As the United States designs its strategy for regulating emissions of greenhouse gases, two central issues have emerged. One is how to limit the cost of compliance while still maintaining environmental integrity. The other is how to "engage" developing countries in serious efforts to limit emissions. Industry and economists are rightly concerned about cost control yet have found it difficult to mobilize adequate political support for control mechanisms such as a "safety valve;" they also rightly caution that currently popular ideas such as a Fed-like Carbon Board are not sufficiently fleshed out to reliably play a role akin to a safety valve. Many environmental groups have understandably feared that a safety valve would undercut the environmental effectiveness of any program to limit emissions of greenhouse gases. These politics are, logically, drawing attention to the possibility of international offsets as a possible cost control mechanism. Indeed, the design of the emission trading system in the northeastern U.S. states (RGGI) and in California (the recommendations of California's AB32 Market Advisory Committee) point in this direction, and the debate in Congress is exploring designs for a cap and trade system that would allow a prominent role for international offsets.

This article reviews the actual experience in the world's largest offset market-the Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)-and finds an urgent need for reform. Well-designed offsets markets can play a role in engaging developing countries and encouraging sound investment in low-cost strategies for controlling emissions. However, in practice, much of the current CDM market does not reflect actual reductions in emissions, and that trend is poised to get worse. Nor are CDM-like offsets likely to be effective cost control mechanisms. The demand for these credits in emission trading systems is likely to be out of phase with the CDM supply. Also, the rate at which CDM credits are being issued today-at a time when demand for such offsets from the European ETS is extremely high-is only one-twentieth to one-fortieth the rate needed just for the current CDM system to keep pace with the projects it has already registered. If the CDM system is reformed so that it does a much better job of ensuring that emission credits represent genuine reductions then its ability to dampen reliably the price of emission permits will be even further diminished.

We argue that the U.S., which is in the midst of designing a national regulatory system, should not to rely on offsets to provide a reliable ceiling on compliance costs. More explicit cost control mechanisms, such as "safety valves," would be much more effective. We also counsel against many of the popular "solutions" to problems with offsets such as imposing caps on their use. Offset caps as envisioned in the Lieberman-Warner draft legislation, for example, do little to fix the underlying problem of poor quality emission offsets because the cap will simply fill first with the lowest quality offsets and with offsets laundered through other trading systems such as the European scheme. Finally, we suggest that the actual experience under the CDM has had perverse effects in developing countries-rather than draw them into substantial limits on emissions it has, by contrast, rewarded them for avoiding exactly those commitments.

Offsets can play a role in engaging developing countries, but only as one small element in a portfolio of strategies. We lay out two additional elements that should be included in an overall strategy for engaging developing countries on the problem of climate change. First, the U.S., in collaboration with other developed countries, should invest in a Climate Fund intended to finance critical changes in developing country policies that will lead to near-term reductions. Second, the U.S. should actively pursue a series of infrastructure deals with key developing countries with the aim of shifting their longer-term development trajectories in directions that are both consistent with their own interests but also produce large greenhouse gas emissions reductions.

National Security Consequences of U.S. Oil Dependency, a report by the Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force on Energy, concludes that the “lack of sustained attention to energy issues is undercutting U.S. foreign policy and U.S. national security.” The report goes on to examine how America’s dependence on imported oil—which currently comprises 60 percent of consumption— increasingly puts it into competition with other energy importers, notably the rapidly growing economies of China and India.

The task force was chaired jointly by James R. Schlesinger, a former secretary of defense and secretary of energy, and John Deutch, former director of Central Intelligence and undersecretary of energy, and drew from industry, academia, government, and NGOs. PESD Director David Victor directed the task force and FSI senior fellow by courtesy James Sweeney, director of Stanford’s new Precourt Institute for Energy Efficiency, served as a member.

The task force unanimously concluded that incentives are needed to slow and eventually reverse the growth in petroleum consumption, particularly in the transportation sector, but was unable to agree on which specific incentives—such as gasoline tax-funded energy technology R&D, more stringent and broadly applied Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency (CAFE) standards, and a cap-and-trade permit system for gasoline—would most effectively achieve this result.

The task force report included additional recommendations regarding the supply and consumption of energy including the following:

• Encourage oil supply from all sources
• Promote better management and governance of oil revenues
• Remove the protectionist tariff on imported ethanol
• Increase the efficiency of oil and gas consumption in the United States and elsewhere
• Switch from oil-derived products to alternatives such as biofuels
• Make the oil and gas infrastructure more efficient and secure
• Increase investment in energy technology R&D
• Promote the proper functioning and efficiency of energy markets
• Revitalize international institutions such as the International Energy Agency (IEA)

The report stressed that the U.S. government must reorganize to integrate energy issues with foreign policy to address the threats to national security created by energy dependence. The task force offered a number of recommendations to better promote energy issues in foreign policy deliberations as follows:

• Establish an energy security directorate at the National Security Council to lead an interagency process to influence the discussion and thinking of the NSC principals
• Fully inform and engage the secretary of energy on all foreign policy matters with an important energy aspect
• Include energy security issues in the terms of reference of all planning studies at the NSC, Defense, State, and the intelligence community

The task force restricted its inquiry to the challenges of managing U.S. and global dependence on imported oil and gas and did not address other important energy security issues such as nuclear proliferation and global warming.

Uncertainty can hamper the stringency of commitments under cap and trade schemes. We assess how well intensity targets, where countries' permit allocations are indexed to future realised GDP, can cope with uncertainties in a post-Kyoto international greenhouse emissions trading scheme. We present some empirical foundations for intensity targets and derive a simple rule for the optimal degree of indexation to GDP. Using an 18-region simulation model of a 2020 global capand-trade treaty under multiple uncertainties and endogenous commitments, we estimate that optimal intensity targets could achieve global abatement as much as 20 per cent higher than under absolute targets, and even greater increases in welfare measures.

The optimal degree of indexation to GDP would vary greatly between countries, including super-indexation in some advanced countries, and partial indexation for most developing countries. Standard intensity targets (with one-to-one indexation) would also improve the overall outcome, but to a lesser degree and not in all cases. Although target indexation is no magic wand for a future global climate treaty, gains from reduced cost uncertainty might justify increased complexity, framing issues and other potential downsides of intensity targets.

The stellar performance of BP's emission control program has led many observers, inside and outside BP, to ascribe success to the firm's emissions trading system. As countries and other firms have considered the adoption of trading systems they often point to BP's pioneering experience as a guiding star. Yet no study has ever explained the operation and impact of BP's trading system. Which factors truly drove the leaders of BP's business units to cut emissions? What lessons should be learned from BP's experience to guide other trading systems? We focus on these questions, drawing heavily on interviews with key corporate policymakers at BP as well as managers in key business units (BUs) that were actually involved in trading.