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David G. Victor
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David G. Victor is a professor at Stanford Law School and directs the Freeman Spogli Institute's Program on Energy & Sustainable Development; he is also adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

What to do about Mexico's oil company, Pemex, may seem like a parochial issue of interest only to Mexicans and a few oil industry executives. But the matter should be of concern to anybody who is wondering when oil will come down off its near-record highs.

Pemex generates two fifth's of the Mexican government's income and is a lucrative employer, but it is ailing from neglect. For years the government has milked Pemex of cash without giving it the wherewithal to invest in and develop new sources of oil. When President Felipe Calderon proposed last week to reform Pemex and encourage more private investment in oil exploration and refining, his leftist opponents shut down the country's legislature in protest. Pemex, they claimed, is a cherished national treasure that must not be pushed into private hands.

Mexico is hardly the only country that treats its state oil companies as ATMs for governments, unions, cronies and others who siphon the rich benefits for themselves. A large fraction of the world's oil patch is struggling with the problem that bedevils Calderon: how to make state-owned oil companies (which control about three quarters of the world's oil reserves) more effective at finding and producing oil. Veneuzuela's oil output is flagging. Russia's state-owned gas company, Gazprom, is on the edge of a steep decline in production. And in different ways many of the world's state-owned oil companies are struggling to keep pace with rising demand. Simply privatizing them is politically difficult, and thus most of the world's oil-rich governments are struggling to find ways to make state enterprises perform better.

Even among state oil companies, Pemex's performance is notably poor. Used as a cash cow for the government, Pemex has never been able to keep enough of its profits to invest in exploration and better technology, the lifeblood of the best oil companies. Until a few years ago, Pemex invested essentially nothing in looking for new oil fields. It relied, instead, on the aging Cantarell field, which was discovered in the 1970s not by Pemex but by fisherman who were angry that the seeping oil was fouling their nets and assumed that Pemex was to blame. Pemex brought the massive field online with relatively simple technology. A scheme in the late 1990s extended the life of the field, but that effort has run out of steam. On the back of Cantarell's decline, total output from Pemex is sliding; some even worry that Mexico could become a net importer of oil in the next decade or two. They're probably wrong, but even the idea makes people nervous.

At times over the last few decades (including today) Pemex has been blessed with a dream team of smart managers, but even they have not been able to reverse the tide of red ink. That's because the company's troubles run so deep that even the best management can't fix them. Indeed, the most striking thing about Calderon's proposed reforms is that they don't go nearly far enough to make Pemex a responsive company, even though they are on the outer edge of what's probably politically feasible in Mexico.

For example, Calderon proposes a new system of "citizen bonds" that will help bring capital to the company (and because they would be owned by the public, these bonds would help blunt the legal block to any reform—Mexico's Constitution requires that its hydrocarbons be owned by the people). Money alone, though, won't reverse Pemex's fortunes. Part of the problem is that risk taking, which is essential to success in oil, is strongly discouraged. My colleagues at Stanford, in a study released last week, have shown that a system of tough laws that control procurement make managers wary of projects that could fail. Although such laws are designed to help stamp out corruption, a noble goal, they are administered by parts of the Mexican government that know little about the risky nature of the oil business.

Pemex's ability to control its own investment capital is probably more important to its success than anything else. The firm, though, has been hobbled because the government keeps all profits for use in the federal budget and the finance ministry has the final word on all Pemex investments. Solving that problem would require distancing government from the oil company. Given that the government is dependent on Pemex cash, that is politically risky. In fact, the real foundation for Calderon's reforms announced last week actually happened long ago when he first took office and spearheaded an effort to change Mexico's tax system. Much of the Mexican economy doesn't pay taxes to the government, which explains why its need for cash from Pemex is particularly desperate. Those tax reforms, however, are too modest to make a fundamental difference in the government's dependence on Pemex.

