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Nadejda M. Victor
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For Victor's detailed analysis, presented at a recent G8 Energy summit, click on the International Conference on Energy and Security event or directly download the presentation below.

Three months ago the Russian energy giant Gazprom forced Ukraine to pay sharply higher prices for natural gas. At the time, the story was portrayed as a political struggle for control in Kiev. But last week Gazprom announced it was tripling gas prices in Belarus, a country that is politically close to the Kremlin. Moldova has been forced to accept a doubling of prices over the next three to four years, and the other former Soviet republics are already paying market prices for Russian gas.

The truth is that these price increases are not political. Rather, they reflect worrisome economic and geological facts about Russian gas fields. The Kremlin is not simply trying to use Gazprom to reassert authority in Belarus, Ukraine or anywhere else. There are in fact deep problems with Gazprom -- problems created by its inefficient management and a looming decline in gas production.

Russia controls over a quarter of the world's gas reserves -- more than any other country. Most of the known Russian reserves (about 80 percent) are in west Siberia and concentrated in a handful of giant and super-giant gas fields. Since the early 1970s the rate of discovery for these new fields has been declining. Moreover, output from the country's mainstay super-giant fields is also steadily falling.

Huge investments are needed to replace this dwindling supply, and all the options for new production will prove costly and difficult. New fields in the far north and east of the country are distant from most of Russia's people and export markets, requiring wholly new transport systems such as pipelines. Moreover, most of these fields are found in extremely harsh environments where it is technically and financially difficult to operate.

Gazprom controls neither the capital nor the technology that will be needed. The state-controlled company is already deeply in debt and burdened by many expensive obligations, such as supplying Russia's population and friends with cheap gas. The company has to work with foreign partners.

So far Gazprom has been able to forestall crisis. Economic stagnation across the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe since 1990 dampened gas demand. Russia, which had a surplus at the time, sharply increased its gas exports and made contractual commitments that will remain in force for many years.

But following the long stagnation, Russia's internal gas consumption is rising again as the economy expands. And new Russian policies to promote development of the country's eastern regions will, in the next few years, require large new commitments to supply gas to that region (along with spending on railroads, airports and other infrastructure).

Even when the Russian economy was in the doldrums the country was notable as a large gas consumer because of its extremely inefficient energy system. Today Russia is the world's second-largest gas user, after the United States, although its economy is only one-twentieth the size of the U.S. economy.

Electricity in Russia is produced for the most part by gas, but the country's gas-fired electric generators work at 33 percent efficiency on average, compared with 50 to 55 percent in Europe. More than 90 percent of residential and industrial gas consumers don't have meters. Gas is even cheaper than coal -- Russia is the only large country where that is true -- so incentives to switch to an abundant fuel are weak.

In recent years Russia has boosted gas supplies by squeezing Turkmenistan to sell gas to Russia at a deep discount. But Turkmen gas production is poised to decline, and Turkmenistan's gas industry is barely functional because the country's political environment is scary for long-term investors. Other Central Asian suppliers, notably Kazakhstan, are unlikely to be able to bridge the gap.

Caught between growing internal consumption of gas, continued inefficiency and mounting external obligations, Russia's gas industry faces a looming crisis. Given the country's vast resources, it seems that many producers could fill the void. But a series of policy decisions created two roadblocks that Gazprom has been happy to reinforce. One is the lack of access to the Gazprom-controlled pipeline network, which explains why few companies even bother to look for gas: They know they can't get what they find to market. The other barrier to investment is the low internal prices, which make gas production uneconomic except for companies that can sell their products outside.

Gazprom needs cash -- much more cash -- for investment. At the same time, it needs a strong incentive for former Soviet republics to cut their own very inefficient consumption.

Analysts have ignored the risk that Russia's supplies could fall short because they focus on Russia's vast gas resources and the new Western investors who are -- albeit cautiously -- entering into joint ventures with Gazprom. But those resources and ventures are for the long term, and the looming crisis of supply is unfolding now.

The gas shortage is likely to become most acute over the next few years. If there is an unusually cold winter in 2008, the year of Russia's presidential election, then Gazprom will face a politically unpleasant choice: whether to cut off internal customers (voters) or the Western customers who are the firm's main source of hard cash.

The writer is a research fellow at the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development at Stanford University. She is co-author of "Axis of Oil" and of a forthcoming comprehensive review of Russia's gas pipelines.

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PESD fellow Nadeja Victor presented Global Natural Gas Market and Russian Gas Supply Presentation on March 14 during the "market mechanisms of energy market regulation and ways of improving them" roundtable chaired Anantoliy Yanovskiy, Director, Department of Fuel and Energy Complex, Ministry of Industry and Energy, RF. In the meeting of the Group of Eight energy ministers the following days, the chair's statement was the following:

1. G8 Energy Ministers met in Moscow on 15-16 March 2006 in order to discuss the matters of mutual interest related to global energy security.

2. The reliable energy supply plays a key role in development of worlds economies bearing in mind that the well-being, way and quality of life of people directly depend on access to energy.

3. Ministers are aware that the 21st century is sure to witness a significant increase of the global consumption of energy, primarily by dynamically developing economies. Despite the increased presence of alternative sources in the energy mix, the fossil fuels will remain the basis of the world energy industry for at least the first half of the 21st century.

