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David Hults
David Hults
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Sanctuary for the State: National Oil Companies in Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela

As the pro-market "Washington Consensus" has unraveled, this decade has seen the emergence of two new Latin American trends: One group of countries favoring continued liberalization (Brazil, Chile, Mexico), and another opting for increasing state intervention (Argentina, Ecuador, Venezuela). Energy policy tells some of the story behind these two trends. This talk will focus on energy policy for three Latin American countries-- Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela-- within the context of a larger fifteen-country study on National Oil Companies. The speaker will address how oil has both facilitated greater state control and created, though typically to a lesser degree, some pressures for market liberalization, as well as suggest some implications from recent oil market trends (new oil field discoveries in Brazil, falling oil prices globally) for state control in the region. 

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» Annual Meeting 2008 Materials (password protected)

PESD's 2008 Annual Review Meeting, Reconciling Coal and Energy Security, will be held October 29-30, 2008 at Stanford University. The meeting is PESD's annual forum in which to create a wide-ranging conversation around our research and obtain feedback to shape our research agenda going forward.

PESD is a growing international research program that works on the political economy of energy. We study the political, legal, and institutional factors that affect outcomes in global energy markets. Much of our research has been based on field studies in developing countries including China, India, Brazil, South Africa, and Mexico.

At present, PESD is active in four major areas: climate change policy, energy and development, the global coal market, and the role of national oil companies.

The workshop will begin on Wednesday, October 29 at 8:30 am with registration and breakfast followed by a welcome and an overview of PESD's research activities. This year's Annual Meeting will have a concerted focus on carbon markets, regulation, and carbon capture and storage models. There will be a session in the morning that will discuss and explore ways to engage developing countries on climate change. New to this year's meeting will be a reception and poster session at the conclusion of the first day. We also anticipate discussion of areas where PESD can better collaborate with other institutions. The meeting ends at 1pm on Thursday, October 30.

Annual Meeting invitees can access the complete agenda and subsequent presentation files by logging on with your password.

Bechtel Conference Center

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Mark C. Thurber
Mark Thurber
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As oil prices surge through $140/barrel at the time of writing, surely one can at least count on the invisible hand of the market to drive further exploration and production and ultimately bring more supplies on line, right? Or perhaps, more ominously, high oil prices presage a darker future of shortage and conflict as global oil fields pass their geological “peak”? In fact, both positions miss a crucial point about the dynamics of the world oil market — that it is increasingly animated by the counterintuitive behavior of the state-owned oil and gas giants that now control the vast majority of the world’s hydrocarbon resources.

“On average national oil companies (NOCs) extract resources at a far lower rate than international oil companies (IOCs), leaving about 700 billion barrels of oil effectively ‘dead’ to the world market.”So-called “national oil companies,” or NOCs, own about 80 percent of the world’s proven reserves of oil, a percentage that has been on the rise as the persistent high price environment encourages countries to assert even tighter control over the rent streams flowing from their resources. NOCs are curious and variegated beasts, and, contrary to the popular imagination, some are highly capable both technically and organizationally. Brazil’s Petrobras is an acknowledged world leader in deepwater drilling, while Norway’s StatoilHydro is highly regarded for its competence and transparent business practices. Saudi Arabia’s national champion, SaudiAramco, is secretive to the outside world but generally considered to be a well-run, technically capable organization. At the other end of the continuum, government infighting and micromanagement hobble Mexico’s Pemex and Kuwait’s KPC. Once-independent PDVSA in Venezuela has been remade by President Hugo Chávez into a government puppet that spends liberally on social programs but consistently undershoots its production targets. And indeed some national oil companies are hardly oil companies at all — Nigeria’s NNPC, for example, is mostly a rent-seeking bureaucracy.