Calderon's reforms seem unlikely to solve the politically hardest task: reigning in the Pemex workers' union, which favors projects that generate jobs and benefits for its members. The union is well-connected to Mexico's left-leaning political parties, which helps explain why those same parties are so wary of "privatization." In fact, Calderon's proposals would not privatize the companies, but the union and the left know that cry will rally the people to prevent change.

Elsewhere in the world a thicket of similar, interlocking problems loom over the oil patch. Kuwait has a procurement system much like Mexico's, with a similarly perverse effect on the incentives for workers in that country's oil company to take risks and perform at world standard. Even in Brazil, whose state oil company is one of the best performing, has a hard time keeping the government at bay when it comes to taxing oil output. Two massive new oil finds over the last six months have kindled discussions in Brazil about raising the tax rate and channeling ever more of the oil output for government purposes. In Venezuela, where Chavez has taken a good oil company and run it into the ground, the burden of public projects is so great that the oil company can no longer focus on actually producing oil efficiently, and production is in decline.

The odds are that Calderon will make some reforms but won't transform Pemex. And that outcome, multiplied through state-owned oil companies around the world, suggests that oil output will increase only sluggishly. With demand still strong, oil prices are set to stay high for some time.

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Ognen Stojanovski
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PESD has just released an 87-page case study of Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex), Mexico's national oil company. In "The Void of Governance: An Assessment of Pemex's Performance and Strategy," researcher Ognen Stojanovski examines how the state-owned company functions and details some of the profound challenges faced by reformers.

Mexico's Petróleos Mexicanos, or Pemex, is the world's third-ranked company by oil production. Almost 40% of the Mexican government budget is derived from Pemex revenues, leaving the country highly exposed to a drop in oil prices and the company itself strapped for cash to support much-needed investment. At the same time, the company has been progressively de-skilled over the decades by an exclusive focus on financial returns for the government, constitutional restrictions on foreign participation in the oil sector, and suffocating interference by diverse government agencies and the powerful workers' union.

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Mexico's Petróleos Mexicanos, or Pemex, is the world's third-ranked company by oil production. Almost 40% of the Mexican government budget is derived from Pemex revenues, leaving the country highly exposed to a drop in oil prices and the company itself strapped for cash to support much-needed investment. At the same time, the company has been progressively de-skilled over the decades by an exclusive focus on financial returns for the government, constitutional restrictions on foreign participation in the oil sector, and suffocating interference by diverse government agencies and the powerful workers' union.

In this case study, Ognen Stojanovski leverages extensive interviews with present and former Pemex and Mexican government insiders to paint a detailed picture of the organizational dynamics that drive Pemex's performance and strategy. Particularly important are the manifold interactions between Pemex and a host of intrusive, and yet ultimately non-strategic, government agencies, with the net result being extensive government interference and yet no actual government ownership of oil sector performance.

Facing a steep drop-off in the free-flowing oil from the Cantarell field that long provided easy revenues even in the face of weak organizational and technical capability, Pemex now finds itself scrambling to plug the production gap through new investments in exploration. At the same time, politically-popular constitutional restrictions on foreign ownership of Mexican hydrocarbons limit Pemex's ability to enlist foreign help to rapidly develop offshore oil. Current President (and former Energy Minister) Felipe Calderón recognizes the crises of finances, reserves, and oversight that are now facing Pemex, and on April 8, 2008 he proposed a set of reforms to the Mexican Senate. The PESD case study of Pemex elucidates what is needed on the reform front as well as the formidable obstacles that stand in front of Calderón as he attempts to remake Pemex into a strong performer.