4. Ministers discussed the challenges to the global energy security, issues related to promotion of market efficiency of the fuel and energy sector. We note that meeting energy security challenges will require reliance on market-oriented approaches aimed at increasing energy supply and stemming growth in demand, while encouraging market-based pricing, competition, energy efficiency, and conservation.

5. Ministers point out the importance of further development and strengthening of dialogue among energy producer, transit and consumer countries, including information exchange on the current situation as well as medium- and long-term plans and programmes of development of their respective energy sectors.

6. Ministers confirm our support for appropriate international initiatives such as the Joint Oil Data Initiative aimed at greater accessibility and transparency of data on reserves, demand and supply, stocks and production capacities.

7. Ministers note that a stable future of the international energy sector requires significant investment in the production, transportation and processing of energy resources. We recognize that to attract investment it is essential for countries to have open and favourable investment regimes including stable and predictable regulations, clear tax laws, and efficient administrative procedures as well as fair and reciprocal access to markets along the energy value chain.

8. Ministers favour the implementation of the Action plan adopted last year by our leaders in Gleneagles which includes a wide range of measures to promote innovations, increase energy efficiency and enhance environmental protection.

9. Ministers proceed from the fact that diversification of the energy portfolio in terms of energy sources, suppliers and consumers as well as delivery methods and routes will reduce energy security risks not only for individual countries but for the entire international community. Joint efforts of the G8 and other countries aimed at wider use of renewable and alternative energies, development and implementation of innovative energy technologies and development of low-carbon energy would contribute substantially to the solution of this strategic task. For those countries that wish, wide-scale development of safe and secure nuclear energy is crucial for long-term environmentally sustainable diversification of energy supply.

10. Ministers agree that continued international cooperation to develop the low carbon technologies of the future will be crucial. Facilitating development and deployment of innovative energy technology solutions will have longer term environmental, economic and energy security benefits and be key to a global sustainable energy future.

11. A significant reduction of the gap in energy supply between developed and undersupplied less-developed countries is a major aspect of global energy security.

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David G. Victor
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Sustainable development -- the notion that boosting economic growth, protecting natural resources, and ensuring social justice can be complementary goals -- has lost much appeal over the past two decades, the victim of woolly thinking and interest-group politics. The concept can be relevant again, but only if its original purpose -- helping the poor live healthier lives on their own terms -- is restored.

A FASHIONABLE NOTION

The concept of sustainable development first emerged from academic seminar rooms two decades ago, thanks to a best-selling report called Our Common Future. Put together by the World Commission on Environment and Development, the report argued that boosting the economy, protecting natural resources, and ensuring social justice are not conflicting but interwoven and complementary goals.

A healthful environment, the theory goes, provides the economy with essential natural resources. A thriving economy, in turn, allows society to invest in environmental protection and avoid injustices such as extreme poverty. And maintaining justice, by promoting freedom of opportunity and political participation, for example, ensures that natural resources are well managed and economic gains allocated fairly. Civilizations that have ignored these connections have suffered: consider the Easter Islanders, who by denuding their forests triggered a spiral of economic difficulties and strife that eventually led to their civilization's collapse.

Yet even as sustainable development has become conventional wisdom over the past two decades, something has gone horribly wrong. Because the concept stresses the interconnection of everything, it has been vulnerable to distortion by woolly thinking and has become a magnet for special interest groups. Human rights watchdogs, large chemical companies, small island nations, green architects, and nuclear power plant operators have attached themselves to the fashionable notion only to subvert it for their own ends. Instead of bringing together nature, the economy, and social justice, sustainable development has spawned overspecialized and largely meaningless checklists and targets. Particularly harmful has been a series of consensus-driven UN summits that have yielded broad and incoherent documents and policies. Sustainable development, the compass that was designed to show the way to just and viable economics, now swings in all directions.

This deterioration was probably unavoidable. But the slide matters, and not only because sustainable development has become a cover for inaction and a black hole for resources; it is also a wasted opportunity. The concept has gained such a powerful following over the past two decades that if it recovered its original meaning, it could become a guiding force for governments, firms, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). fixing this mess requires understanding how it came to be and recalibrating the compass so that it can reliably point in a single direction again.

THE PRICE OF FAME

One way to trace the slide of sustainable development is to follow the idea's degradation through the UN. After all, its earliest high-profile proponent, the World Commission on Environment and Development, headed by then Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Brundtland, operated under a UN mandate. The UN General Assembly and the UN Secretariat were always at the forefront in championing Brundtland's vision. And today, the conferences, commissions, and task forces that constitute the sustainable development apparatus all find their focus within the UN system. What happens there is worth observing -- not because the UN is solely responsible for what has gone wrong, but because the organization reflects the aspirations and flaws of the players that are.

The trouble began at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, which involved more than 100 heads of state, 170 governments, 2,400 representatives from NGOs, and nearly 10,000 journalists. The attention generated by the meeting kindled demand for more conferences. The result was a decade of summits, with one held almost every year, that covered a range of topics, including demographics (in 1994), the rights and roles of women (in 1995), social development (in 1995), and the expansion of urban habitats (in 1996). Most of these gatherings, the culminations of arduous negotiations, produced two documents: a detailed action plan for insiders and a crisper statement of principles for outsiders. At Rio, these were called, respectively, Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration.