What NOCs do share in common as distinct from the familiar international oil companies (IOCs) is being answerable to a host government, which inevitably brings with it some focus on objectives other than simple profit maximization. Typically, an NOC arises originally from the desire of resource-rich governments (“principals”) to gain more effective control over resource extractors (“agents”) by creating an oil champion owned by the state. Prior to NOC formation, governments are frequently (and often justifiably) wary of exploitation by the foreign oil operators providing hydrocarbon extraction services. Lacking a deep understanding of the costs of production, states are simply unable to be sure they are taxing their agents appropriately. In addition to enhancing control over the hydrocarbon sector and the revenue it brings, states may hope for other benefits from the NOC: cheap energy to fuel a growing economy, employment and development of local industry to support the hydrocarbon sector, or even foreign policy leverage derived from control of key resources.

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Unfortunately for the states, relationships with their NOCs are rarely straightforward, with implications for performance. Some national oil companies evolve into barely controllable “states within a state”— PDVSA pre-Chávez was an example of this — while others see their initiative smothered by excessive government intervention as in the case of Pemex and KPC. Fraught state-NOC interactions can take their toll on company effectiveness; in other cases, NOCs may simply appear less efficient than their IOC brethren because they are serving state purposes beyond simple monetization of hydrocarbon resources. Irrespective of cause, the result is that on average NOCs extract resources at a far lower rate than IOCs, leaving about 700 billion barrels of oil effectively “dead” to the world market. A far more immediate concern than whether oil fields are passing their geological “peak” is who is sitting on top of those fields!

A detailed study of NOC performance and strategy at the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development at FSI suggests a useful way of thinking about the effects of NOC resource domination on world oil and gas markets. Price versus quantity supply curves from classical economics assume that increased price will spur efforts to expand supply. Unfortunately, the counterintuitive reality for NOCs is that, when it comes to expanding supply in the current high-price environment, most either 1) can but don’t want to or 2) want to but can’t. The end result is what one could call a “backward-bending” supply curve — additional price increases do little or nothing to boost supply.

“The world has plentiful hydrocarbons in the ground, but that’s where many of them are going to stay due to the unique organizational and political dynamics of the NOCs.”In the “can but don’t want to” category are resourcerich governments that have decided they cannot assimilate any more money. Already, their investments are running into political resistance around the globe — witness Dubai’s failed attempt to purchase U.S. port management contracts, CNOOC’s failed bid for Unocal, or the increasing calls for curbs on the activities of sovereign wealth funds. Nations may decide they have enough cash and are better off leaving resources in the ground where they safely await monetization at a later date.

In the “want to but can’t” camp are countries and their NOCs that are simply unable to provide the stable political and regulatory climate to support additional build-out of expensive production and transport infrastructure. This situation is particularly common for natural gas, where long investor time horizons are needed to bankroll the multibilliondollar capital costs of pipelines or liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals.

Meanwhile, international oil companies are left on the sidelines salivating helplessly over the vast reserves in NOC hands. Venezuela’s Orinoco region could yield hundreds of billions of barrels of heavy crude, but the government and a nowpliant PDVSA invite favored countries and their NOCs to explore rather than selecting the operators most capable of extracting the challenging but plentiful resource. Technical expertise and massive investment are required to fully develop vast Russian gas fields including Kovykta, Shtokman, and Yamal, but IOCs already burned by nationalizations and shifting rules in these and other Russian ventures are unlikely to be in a position to supply enough of either. In the face of dwindling resources they can tap, IOCs will need to diversify their business models, perhaps tackling technologically challenging options like oil sands or liquids from coal in conjunction with the carbon storage techniques that could make these palatable from a climate change perspective. Ironically, the only “easy” oil for IOCs has become oil that is geologically and technologically difficult.

While oil price is dependent on many factors (including global economic health) and is impossible to forecast with certainty, one can confidently predict continued tight supply of oil and gas, especially given global demand that will be propped up indefinitely by rising consumption in China and India. The world has plentiful hydrocarbons in the ground, but that’s where many of them are going to stay due to the unique organizational and political dynamics of the NOCs. Leverage over the market is weak; measures to reduce demand for oil and gas (though politically unpopular) or to spur development of alternative fuels and associated infrastructure (though slow to develop at scale) may be all that we have.

