oil prices are set to stay high for some time.

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Ognen Stojanovski
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PESD has just released an 87-page case study of Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex), Mexico's national oil company. In "The Void of Governance: An Assessment of Pemex's Performance and Strategy," researcher Ognen Stojanovski examines how the state-owned company functions and details some of the profound challenges faced by reformers.

Mexico's Petróleos Mexicanos, or Pemex, is the world's third-ranked company by oil production. Almost 40% of the Mexican government budget is derived from Pemex revenues, leaving the country highly exposed to a drop in oil prices and the company itself strapped for cash to support much-needed investment. At the same time, the company has been progressively de-skilled over the decades by an exclusive focus on financial returns for the government, constitutional restrictions on foreign participation in the oil sector, and suffocating interference by diverse government agencies and the powerful workers' union.

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Mexico's Petróleos Mexicanos, or Pemex, is the world's third-ranked company by oil production. Almost 40% of the Mexican government budget is derived from Pemex revenues, leaving the country highly exposed to a drop in oil prices and the company itself strapped for cash to support much-needed investment. At the same time, the company has been progressively de-skilled over the decades by an exclusive focus on financial returns for the government, constitutional restrictions on foreign participation in the oil sector, and suffocating interference by diverse government agencies and the powerful workers' union.

In this case study, Ognen Stojanovski leverages extensive interviews with present and former Pemex and Mexican government insiders to paint a detailed picture of the organizational dynamics that drive Pemex's performance and strategy. Particularly important are the manifold interactions between Pemex and a host of intrusive, and yet ultimately non-strategic, government agencies, with the net result being extensive government interference and yet no actual government ownership of oil sector performance.

Facing a steep drop-off in the free-flowing oil from the Cantarell field that long provided easy revenues even in the face of weak organizational and technical capability, Pemex now finds itself scrambling to plug the production gap through new investments in exploration. At the same time, politically-popular constitutional restrictions on foreign ownership of Mexican hydrocarbons limit Pemex's ability to enlist foreign help to rapidly develop offshore oil. Current President (and former Energy Minister) Felipe Calderón recognizes the crises of finances, reserves, and oversight that are now facing Pemex, and on April 8, 2008 he proposed a set of reforms to the Mexican Senate. The PESD case study of Pemex elucidates what is needed on the reform front as well as the formidable obstacles that stand in front of Calderón as he attempts to remake Pemex into a strong performer.

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Program on Energy and Sustainable Development Working Paper #73
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Ognen Stojanovski
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