Action plans tend to be sprawling documents that offer something for everyone. They are crafted through a consensus process in which the easiest way for special interests to get what they want is to agree with everyone else. The result is often an incoherent and costly wish list. The secretariat of the Rio summit estimated that implementing Agenda 21 might cost $600 billion a year in new spending, of which $125 billion would have to come as foreign assistance from the industrialized countries. Since then, summit negotiators have not even bothered to tally the costs of their plans. And in the meantime, the international community has continued to behave like a child crafting his dream order of Christmas presents out of the Bible-size FAO Schwarz catalog.

Statements of principles have not had much effect either. The documents are usually drafted in lawyers' false poetry: they are meant to inspire without offending any specific interest group. Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, for example, purported to offer a fresh interpretation of the conflict between a nation's sovereignty and its international responsibilities: "States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." Nobody really knows what the sentence means. Advocates for sovereignty (especially in developing countries) claim that it endorses sovereign freedom of action, whereas advocates for environmental responsibility (notably ngos from rich industrialized nations) claim that it establishes international duties.

The Rio process, moreover, bred a set of new institutions. Two new secretariats were created to oversee the implementation of two new treaties, one on climate change, the other on biological diversity. Summit participants also set up the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), which holds an elaborately prepared meeting every year and is charged with the impossible task of monitoring the implementation of the Agenda 21 commitments. The CSD, in particular, has accomplished very little.

DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR

Governments and the UN system have also marginalized sustainable development by failing to articulate serious objectives and coherent strategies for its implementation. Agenda 21 embraced every goal offered up in anticipation of the Rio summit, but it set no specific priorities or targets, making it impossible to mobilize support for any strategy or to measure progress. At the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, the process reached its lowest point with a sprawling and incoherent plan. Participants endorsed eight broad Millennium Development Goals (MDGS) -- including the eradication of extreme poverty, the provision of universal primary education, and the assurance of equality for women -- that had been crafted at the UN's Millennium Summit two years earlier. Since then, the UN Secretariat has parsed these broad objectives into 18 specific targets and 48 indicators. But the MDGS are already losing traction because governments have limited power to directly affect these outcomes. Most of the world is closer to meeting the MDGS now than it was a decade ago, but that is largely because human welfare has generally been improving. (The most striking exceptions are found in the many African countries that score worse today on most measures of human welfare.)

The MDGS, targets, and indicators do not constitute a strategy that informs the actions of governments, companies, and NGOS. Most of what the MDGS envision is beyond the power of any enterprise to deliver. Consider, for instance, the efforts that would be needed to meet the mdg to "develop a global partnership for development." The indicators designed to measure compliance with this goal include some activities that governments do control, such as the amount of untied official development assistance (ODA) they offer, which, in the right settings, can help alleviate poverty. But they also include special targets for ODA to small island nations and landlocked states that serve no strategic purpose -- reflecting these nations' special ability to manipulate UN commitments to their narrow advantage. And regarding the indicators on which progress has been most remarkable -- access to phone services, computers, and the Internet -- advances have been the fortuitous byproduct of technological development and have often reflected the accidental wisdom of governments' decisions to let the market work on its own.

The trouble with sustainable development and the MDGS is that they reflect a diplomatic process that has devoted too much effort to lengthening the international community's wish list and not enough to articulating and ranking the types of practical measures that are the hallmark of serious policymaking. Governments might have wondered whether any given dollar in aid would be best invested in water treatment, poverty alleviation, or structural adjustment, or if it would be better to treat the causes of underdevelopment, such as corruption, or its symptoms, such as inadequate health care. Yet these crucial questions were left unanswered -- and often even unasked.

THE POVERTY PRIORITY

The only way to fix the mess with sustainable development is to return to Brundtland's fundamentals. Sustainable development must be viewed afresh, as a framework for every aspect of governance rather than as a special interest. It can be revived by following four courses of action: making a priority of alleviating poverty, dropping the environmental bias that has hijacked the entire movement, favoring local decisions over global ambitions, and tapping into new technologies to spur sustainable growth.

First, and most fundamental, progress on sustainable development requires more success with economic development, in particular poverty alleviation; the other two prongs of sustainability, environmental protection and social justice, will lack force until basic living standards are improved. Development experts do not know exactly which policies best boost development, and without a well-accepted theory, many have tended to embrace grand schemes, such as the MDGS, that are politically unrealistic and unlikely to deliver results. But these uncertainties should not mask a growing canon of good sense about the policies that offer the best chances for eradicating poverty. One place to start is with some of the careful studies conducted over the last decade, especially those done by the World Bank. They show that a few key institutional factors -- such as fiscal discipline, openness to market competition, strong investment in education, political freedom, and low levels of corruption -- largely explain why some countries flourish while others wither. The breadth of consensus on these points is reflected in the comprehensive 2005 Human Development Report by the UN Development Program (UNDP), which endorses a similar institutional focus for alleviating poverty.

Yet very few of these factors, such as openness to competition or investment in primary education, appear among the MDG indicators. Equally vital levers for development -- including anticorruption measures, the protection of private property, and the containment of civic strife -- do not appear, because the soft-spined corps of believers in sustainable development has been unwilling to advocate policies that some view as intrusions into national sovereignty. Getting serious about sustainable development requires redrawing the lines of sovereignty; if sustainable development is a universal concept, then governments have a universal responsibility to promote it.