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Michael Wara and David G. Victor's recent work "A Realistic Policy on International Carbon Offsets" addresses problems with the world's largest offset program, the UN's Clean Development Mechanism. Wara and Victor argue that much of the CDM investment doesn' actually meet the UN's crucial additionality standards, and they outline ways to fix the problem.

David Victor Discusses Climate Policy, Offsets, and Incentives in the Wall Street Journal

In the News: Wall Street Journal on July 23, 2008

Income from carbon offsets has become French chemical manufacturer Rhodia SA's most profitable business. The WSJ estimates payouts to the firm from projects in Brazil and South Korea could total $1 billion over seven years, raising questions about the incentive structure of the CDM. David G. Victor argues that carbon markets are not sending the appropriate signals to the developing world.

Michael Wara and David Victor Address the Role of Offsets in California's Cap and Trade Plan

In the News: Science Magazine

California's plan to cut carbon emissions 10% by 2020 relies on offsets as a part of a cap and trade scheme. Michael Wara points out the challenges that face the state as it designs its offset program, and David G. Victor sheds light on difficulties faced by the world's largest offset program, the UN's CDM protocol.

Michael Wara Discusses Coal and the CDM

In the News: Wall Street Journal on July 11, 2008

The CDM Executive Board recently approved several gas-fired power plants under the UN's carbon offset scheme, opening the door for subsidizing coal generation and stoking controversy. Michael Wara questions the additionality of such projects and argues subsidies are better spent on other clean-energy development.

 

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Introduction:

This report describes the results of my analysis of the options for short-term price determination in the Brazilian electricity supply industry. The three major questions considered are: What are the initial conditions necessary for the introduction of bid-based short-term market for the Brazilian electricity supply industry? What should be the transition process from the current cost-based market to the final bid-based market. What is the recommended form for the final bid-based short-term market in Brazil? To provide a framework for considering these questions, the economic theory of the electricity market design process is first introduced. The two fundamental challenges of the market design process are how to obtain: (1) technically and allocatively efficient production and (2) economically efficient pricing of wholesale electricity.

Six major dimensions of the short-term electricity market design process are then introduced. I then discuss how each of these dimensions is dealt with in the current Brazilian short-term wholesale electricity market and how each might be addressed in my recommended future short-term market. The major issue dealt with in this section of the report is the issue of a cost-based versus bid-based short-term wholesale market. In order to understand the potential market efficiency and system reliability benefits of a bid-based market for Brazil, I then present the results of a comparative empirical analysis of the performance the current Brazilian shortterm market and the short-term markets in hydroelectric-dominated industries with bid-based markets in Colombia, New Zealand, and Norway. I believe that the results of these market performance comparisons provide evidence that there are significant market efficiency benefits associated with Brazil adopting a bid-based short-term market.

The next section of the report describes the initial conditions necessary to implement a bid-based short-term market in Brazil. These necessary conditions are: (1) coverage of close to 100% of final demand in fixed-price forward contract obligations negotiated far enough in advance of delivery to allow new entrants to compete to supply these contracts, (2) a local market power mitigation mechanism that applies to all market participants, (3) a cap and floor on supply offers into the short-term wholesale market, and (4) a prospective market monitoring process with public release of all data necessary to operate the short-term market. A key recommendation from this section of the report is that a bid-based short-term market should not be implemented in Brazil without these necessary pre-conditions.

The report then presents a recommended bid-based short-term market design and suggests a transition process from the current cost-based market design to this market design that initially involves minimal changes in the current cost-based market. Although I believe that this transition process should take between 12 to 18 months to complete, I do not think that this timetable should be adhered to without regard to events in the short-term market. In particular, further moves towards introducing flexible market mechanisms should not be made without the appropriate safeguards against the exercise of unilateral market power in place and validation that these safeguards are working as intended.

