Techno-economic energy models consistently project world gas demand to rise sharply in the coming decades. The most recent World Energy Outlook envisions that global gas consumption will double by 2030 and other major energy scenarios anticipate similar increases in gas demand. In the areas of highest expected demand-North America, Europe, China, and South and East Asia-the projected consumption of gas is expected to far outstrip indigenous supplies. These regions could import gas from regions where there is large surplus, but those are geographically distant. Indeed, surplus gas supplies-that is, reserves in excess of expected demand growth-are concentrated in a wide band stretching from the Middle East north to Siberia. Nearly half of the world's proven gas reserves are located in two countries-Russia and Iran-and three quarters of projected gas resources are located in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Russia. Delivering gas from these sources to the future demand centers will require a major expansion of inter-regional natural gas pipelines and LNG trains, in addition to significant intra-regional, cross-border gas transport infrastructures. The joint Stanford-Rice University study on the "Geopolitics of Gas" looks forward to this hypothesized gas-intensive world and explores a series of tightly interrelated questions.

This paper relates to significant medium and long-term planning for the Indian power sector. Given the very high losses, both technical as well as theft, and lack of reliable data (stemming from lack of metering for millions of pumpsets, among other reasons), the use of IT offers a significant opportunity for leapfrogging to a "smart" distribution system. Such a system might reduce losses, improve sustainability, and free up electricity for rural consumption - which today is throttled due to lack of supply. However, as the paper indicates, IT is not a silver bullet, and its optimum use requires significant analysis, consensus, and R&D.

When the People's Republic was founded in 1949, the Chinese electricity industry, with only 1.85 GW installed capacity, was primitive. It has since grown into the second largest in the world, with installed capacity rising to 353 GW in 2002. The number of people who have no access to electricity has been reduced to less than 2 percent of a population of 1.26 billion. On a per capita basis, installed capacity has edged up to one half of the world's average. Development has been particularly impressive since the 1980s thanks to increased investment in the sector. According to industry accounts, an estimated RMB 1,107 billion ($US 134 billion) was invested between 1981 and 2001 in new generation and delivery capacity. Additional investment was also made in retrofitting and upgrading the system, reaching over RMB 100 billion ($12 - 15 billion) per annum in the past seven years. Three quarters of this sectoral capital came from domestic sources, with foreign investment making up the rest. This remarkable power sector growth and financing have been achieved through an ongoing, unsystematic process of electricity industry reforms initiated in the mid 1980s. Further system expansion, projected at about 25 GW per year for the next two decades, challenges the Chinese government to continue and deepen this reform process.

After a long period of rapid growth the Brazilian power industry entered a period of stagnation and crisis in the 1980s. Ever since the 1930s a series of tariff rules and nationalizations had squeezed private investors from the market. In their place, state enterprises had assumed the function of distributing electricity in Brazil's 26 states; Eletrobras, owned by the central government, managed the transmission system and also generated much of the electricity in Brazil. Through its control over state funds for building power plants, Eletrobras pursued vast projects such as the Itaipu hydroelectric plant and assured low electricity prices as part of the government's policy of import substitution. In the shock of the two oil crises and the Latin American debt crisis this system unraveled. Financing costs escalated yet tariffs were kept low; losses mounted.

This is an updated draft of a version published in February 2003.