In the United States, some of this advice is already being put into practice through the Millennium Challenge Corporation (mcc), a governmental organization whose origins lie in President George W. Bush's promise to provide new development assistance to the countries that can best use the money. The plan was to offer a $5 billion annual increase in development assistance by fy2006. Unfortunately, as with so many of this administration's bold projects, progress on the idea is being hobbled by halfhearted implementation and perennial underfunding -- the partial result of a budget crunch brought on by unsound tax policies and the ballooning cost of the Iraq war. The mcc has run into trouble implementing its funding strategy. Countries with the best conditions for making effective use of mcc money are those best able to attract private investment on their own. On the other hand, countries with conditions that are least conducive to development -- and thus the least eligible for mcc aid -- are also likely to be the poorest and those in the greatest need of a hand. This Catch-22 most affects Africa, which includes, according to the UNDP's most recent tally, 14 of the 18 countries in the world whose human development has regressed since 1990. The United States has voluntarily increased foreign aid by $8 billion since 2000 and is the largest single supplier of aid to Africa. Other donors have also redoubled their efforts in Africa. But on most of the continent, governments have no viable plan to ensure economic growth, and sustainable development remains far from reach.

GREEN WITH ENVY

It is also necessary to challenge the environmental bias that has dominated the sustainable development agenda. From the outset of the Brundtland commission's work, developing countries have rightly feared that the developed world's concern about the environment would overshadow their interest in development. They insisted that the Rio summit be called the UN Conference on Environment and Development, but diplomats from the industrialized countries (even the conference's secretary-general, Canadian Maurice Strong) nonetheless referred to it informally as the Earth Summit. The two treaties signed in Rio, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, mostly reflected the environmental priorities of the industrialized world. A treaty on protecting the world's forests was also considered. The developing countries, rich in forests and wary of intrusion, organized to kill it, but because nothing really dies in the diplomatic world, the stillborn convention has been resurrected as a set of new principles and institutions known as the UN Forum on Forests. So far, the forum has had little effect on forests -- except to further deplete them by generating a prodigious number of documents.

The tactical success of environmentalists, especially well-organized multinational NGOs based in industrialized countries, in moving their issues to the top of the sustainable development agenda is unhealthy -- even for environmentalism. Easy pickings in the UN have distracted environmentalists from the more urgent need to articulate ways in which they can contribute to the other pillars of sustainability: development and social justice. And this lapse has alienated them from an important base of potential partners in the developing world. Notably, the 2004 report of the high-level UN panel (which included Brundtland) convened by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to articulate new visions for world security was strikingly thin on environmental matters -- evidence that such issues have not sufficiently permeated mainstream policymaking in much of the world.

After being hoodwinked at Rio, the developing countries made sure that the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development did not include the word "environment" in its title. Nonetheless, the multinational environmental lobby has continued to score tactical victories in many areas that the industrialized states control, especially funding. The Global Environment Facility (GEF), which was created in 1991 to provide funds for the then nascent sustainable development apparatus, now finances projects in six areas: climate change, biodiversity, pollution in international waters, land degradation, ozone depletion, and persistent organic pollutants. These areas largely match the leading environmental priorities of diplomats from the industrialized nations, not the most pressing concerns of the states that GEF funds were intended to address. Climate change and biodiversity are top priorities for most industrialized countries and also, therefore, for the GEF: the two issues alone consume two-thirds of the GEF's resources. However, these concerns are disconnected from the real developmental priorities of the poorest populations in developing countries. In the area of climate change, for example, the GEF's funding strategy is to push for the development of technologies such as solar and wind-generated energy, which emit no carbon dioxide, a leading cause of climate change. These are darlings of environmentalists in the North, who claim that these exotic technologies, although currently expensive, will become cheaper with time. That argument is of dubious relevance to the 1.6 billion people who lack electricity today. For them, real progress usually comes in the form of less sexy but more cost-effective options, such as diesel generators and grid extensions.

THINK LOCAL

The third step toward recovering sustainable development is remembering that the theory works only if it is approached as a hardheaded calculation about tradeoffs, rather than as an amalgam of sacrosanct principles. The cocktail-party version of sustainable development gleams with promises of harmony and globalism: economic growth, environmental protection, and social justice can be achieved fully and simultaneously; because the ecosystems and economies of nations are interdependent, the problems they face require global solutions. In fact, however, the concept has practical relevance only if it can accommodate local preferences and capabilities. Cocktail-party visions of sustainability properly laud the benefits of electricity, for example, as a cure for darkness and a substitute for costly candles. Yet the diesel generators that bring electric lighting to the most remote areas are, in some respects, a paragon of unsustainability: diesel, which is derived from oil, is an exhaustible and polluting resource. Poor communities love diesel-generated electricity nonetheless: it has brought them television, high-quality lighting, and refrigeration, which were unavailable before. Similarly, whenever multinational environmentalists have sought to ban DDT worldwide, developing countries have resisted, wisely pointing out that the pesticide is crucial to controlling mosquitoes and other disease carriers in poor regions such as West Africa.