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Stanford University, Department of Economics
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Frank Wolak
Frank Wolak
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Hisham Zerriffi
Hisham Zerriffi
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Small scale power generation technologies (distributed generation) have the potential to significantly contribute to solving the rural electricity access problem in the developing world. This paper presents results from case studies in Brazil (part of a larger three country study) and shows that differences in business models and the influence of institutions are important factors for understanding success and failure in rural electrification and the contribution rural electrification can play in rural development. 

 

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David G. Victor
David G. Victor
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David G. Victor is a professor at Stanford Law School and directs the Freeman Spogli Institute's Program on Energy & Sustainable Development; he is also adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

What to do about Mexico's oil company, Pemex, may seem like a parochial issue of interest only to Mexicans and a few oil industry executives. But the matter should be of concern to anybody who is wondering when oil will come down off its near-record highs.

Pemex generates two fifth's of the Mexican government's income and is a lucrative employer, but it is ailing from neglect. For years the government has milked Pemex of cash without giving it the wherewithal to invest in and develop new sources of oil. When President Felipe Calderon proposed last week to reform Pemex and encourage more private investment in oil exploration and refining, his leftist opponents shut down the country's legislature in protest. Pemex, they claimed, is a cherished national treasure that must not be pushed into private hands.

Mexico is hardly the only country that treats its state oil companies as ATMs for governments, unions, cronies and others who siphon the rich benefits for themselves. A large fraction of the world's oil patch is struggling with the problem that bedevils Calderon: how to make state-owned oil companies (which control about three quarters of the world's oil reserves) more effective at finding and producing oil. Veneuzuela's oil output is flagging. Russia's state-owned gas company, Gazprom, is on the edge of a steep decline in production. And in different ways many of the world's state-owned oil companies are struggling to keep pace with rising demand. Simply privatizing them is politically difficult, and thus most of the world's oil-rich governments are struggling to find ways to make state enterprises perform better.

Even among state oil companies, Pemex's performance is notably poor. Used as a cash cow for the government, Pemex has never been able to keep enough of its profits to invest in exploration and better technology, the lifeblood of the best oil companies. Until a few years ago, Pemex invested essentially nothing in looking for new oil fields. It relied, instead, on the aging Cantarell field, which was discovered in the 1970s not by Pemex but by fisherman who were angry that the seeping oil was fouling their nets and assumed that Pemex was to blame. Pemex brought the massive field online with relatively simple technology. A scheme in the late 1990s extended the life of the field, but that effort has run out of steam. On the back of Cantarell's decline, total output from Pemex is sliding; some even worry that Mexico could become a net importer of oil in the next decade or two. They're probably wrong, but even the idea makes people nervous.

At times over the last few decades (including today) Pemex has been blessed with a dream team of smart managers, but even they have not been able to reverse the tide of red ink. That's because the company's troubles run so deep that even the best management can't fix them. Indeed, the most striking thing about Calderon's proposed reforms is that they don't go nearly far enough to make Pemex a responsive company, even though they are on the outer edge of what's probably politically feasible in Mexico.

For example, Calderon proposes a new system of "citizen bonds" that will help bring capital to the company (and because they would be owned by the public, these bonds would help blunt the legal block to any reform—Mexico's Constitution requires that its hydrocarbons be owned by the people). Money alone, though, won't reverse Pemex's fortunes. Part of the problem is that risk taking, which is essential to success in oil, is strongly discouraged. My colleagues at Stanford, in a study released last week, have shown that a system of tough laws that control procurement make managers wary of projects that could fail. Although such laws are designed to help stamp out corruption, a noble goal, they are administered by parts of the Mexican government that know little about the risky nature of the oil business.

Pemex's ability to control its own investment capital is probably more important to its success than anything else. The firm, though, has been hobbled because the government keeps all profits for use in the federal budget and the finance ministry has the final word on all Pemex investments. Solving that problem would require distancing government from the oil company. Given that the government is dependent on Pemex cash, that is politically risky. In fact, the real foundation for Calderon's reforms announced last week actually happened long ago when he first took office and spearheaded an effort to change Mexico's tax system. Much of the Mexican economy doesn't pay taxes to the government, which explains why its need for cash from Pemex is particularly desperate. Those tax reforms, however, are too modest to make a fundamental difference in the government's dependence on Pemex.