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Program on Energy and Sustainable Development Working Paper #73
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Ognen Stojanovski
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What does it cost to produce a barrel of oil? CDDRL research associate and PESD affiliate Christine Jojarth provides a systematic answer to this question, taking into account geography, the "difficulty" of the oil field, and other factors. The results help quantify how much extra revenue is flowing to oil producers worldwide.
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David G. Victor
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David G. Victor is a professor at Stanford Law School and directs the Freeman Spogli Institute's Program on Energy & Sustainable Development; he is also adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Democrats voting in Ohio and Texas may well decide the shape of the U.S. presidential election. Regardless of who they choose to run against Sen. John McCain, the all but certain Republican candidate, it is likely that energy issues will figure more prominently in the election than at any time in the last generation. High prices are sapping economic growth, the No. 1 concern across most of the country. Gasoline is now approaching $4 a gallon; natural gas and electricity are also more costly than a few years ago. Global warming has become a bipartisan worry, and solving that problem will require radical new energy technologies as well. All this is good news in the rest of the world, which is hoping that a new regime in Washington will put the United States on a more sustainable energy path.

It may be a vain hope. It is extremely unlikely that Washington will ever supply a coherent energy policy, regardless of who takes the White House in November. That's because serious policies to change energy patterns require a broad effort across many disconnected government agencies and political groups. Higher energy efficiency for buildings and appliances, a major energy use area, requires new federal and state standards. Higher efficiency for vehicles requires federal mandates that always meet stiff opposition in Detroit. A more aggressive program to replace oil with biofuels requires policy decisions that affect farmers and crop patterns-yet another part of Washington's policymaking apparatus, with its own political geometry. New power plants that generate electricity without high emissions of warming gases require reliable subsidies from both federal and state governments, because such plants are much more costly than conventional power sources. Approvals for these new plants require favorable decisions by state regulators, most of whom are not yet focused on the task. Expanded use of nuclear power requires support from still another constellation of administrators and political interests. And so on.

Whenever the public seizes on energy issues, the cabal of Washington energy experts imagines that these problems can be solved with a new comprehensive energy strategy, backed by a grand new political coalition. Security hawks would welcome reduced dependence on volatile oil suppliers, especially in the Persian Gulf. Greens would favor a lighter tread on the planet, and labor would seize on the possibility for "green-collar" jobs in the new energy industries. Farmers would win because they could serve the energy markets. The energy experts dream of a coalition so powerful that it could rewire government and align policy incentives.

This coalition, alas, never lasts long enough to accomplish much. For an energy policy to be effective, it must send credible signals to encourage investment in new equipment not just for the few months needed to craft legislation but for at least two decades-enough time for industry to build and install a new generation of cars, appliances and power plants, and make back the investment. The coalition, though, is politically too diverse to survive the kumbaya moment.

Just two weeks ago the feds canceled "FutureGen," a government-industry project to develop technologies for burning coal without emitting copious greenhouse gases, demonstrating that the government is incapable of making a credible promise to help industry develop these badly needed technologies over the long haul. (The project had severe design flaws, but what matters most is that the federal government was able to pretend to support the venture for as long as it did and then abruptly back off.) Similarly, legislation late last year to increase the fuel economy of U.S. automobiles will have such a small effect on the vehicle fleet that it will barely change the country's dependence on imported oil and will have almost no impact on carbon emissions. Democrats and Republicans alike claim they want to end the country's dependence on foreign oil, but neither party actually does much about it.

The only policies that survive in this political vacuum are those that target narrower political interests with more staying power. Thus America has a highly credible policy to promote corn-based ethanol, because that policy really has nothing to do with energy; it is a chameleon that takes on whatever colors are needed to survive. It is a farm program that masquerades as energy policy; at times, it has been a farm program that masquerades as rural development. As an energy policy it is a very costly and ineffective way to cut dependence on oil. As a global warming policy it is even less cost effective, since large-scale ethanol doesn't help much in cutting CO2 and other warming gases. Similarly, the United States has a stiff subsidy for renewable electricity-mainly wind and solar plants-because environmentalists are well organized in their support for it. The coal industry periodically gets money for its favored technologies, as in FutureGen, but even that powerful lobby has a hard time getting the government to stay the course.