The last decade of UN summits propagated the myth that sustainable development can promote international harmony through "global action plans" and "universal principles." In fact, providing sustainability is a highly political activity governed by interests and resources that vary widely from one place to another. Advocating MDGS that apply equally to Latin America (where reaching them is fortuitously at hand) and Africa (where development is largely stagnant) makes little sense. The only way to craft serious goals is from the bottom up, focusing on responsible systems of government rather than disconnected global processes to do most of the work. But this approach, although pragmatic, is less satisfying ideologically and more demanding -- and therefore ignored by cocktail-party globalists.

The current disconnect between global ambitions and local realities helps explain why efforts to curb climate change, for example, have achieved so little. Although the problem's effects are inherently global, its causes are resolutely local. In most of the world, including many developing countries, domestic authorities choose what energy system to use, and because they decide how much fossil fuel to consume, they effectively control emissions of carbon dioxide. Globalists in industrialized countries are clamoring for "engaging" the governments of developing countries by pressing them to accept caps on emissions. But every major developing country has rejected the demand as an unfair limit on their development, leaving reform at an impasse.

So how can countries be compelled to enforce policies that deviate from their immediate interests in order to pursue the global good? Partly by allowing them to interpret the mandates of international agreements according to their local priorities. Take, for instance, Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou -- three of China's most rapidly growing cities -- which are all struggling with local air pollution. To cut down on noxious emissions, they have (at least) two options. They can either move power plants and heavy industry outside their borders and import the goods and electricity they need, or they can change their primary fuel from coal to natural gas or nuclear energy, both of which are much cleaner. Although either solution would provide China's cities with the energy they need, each one has its drawbacks. Whereas the first would do little to curb China's total effluent of carbon dioxide -- the country as a whole would still burn prodigious amounts of coal -- the second would force Chinese officials to rely more heavily on a less carbon-intensive fuel (gas) that they have little experience using and would have to import in large quantities. To convince Chinese officials to adopt the second strategy even though it seems less favorable to them, the international community could offer a package of measures, including assurances to secure China's gas supplies and agreements to share related technology. In other words, industrialized Western countries could align their objective to slow global warming with China's domestic interests.

The primacy of local interests applies to highly industrialized countries as well. In Europe, governments are implementing the Kyoto Protocol on climate change by customizing it to local and regional needs: they are creating an emissions-trading system that lets individual companies trade credits for their carbon dioxide emissions, thus allowing greater flexibility in meeting the treaty's targets. Meanwhile, governments elsewhere are also developing their own locally tailored trading systems. The authors of the Kyoto Protocol envisioned a single global trading system with a single global price. But such a uniform system is not being implemented because the institutions that allocate credits, monitor compliance, and enforce agreements operate mainly at the local and national levels. Instead, a host of emissions-trading systems are emerging from the bottom up. (The United States, meanwhile, has refused to ratify the agreement for the compelling reason that it cannot satisfy the treaty's core commitment to bring down U.S. emissions of greenhouse gases to an average of seven percent below 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012. Although abandoning the protocol was a wise decision, Washington has not offered any credible plan to manage emissions in the United States.)

TECH SAVVY

Any serious effort at sustainable development will also need to harness the technologies that most affect economic growth and mediate the consequences of growth for the environment. Unfortunately, the sustainable development apparatus has been strikingly ineffective on technological matters. The only technological area in which governments have set specific goals is "technology transfer," the handing over of hardware to developing countries -- a gesture often espoused in UN talks but rarely witnessed in the field. Such goals are largely pointless anyway because most technologies spread through markets rather than thanks to transfers between governments.

Some efforts to harness technological progress for the benefit of sustainable development are under way. They include a long-overdue attempt to promote innovation in areas that matter to very poor countries -- such as developing a vaccine for malaria -- but that have been overlooked by private firms that normally focus their efforts on creating products to combat the diseases of wealthier consumers.

Governments have found it particularly difficult to set credible policies for the development and application of technologies that have long commercial lives. The problem is especially acute for investors in energy infrastructures who are contemplating new technologies that might help address the problem of climate change. In Europe, where the rules on emissions trading are in flux, utility companies have been wary of building new power plants in the absence of greater fiscal certainty, increasing the risk of severe electricity shortages. And in the United States, where there is no meaningful federal policy on greenhouse gas emissions, investors in long-term energy assets such as power plants (the single greatest emitters of carbon dioxide) must make multibillion-dollar commitments without knowing what regulatory regime may exist in the future. A few years ago, this problem was not particularly serious because nearly all new power plants in the United States were fired with natural gas. But today, natural gas costs five times what it did in the 1990s, there are no new gas plants under construction, existing plants are running at only 30 percent of capacity, and dozens of new coal plants are being designed. Unless the U.S. government soon announces a credible plan for the future regulation of emissions, utilities will invest in conventional coal-fired power plants. Within a few years, the country could be saddled with far more carbon dioxide emissions as a result of these plants than if the government had given investors a reason to fund less carbon-intensive sources of energy.

Governments and companies must find ways to keep sometimes tyrannical public opinions from blocking the development and use of certain essential new technologies. Today, there is latent public discomfort regarding carbon sequestration, a technology that entails injecting deep underground large volumes of carbon dioxide that would otherwise go into the atmosphere. Elements of the technology are already widely used in oil and gas operations, but carbon dioxide injection projects are under way at only two facilities in the world. This fix holds the promise of an elegant engineering feat, but the technology is not without danger. There are risks of leaks, some potentially catastrophic, and some countries (notably the United States) still lack adequate regulatory regimes for controlling underground disposal. The industry would do well to keep early demonstration projects at remote and especially safe sites in order to quiet public alarmism.