Calderon's reforms seem unlikely to solve the politically hardest task: reigning in the Pemex workers' union, which favors projects that generate jobs and benefits for its members. The union is well-connected to Mexico's left-leaning political parties, which helps explain why those same parties are so wary of "privatization." In fact, Calderon's proposals would not privatize the companies, but the union and the left know that cry will rally the people to prevent change.

Elsewhere in the world a thicket of similar, interlocking problems loom over the oil patch. Kuwait has a procurement system much like Mexico's, with a similarly perverse effect on the incentives for workers in that country's oil company to take risks and perform at world standard. Even in Brazil, whose state oil company is one of the best performing, has a hard time keeping the government at bay when it comes to taxing oil output. Two massive new oil finds over the last six months have kindled discussions in Brazil about raising the tax rate and channeling ever more of the oil output for government purposes. In Venezuela, where Chavez has taken a good oil company and run it into the ground, the burden of public projects is so great that the oil company can no longer focus on actually producing oil efficiently, and production is in decline.

The odds are that Calderon will make some reforms but won't transform Pemex. And that outcome, multiplied through state-owned oil companies around the world, suggests that oil output will increase only sluggishly. With demand still strong, oil prices are set to stay high for some time.

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Seeking to electrify the world as a charity venture is counterproductive, argues PESD affiliate faculty Hisham Zerriffi. What's needed is close attention to which electrification business models actually yield sustainable results, a question Zerriffi tackles in detail through case studies of Brazil, Cambodia, and China.
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The PESD's 2007 Annual Review Meeting, which will be held November 13-14, 2007 at Stanford University, provides the opportunity to take a look at major issues in the world's energy system, as well as PESD's current research and plans for the future.

PESD is a growing international research program that works on the political economy of energy. We study the political, legal, and institutional factors that affect outcomes in global energy markets. Much of our research has been based on field studies in developing countries including China, India, Brazil, South Africa, and Mexico.

At present, PESD is active in four major areas: climate change policy, energy and development, the emerging global natural gas market, and the role of national oil companies.

We have made available the agenda with more detail on the event. The substance of the workshop will begin at 1pm on Tuesday, November 13, with an overview of the program. Then we will focus the rest of the time on a few main research topics, discussing the current state of research for each as well as our plans for the future. We also anticipate discussion of areas where PESD can better collaborate with other institutions. The meeting ends at 1pm on Wednesday, November 14.

Schwab Center
680 Serra Street
Stanford, CA 94305-6090

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David G. Victor
David G. Victor
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The Brazilian government is declaring victory in its decades-long struggle to become self-sufficient in the supply of oil. The milestone is cause for celebration in a country that has long paid a high price for imported energy.

The Brazilian government is declaring victory in its decades-long struggle to become self-sufficient in the supply of oil. The milestone is cause for celebration in a country that has long paid a high price for imported energy.

It will also reverberate here in the United States where policy-makers, too, are trying to wean the nation from costly imports, jittery markets and the foreign spigot. But we must learn the right lessons. Brazil's success came not from treating oil as an addiction but by producing even more of the stuff and by becoming even more dependent on world markets

Here in the United States, most attention to Brazil's fuel supply has focused on the country's aggressive program to replace oil with ethanol that is made by fermenting homegrown sugar. American newspapers are filled with stories about Brazil's famous "flex fuel" vehicles that make it easy to switch between ethanol and conventional gasoline.

Guided partly by Brazil's apparent success, American policy-makers are crafting new mandates for ethanol, and flex fuel vehicles are now taking shape. We have the impression that ethanol is king.

In reality, ethanol is a minor player in Brazilian energy supply. It accounts for less than one-tenth of all the country's energy liquids.