Europe is in danger of contracting the same affliction. To be sure, most European countries long ago started taxing energy as a convenient way to raise revenues, which fortuitously also makes energy more costly and creates a strong incentive for efficiency. That approach did not originate as an energy policy, but it has emerged as a keystone of Europe's more successful efforts to tame energy consumption. And Europe is in the midst of shifting policymaking from the individual countries to Brussels, which may create a more coherent approach. But despite these advantages, Europe is notable for its inability to be strategic. For example, Brussels is touting a new pipeline called Nabucco that would help Europe cut its dependence on Russia for its natural gas. So far, Brussels is good at talking about the Nabucco dream but can't agree on a route, financing, or even on where to get the gas that would replace Russia's.

The rising powers in Asia are also finding that they, like America, have a hard time developing and applying strategic energy policies. China develops energy policy through its economic planning system, with mixed results. The country doesn't even have an energy ministry, and efforts to create one are being stymied by the bureaucracy and companies that fear they will lose influence. India has four energy ministries and no real central strategy. Like America, India is very good at declaring visions for strategic energy policy but dreadful at putting them into practice. The Japanese public is just as fickle, but the government bureaucracy is entrenched and far-sighted enough to keep its focus long after public interest has waned.

All this means that the underlying forces that are causing high demand for energy (and high prices) and emitting greenhouse gases will be hard to alter. The effort to solve global warming might change this pessimistic iron rule of energy policy, because the environmental community that is the core of the coalition in support of global warming policy is becoming much stronger and has shown staying power. For the moment, however, that is a hypothesis to be proved.

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This paper develops empirical models for average oil production costs that represent the structural field-level and country-level determinants most characteristic for the new era beyond easy oil. These models lend themselves as a tool for forecasting the floor of structural cost trends related to the shift into more cost intensive fields that are increasingly producing heavy and extra-heavy crudes and that are located offshore and in countries fraught with high levels of political and environmental risks. Given the extremely limited availability of reliable, non-proprietary cost data, this model deliberately relies on high level factors for which data is publicly available for hundreds of fields from all oil producing states. This model specification offers the important advantage of enabling us to lever insights gained from this study in powerful out-of-sample estimations for the dominant scenario where data is available on field characteristics but not on costs.

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Program on Energy and Sustainable Development Working Paper #72
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David G. Victor
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David G. Victor: Although oil prices will eventually drop as new sources come online and biofuels and other alternatives take hold, crude price are likely to remain high and volatile for a while.
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Russia's Gazprom is among the largest companies in the world, and by far the world's largest producer of natural gas, with close to a 20% share. Driven by its political masters, it continues to consolidate control over Russia's vast oil and (especially) gas resources, and many Western observers are worried by its international expansion into downstream assets. In a new study of the energy giant, Nadejda Victor details the ways in which Gazprom's actions are distorted by political demands and by the inefficiency of the Russian economy, suggesting that it is headed for a production crisis if business and investment considerations don't start to take a higher priority.
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This study, which is part of a larger research project on state-controlled hydrocarbon resources, looks at the strategy, evolution and performance of Gazprom, Russia's largest state company. It explores the critical role that Gazprom plays in the Russian economy, as well as its growing and evolving role as an instrument of state.

Section 1 provides an overview of the Russian oil and gas sectors, with special attention to the history of gas as a Soviet ministry's the period when nearly all of Gazprom's legacy assets in gas fields and pipelines were developed.

Section II focuses on Gazprom as an organization, including its structure, revenues, and its activities within Russia, Western Europe and overseas. As the study makes clear, Gazprom is far more than the world's largest gas company. It is a monopoly controlled by the Kremlin, serving both economic and political agendas, as well as a multidimensional investment enterprise seeking a larger role on the world stage.

Section III looks at the "yin and yang" of Gazprom and the state, and the reasons for early privatization efforts following the demise of the Soviet Union, as well as the current "re-nationalization" of the oil and gas sectors as world prices have risen.

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Program on Energy and Sustainable Development Working Paper #71
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Nadejda M. Victor
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Since 2002, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has dramatically reshaped the national oil company, PDVSA, to align it with his goals. PESD researcher David Hults probes current-day PDVSA through three lenses: as a large and growing source of government income, as an instrument of state objectives, and on the merits of its business plan.
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