Worries that even ill-advised public resistance could stymie such worthy projects are not far-fetched: other promising technologies have run afoul of misguided opinions and poor regulatory policies. Across Europe, for example, public opposition to genetically engineered foods has prompted regulations to keep some of those foods off the market despite growing evidence that they are good for both consumers and the environment. Some of the key technologies for controlling carbon dioxide pollution may face a similar fate. Nuclear power, for example, is probably favored as a low-carbon means of generating electricity. Yet in many countries, it remains politically untenable.

BACK TO THE FUTURE

Despite its beginnings as a powerful animating concept, over the last two decades sustainable development has become meaningless. It has fallen prey to a collection of special interest groups that have both hollowed out the concept and lost track of what they can best do to implement it. When it has been applied, the theory has often distorted the real priorities of development.

Fixing the concept will require going back to its origins, and especially stressing the integration of economic and ecological systems while leaving it up to competent local institutions to decide how to set and pursue their own priorities. Advocates for sustainable development should not promote false universal goals. Because local needs and interests will necessarily vary, sustainable development must be redefined repeatedly, from the bottom up, wherever it is to be put into practice. Sustainable development can have worldwide relevance and appeal, but only if its original purpose of helping the poor live better, healthier, and fairer lives on their own terms is restored.

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"Energy security" is an elastic concept. However, it offers the prospect of linking "hard security" issues, such as territorial protection and supply of vital fuels, in mutually reinforcing ways, with "soft security" issues, such as protection of the environment generally and specifically the limitation of the emissions that lead to global climate change. Such linkages, which could engage a large number of countries and diverse interests, make energy security a good prospect for early action by the L20. Moreover, security of energy supply is once again high on the agenda of most governments because of the current high prices for energy, notably oil. Political action is needed not only because consumers demand it, but also because a large and growing fraction of the world oil supply is under direct control of governments who make supply decisions on the basis of political factors.

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For nearly two decades, most major developing countries have struggled to introduce market forces in their electric power systems. In every case, that effort has proceeded more slowly than reformers hoped and the outcomes have been hybrids that are far from the efficiency and organization of the "ideal" textbook model for a marketbased power system.

At the same time, growing concern about global climate change has put the spotlight on the need to build an international regulatory regime that includes strong incentives for key developing countries to control their emissions of greenhouse gases. In most of these countries, the power sector is a large source of emissions that, with effort, could be controlled.

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol included mechanisms that would reward developing nations that cut emissions, but so far the performance of these mechanisms has fallen far short of their potential.

Beginning in 2002, the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development (PESD) at the Stanford Institute for International Studies (SIIS) and the Indian Institute of Management in Ahmedabad (IIMA) have conducted a set of studies to examine the intersection of these two crucial challenges for the organization of energy infrastructures in the developing world. This research, funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development, examined power-market reforms and greenhouse-gas emissions in two key states in India. At the same time PESD was conducting a comprehensive study of electricity-market reforms in five developing countries (Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa) as well as detailed analyses of the greenhouse-gas emissions from three provinces in China in conjunction with other research partners.

PESD and IIMA presented their findings at a workshop on January 27-28, 2005, at Stanford University. The workshop brought together scholars studying the organization of the electric-power sector and other infrastructures in developing countries with energy policy makers, technologists, and those studying the effectiveness of international legal regimes, with the aim of not only focusing on new theories that are emerging to explain the organization of the power sector and the design of meaningful international institutions, but also identifying practical implications for investors, regulators, and policymakers.

The workshop offered diagnoses of what has gone wrong and what opportunities have nonetheless emerged. It focused on practical solutions and a look at the prospects for different technologies to meet the growing demand for power while minimizing the ecological footprint of power generation.

One of the key conclusions of the research and the workshop, as discussed by David Victor, director of PESD, is that electricity markets in the developing world have not progressed inexorably and consistently from a state-owned model to an open market-based model. Rather, much as the experience of the past ten years in the United States has demonstrated, reform of electric-power systems has proceeded differentially between parts of the industry and between jurisdictional units, with some segments of the power generation, transmission, and distribution systems still dominated by the state and some segments now fully responsive to signals from the market.

This hybrid condition-with portions of the electricity enterprise deregulated and other portions still fully regulated-has proven to be virtually universal and quite durable as well. For the most part, it also has proven beneficial to the overall operation of the system as well as to climate mitigation due to the fact that introduction of market forces to parts of the system tends to have a spillover effect, helping to improve efficiency in parts of the system that remain under state control.

Tom Heller, SIIS senior fellow, noted that the negotiations leading up to the

development of the Kyoto Protocol and subsequent discussions and experience have

demonstrated that the burden-sharing metaphor-expecting developing nations to

make a proportional investment and effort in reducing greenhouse-gas emissions-

will not be successful. Rather, as gross and per capita energy consumption increases in developing nations, which is occurring especially rapidly in China and India, policies and mechanisms that facilitate investment in efficient and clean energy production, transmission, and end-use infrastructures will need to be developed and rolled out.