The real source of Brazil's self-sufficiency is the country's extraordinary success in producing more oil. After the 1970s oil shocks, when Brazil's fuel import bill soared, the government pushed Petrobras, the state-controlled oil company, to look asunder for new energy sources.

Petrobras delivered, especially at home, where the firm pioneered the technologies that make it possible to extract oil locked in sediments under the seabed in extremely deep water. In the middle 1970s Brazil struggled to produce just 180,000 barrels of oil per day while importing four times that amount. Today it produces about 2 million and is self-sufficient. Indeed, the current milestone of self-sufficiency arrives with the inauguration of Brazil's newest deep water platform, the "P50." When P50 reaches its full output later this year, that one platform will deliver more liquid to Brazil than the country's entire ethanol program.

Brazil's self-sufficiency offers three lessons for U.S. energy policy:

-First is that ethanol, with current technology, will do little to sever our dependence on imported energy. Today's approach involves growing a crop - sugar in Brazil, corn in the United States - and then fermenting the fruits to yield fuel. Sugar plants in Brazil's climate are a lot more efficient at converting sunlight to biomass than is corn in the Midwest, but U.S. policy nonetheless favors corn (and imposes tariffs on imported sugar) because the program is really a scheme to deliver heartland votes rather than a commercially viable fuel.

Yet, even with Brazil's favorable climate and sugar's inviting biology, ethanol is already reaching the limit. That's because the land and other resources devoted to ethanol can be put to other uses such as growing food and cash crops.

Indeed, today the Brazilian government is actually reducing the share of ethanol that must be blended into gasoline because sugar growers prefer to make even more money by selling their product as sugar on the world market rather than fermenting it into alcohol.

New technologies - notably "cellulosic biomass"- could breathe fresh life into ethanol and replace still more oil. Cellulosic biomass is intriguing because it cuts costs by allowing the entire plant - the cellulose in the stalks, as well as the prized grain or sugar - to be fermented into fuel.

Advocates for this technology, including President Bush in his State of the Union address, have wrongly confused the sexy promise of this new-fangled approach to making ethanol with the practical realities of fuel markets. Schemes to produce cellulosic biomass, today, work only under special circumstances and nobody has delivered the fuel at the industrial scale that would be required for the technology to become commercially viable.

-Second, we should learn that, for now, the greatest force to loosen the world's oil markets lies with oil itself. We can use oil more efficiently, as would occur with a gasoline tax or wise fuel economy standards. But we can also find ways to produce more of the stuff - as Brazil did with Petrobras.

The problem for U.S. policy-makers is that the richest veins for new production lie mainly outside the United States and beyond our direct control.

Indeed, the Brazilian government made Petrobras more efficient by putting the firm partly beyond its control as well. When the government sold part of the company on international stock exchanges, it accepted Western accounting procedures and other strictures that have given Petrobras the autonomy and accountability to its shareholders that, in turn, helped make it an efficient company.

We have a stake in seeing other countries do the same - from Algeria to Mexico to Iran and even Russia. But we must remember that Brazil did this on its own, in response to internal pressures for reform, with little leverage from foreign governments.

-Third, we should learn from Brazil not to confuse the goal of greater self-sufficiency with the illusion of independence. Even as Brazil has become self-sufficient it has also, ironically, become more dependent on world markets. That's because the Brazilian government has wisely relaxed price controls so that the prices of fuels within the country are set to the world market. Thus Brazilians see real world prices when they fill up at the pump, and the decisions about which cars to buy and how much to drive reflect real costs and benefits of the fuel they consume. That is why, even as the country becomes self-sufficient, Brazilians are working ever harder to be more frugal with oil - because the price at the pump is high and rising.

Dependence on oil is a liability that must be managed. But it is not an addiction.

Efficiency, sober policies toward modest alternatives such as ethanol, and more production - all tools of the manager, not the addict - are required. Brazil helps show the way, but only if we learn the right lessons.

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