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Californians like to think of themselves as environmentally conscious and forward-thinking. The state’s energy and environmental policies reflect these sentiments. With the passage of SB 100, California has one of the nation’s most ambitious renewable energy goals for its electricity supply industry. The California Solar Initiative rebate program has led to more rooftop solar capacity in the state than the total rooftop solar capacity installed in the next eight highest-capacity states. AB32 established California as the only state with its own cap-and-trade market for greenhouse gas emissions. This market currently sets the nation’s highest price for a ton of greenhouse gas emissions. California recently set a goal of five million electric vehicles in the state by 2030. Under AB 2514, California’s three investor-owned utilities are required to purchase 1,325 megawatts of grid-scale storage capacity and AB 2868 requires them to purchase 500 megawatts of behind-the-meter storage capacity. All of these policies have made California a global leader in the transition to a less carbon-intensive energy sector.

There is one major downside to California’s energy and environmental policies: they are extremely expensive for California consumers. Average residential electricity prices in California are among the highest in the nation—not because it is so expensive to produce electricity in the state, but because the costs of these policies are recovered from retail electricity prices. A comparison to Texas, another large state that also uses natural gas to power most of its electricity generation fleet, illustrates this point. According to the US Energy Information Administration (US-EIA), average residential electricity prices in California are currently about 20 cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh) versus 10 cents per kWh in Texas. However, average wholesale electricity prices in the two states are roughly equal.

This difference in retail prices is primarily due to different policy responses in the two states to the shale gas boom that started in the mid-2000s and ultimately led to a roughly 66 percent decline in the wholesale price of natural gas. California responded to these low natural gas prices with spending on the policies described above and no reductions in retail electricity prices, despite average wholesale electricity prices in California falling by one-half to two-thirds relative to their pre-shale gas boom levels. Texas responded to this decline in natural gas prices by implementing vigorous retail competition for all classes of customers, which passed on the resulting lower wholesale electricity prices into lower retail electricity prices.

What is more surprising about the Texas-versus-California comparison is that over this same time period Texas managed to build more zero-carbon wind and solar generation capacity than California. Texas currently has more than 22,000 megawatts (MWs) of grid-scale wind and solar capacity versus about 17,000 MWs in California. Different from California, Texas has accomplished this massive renewable generation buildout which also produces more renewable energy on an annual basis than California with no state-mandated financial support mechanisms beyond its competitive renewable energy zone (CREZ) policy that proactively expanded the state’s transmission network to regions with significant renewable resources. Texas’s market-based approach to fostering renewable generation entry has led to more capacity at significantly lower cost relative to California’s legislatively mandated and consumer-financed approach.

Because Californians are likely to want to continue to lead the energy transition, the relevant policy design question is: How can the state achieve these low-carbon energy goals in a more cost- effective manner?

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A Publication of the Hoover Institution
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Frank Wolak
Frank Wolak
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California’s decision to allow Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) to shut off electricity to hundreds of thousands of Californians because high winds and dry conditions may cause a downed powerline to start a wildfire is a third-world solution to a first-world problem.

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The Hill
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Frank Wolak
Frank Wolak
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Research Affiliate at PESD
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Federico Quaglia is a Senior Technical Analyst and Team Leader at Terna S.p.A., the Italian Transmission System Operator for Electricity. His current fields of activity (carried out both at national and European level) are optimal Bidding Zones reconfiguration processes in zonal electricity markets, adequacy assessments, grid security analysis and Italian capacity market design and implementation. He is a Visiting Scholar at PESD aimed at investigating potential benefits for the Italian Power System in case a Multi-settlement Locational Marginal Pricing Mechanism is applied.

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Mark C. Thurber
Mark Thurber
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Program on Energy and Sustainable Development (PESD) Director Frank Wolak and Associate Director Mark Thurber conducted a workshop on December 3-4 in Brasília, at the offices of Brazil's electricity regulator ANEEL. Regulatory staff used PESD's energy market game to explore what it would mean for the country to move from a cost-based to a bid-based electricity market. Brazil's electricity supply is dominated by hydroelectric power, and a shift to a bid-based market could help the country manage variable hydro output. At the same time, regulators have to make sure the incentives of participants in a bid-based market are set so they align with desired social outcomes. By playing the roles of generating companies in the energy market game, regulators at ANEEL gained a deeper understanding of what these incentives would be under different market configurations -- and specifically, the workshop examined the relative strengths and weaknesses of capacity markets and forward contracts as mechanisms for ensuring resource adequacy in a high-renewables world.

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On November 2 at the University of Hawaii, Program on Energy and Sustainable Development (PESD) Director Frank Wolak gave a special seminar "How Should the Public Utilities Commission Regulate Hawaiian Electric Company for Better Integration of Renewable Energy?" He summarized inefficiencies in Hawaii's electricity system and advocates a "cost based" market in which long-term competitive contracts for power would be used in conjunction with a regulated optimization model that would set real-time prices for buying and selling of electricity and grid services.  

Read more (includes links to video of Professor Wolak's talk and slides)

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Program on Energy and Sustainable Development (PESD) Director Frank Wolak, Associate DIrector Mark Thurber, and doctoral candidate Trevor Davis led an Electricity Market Simulation Workshop as part of the 2018 Western Electricity Market Forum September 20-21 in Boise, Idaho.  The audience was comprised of regulators and regulatory staff as well as policy makers representing states from across the western U.S.

The workshop used the PESD-developed Energy Market Game to explore timely questions about how electricity markets with a high share of renewable resources might function. “The Energy Market Game allows people of diverse backgrounds to understand market dynamics,” Thurber explained. “It can help policy makers and regulators set up incentives for market participants which naturally align with desired outcomes.”

The PESD team ran games with two contrasting policy approaches aimed at ensuring resource adequacy, with workshop participants playing the role of generating companies (“gencos”). In a high-renewable world, the specific resource adequacy concern is that thermal power plants won’t run enough to be profitable, and gencos therefore won’t build or keep enough thermal power plants to back up renewables when wind and sun aren’t available.

In the first game scenario, capacity markets were used to spur gencos to build enough gas-fired power plants to meet demand. Capacity markets straight-out pay gencos for holding generation capacity. They are used in a number of real-world electricity markets, but the games suggested they may not result in the cheapest power for consumers.

 

wemf 18 PESD Director Frank Wolak helps a workshop participant set up an Energy Market Game scenario.

PESD Director Frank Wolak helps a workshop participant set up an Energy Market Game scenario.
Photo Credit:  Maury Galbraith, Western Energy Board

 

In the second game scenario, forward contracts for electricity created the incentive for gencos to build power plants. If a genco doesn’t produce enough electricity to cover its forward contract, it risks having to buy the shortfall out of the spot market at high prices. Forward contracts therefore encourage gencos not only to build adequate generation capacity, but also to bid that capacity into the market at competitive prices. As this second game scenario showed, that can mean cheaper power for consumers.

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