The Kyoto Protocol provided a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to encourage such investment. However, the conclusion reached by practitioners developing such projects in China is that CDM is an inefficient and insufficient mechanism for fostering the magnitude of development projects that will be required to help mitigate the environmental effects of energy growth in the developing nations.

Two problems with CDM were raised at the workshop. First, the bureaucratic hurdles facing developers of CDM projects are daunting. To date no such project has received certification. Second, the Kyoto Protocol's current round of reductions targets expires in 2012, and uncertainty regarding the likely direction and form of future U.S. and European initiatives provides a disincentive to investment in CDM projects.

Alberto Chiappa, managing director of Energy Systems International, noted the good news is that in spite of these difficulties, investors are finding opportunities to develop projects to provide cleaner sources of energy and improve end-use energy efficiency. Professor P.R. Shukla of IIMA pointed out that there is a great need to align development and climate concerns if future mechanisms for climate mitigation in the developing world are to be successful.

Douglas Ogden, program officer at the Energy Foundation, noted that China has made a firm commitment to greatly increase the market share of electricity from renewable sources to 5 percent by 2010 and 20 percent by 2020 and in 2008 will adopt an automobile fuel-economy standard 20 percent more efficient than U.S. CAFE standards. Also, both China and India are engaged in developing natural gas markets in sectors traditionally dominated by coal.

Mario Pereira, director of Power Systems Research, discussed Brazil's current efforts to develop economical and efficient electricity supply through biomass-specifically ethanol derived from sugarcane bagasse. The ethanol industry was originally developed as a reaction to the oil shocks of the 1970s. Although the majority of electricity in Brazil is provided by hydroelectric projects, sugarcane ethanol has some important advantages. First, the sugarcane fields are geographically close to major centers of demand, and second, sugarcane thrives during drier periods of the year when hydroelectric production declines. The experience in Brazil thus demonstrates that renewables can provide an economically attractive source of energy for developing nations.

Looking toward the future, PESD has several projects under way pertaining to the

intersection of electricity-market reforms and global climate change. The program is expanding its research on power-market reforms through a set of case studies on independent power producer projects in ten developing nations and is also initiating a set of studies examining the introduction of natural gas to regions in India and China.

Much work remains to be done before the interface between electricity-market reform and global climate change is well understood. As energy markets in the developing world expand, addressing this question will become more and more important if we are to stabilize atmospheric levels of greenhouse gases.

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The electricity industry of China's Guangdong Province has been in a process of reforms since the 1980s. The reforms have so far greatly promoted the industry development, advancing the provincial electric power system to the largest in the country (Zeng, et al., 1999; Zhang, et al. 2001). Achievements notwithstanding, the industry is facing numerous difficulties that challenge both reform policy makers and academics. The province needs high speed capacity expansion and power imports in the foreseeable future to meet the continued demand surge. End-users in Guangdong are paying the highest tariffs in the nation. The technological structure of the existing generation capacity is highly undesirable because large number of tiny generating units and oil-fired capacity are adversely affecting economic and energy efficiencies of electric power supply.

Power generation is causing increasing environmental damages. However, the most challenging is probably the fact that there lacks an adequate mechanism to solve these problems and promote efficient and sustainable growth of the electric power industry. On one hand, reforms in the past twenty years not only have not fundamentally changed the traditional mode of central government planning of provincial electric power supply and development, but also have contributed to the evolving problems of the industry and showed their limitation. On the other hand, utility de-integration and market competition represents an attractive alternative to policy makers, but little is known of the reform roadmap and the potential impact.

This paper examines the utility market reform scenario in Guangdong Province and provides a basic quantitative assessment of the possible impact of the reform policy on electricity tariffs and system development.

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Program on Energy and Sustainable Development Working Paper #33
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Chi Zhang

Dr. Nadejda Victor
Sr. Associate
Technology & Management Services, Inc.
U.S. Department of Energy
National Energy Technology Laboratory
PO Box 10940, MS 922-178C
Pittsburgh, PA 15236-0940

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NVictor.jpg PhD

Nadejda Makarova Victor is a Research Fellow at the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development at Stanford University. Her current research efforts focus on the political and economic implications of the shift to natural gas, the role of Russia in world oil and gas markets, and analysis of the different technologies of H2 production, storage and transportation. In addition, Dr. Victor is involved with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) study on Energy and Sustainable Development evaluation. She is also consulting at IIASA, where she focuses on economic development indicators and the long-lasting debate over SRES emissions scenarios.

Previously, Dr. Victor was a Research Associate in the Economics Department at Yale University under Prof. William Nordhaus, where she developed a new spatially referenced economic database. At the same time she was involved in research at the Program for the Human Environment at Rockefeller University. There she analyzed the technical changes bearing on the environment, rates and patterns of technical change in the information and computer industries, and R&D in the energy sector.

Before she moved to the U.S. in 1998, Dr. Victor was a Research Scholar at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg, Austria. Her IIASA research included analysis of the long-term development of economic & energy systems, energy modeling at regional and global scales, scenarios of infrastructure financing, trade in energy carriers and environmental impacts. She had extensive collaboration with international organizations, including the World Energy Council (WEC) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). She holds a Ph.D. and a B.A. in Economics from Moscow State University.

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David G. Victor
Joshua C. House
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In an Aug. 22 op-ed published in the Los Angeles Times and an Aug. 25 commentary on Marketplace on NPR, CESP researchers David G. Victor and Joshua C. House argue that an independent panel should be given control of the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve. The power to buy and sell the stockpiled oil currently rests with the Department of Energy, which passes the decision on to the president, effectively politicizing oil supply decisions.

STANFORD -- With oil prices heading toward $50 a barrel, what would happen if the markets really blew?

Ever since the late 1970s, Washington's answer to such an event has relied on oil stockpiled mainly by the federal government, to be released if market instability warranted it. Today, the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve contains 666 million barrels -- nearly 65 days of imports -- worth nearly $30 billion at current prices. Our industrialized allies have similar stocks, India has started one and China, whose oil imports are rising rapidly, is expected to create a reserve soon. Through the International Energy Agency in Paris, the major oil importers have agreed, in principle, to coordinate their stockpiles.

Unfortunately, reserves in the United States and most democracies are nearly feckless as a policy instrument. The legislation that created the U.S. reserve gave the power to buy and sell stocks to a federal agency, now the Department of Energy, that, in effect, passes the decision on to the president. White House control automatically converts every key decision into a highly political act.

In July 2000, President Clinton's order to transfer some strategic reserves to fill a newly created Northeast Home Heating Oil Reserve had obvious political implications for Al Gore's presidential bid. In 1996, Congress required the sale of more than $220 million of stockpiled oil to help pay down the budget deficit, another political move, though one that, in hindsight, looked wise when oil prices tanked two years later.

The uncertainty of reliable production in Russia and Iraq, coupled with the general threat of new terrorist attacks, makes for many worrisome scenarios. But a cloud of political suspicion would hang over any management decision. If President Bush released stockpiled oil to stabilize prices in an election year, no matter how justified his action, he surely would be accused of political pandering. And if he rightly refused to release oil because speculative trading doesn't meet the standard of "severe energy supply interruption," as called for in the 1975 legislation setting up the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, would he face charges that he was rewarding his oil buddies with record profits?

One way to take the politics out of governing the Strategic Petroleum Reserve would be to mechanize decision-making, such as by setting a price trigger for sales and fills. President Reagan's Council of Economic Advisors, among others, considered this option and wisely demurred. In the 1980s, the international spot market for oil was not fully developed; prices were mainly driven by opaque long-term contracts, not market dynamics. Price triggers act similarly to price controls, increasing the risk of creating true scarcities in oil supply. Such automatic triggers would have smoothed small gyrations in the oil market but failed when most needed to dampen large price swings.

There's a better way: independent management of the strategic reserve. In contrast to an automatic mechanism, an independent authority would be able to detect subtle economic and political shifts that determine our true vulnerability to oil shocks. More important, such an authority would depoliticize Strategic Petroleum Reserve decision-making, which would enable us to use the stockpile for its originally intended purpose of providing a credible bulwark against the most severe chaos in oil markets.

The president could create an independent board to manage the reserve within existing legislation, but that would not completely remove a political taint. New legislation would better accomplish the job. Congress and the president should look to the Federal Reserve as a model. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve needs its own resources, with politicians supplying broad guidelines for action and periodic review rather than direct control. Such a change would not only affect the United States but would also require remaking the International Energy Agency into something closer to a central bankers' forum.

New management for America's oil reserve would spark new thinking about the optimal size and operation of strategic stocks. Until now, most public debate has focused on the reserve's size. The International Energy Agency suggests that its member countries keep a petroleum stockpile roughly equivalent to 90 days of domestic consumption. In truth, the optimal size of strategic reserves is not a single quantity but depends on political and economic conditions. A competent independent authority would make it possible to carry a smaller stockpile -- at lower cost. Because today's oil prices are formed in highly liquid markets, the standard of "severe supply interruption" is largely meaningless. The better standard is our willingness to absorb price shocks. For that there is no simple answer, yet independent economic authorities can make the wisest choices.

More than 30 years after our first oil shock, the Strategic Petroleum Reserve still wears polyester and bell-bottoms. A dose of market reform and political independence can bring its fashion up to date and create a truly useful tool for protecting the U.S. economy.

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As gas becomes a more important input to industrialized economies and the volume of gas traded in international markets increase, large consuming countries will begin to focus increasingly on the security and availability of their gas supplies. In addition, given the apparent similarities between the development of oil and gas markets, the question arises as to whether the structure of the gas market will evolve towards that prevailing in the market for crude oil. Concern for maintaining a secure supply of reasonably priced natural gas, which up to now has taken a back seat to its sister fuel, will increasingly be viewed as a vital national interest. This change is bound to influence the "geopolitics of natural gas". This paper investigates key variables that might influence this geopolitics and postulate consumer countries response to the new reality of a gas-fed world.

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A snapshot of the central Mediterranean region starting in the 1970's provides an ideal case for the analysis of decision making in cross-border natural gas transport projects. During this period the massive size of Algeria's gas reserves were well known and Sonatrach, Algeria's state-owned oil and gas company, actively sought to monetize this gas through exports. Across the Mediterranean, both Italy and Spain were seeking to expand natural gas consumption. Projects to import gas from Algeria via pipeline or by ship were proposed, studied, and discussed at the highest levels of government and in state-owned energy companies.

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Program on Energy and Sustainable Development Working Paper #27
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Mark H. Hayes
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