The Program on Energy and Sustainable Development is part of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.
Sometimes in diplomacy what is not announced is more revealing than what is. Such is certainly the case in India's recent climate and energy negotiations with the US, as both countries prepare to head to global climate talks in Copenhagen. The occasion of Manmohan Singh's state visit to the US brought the announcement of a flurry of energy and climate-related initiatives. These initiatives were a combination of substance and political theatre, with potentially important initiatives on environmental and regulatory capacity-building and technology partnerships buried under a deep layer of bureaucratic niceties.
What was more noticed was what was not announced: any agreement for India to have a binding target for CO2 emissions reductions, something US and European environmentalists have long claimed is necessary as part of a global effort to stave off severe climate change. And while the Indian government has eventually announced a targeted reduction in what is known as "emissions intensity", CO2 emissions per unit of GDP, that wasn't a big stretch, given India's current annual efficiency improvements. Furthermore, Minister for Environment and Forests Jairam Ramesh has made it abundantly clear in Parliament that such targets would be voluntary and not part of a binding international agreement.
With more than 60 world leaders in attendance, we can be assured that Copenhagen will not end in public failure. But the better question is whether the announced success in Copenhagen will have any practical meaning other than determining that diplomats can spin a "success" out of any actual events. Some Indian commentators have seemed to hope for a "success" of that sort - fretting about India being outmanoeuvred on the public stage by China and other developing countries that may be able to strike a more cooperative posture.
While from a tactical standpoint, such concerns are understandable (there is little reason for India to not commit to doing things it would like to do anyway, such as developing more efficient power plants or cars), from the perspective of actually taking leadership in addressing the climate problem, they mean little. In some ways, India is emulating the example of the US from the previous Kyoto climate round: while the US certainly should have been more proactive and engaged, at least the Americans had the integrity not to ratify an agreement that they couldn't keep. Many other nations could not claim that; they either missed their targets entirely, or resorted to bogus accounting tricks to meet their goals.
That India is showing its seriousness by not making climate commitments it won't live by should actually be seen as a mature and responsible decision, not an intransigent one. Does anyone think that China won't walk away from its promise if they have trouble meeting their emissions reduction goals?
As an alternative to the hot air that is likely to come out of Copenhagen, it is instructive to look at the potentially useful energy and climate agreements the US and India did sign during the PM's recent visit. The fact that clean energy was the second item listed behind security issues in the joint communiqué announced by Singh and Obama is clear evidence that both India and the US place a high importance on this aspect of their relationship.
India and the US announced numerous programmes, from the joint deployment of solar electricity in Indian cities to the strengthening of India's environmental regulatory and monitoring capacity - which is sure to be a critical step if India is to make serious and verifiable long-term commitments to emissions reductions. Perhaps most important, at least symbolically, was the announcement of joint scientific R&D work for renewable energy technologies. The Indo-US Clean Energy Research and Deployment Initiative, which promises joint development of new energy technologies and the development of a joint research centre with a public-private funding model, is one such initiative.
Ultimately, despite the bluster of diplomats in Delhi, Washington or Copenhagen, the solutions to the climate change problem must come through a technological revolution in the world's energy infrastructure. And it is here that India, with its burgeoning corps of bright young engineers, could make the biggest impact on climate change mitigation. Circumstances may not permit
India to lead the deal-making in Denmark, but if the Indian government gets serious about turning more of India's brightest young minds towards solving the clean energy problem, then India's contribution to solving the climate change conundrum may be significant indeed.
PESD researchers Richard K. Morse and Gang He are in Copenhagen attending international climate negotiations at the UN's COP 15. Key issues in PESD's research platform are prominently featured in the event: carbon capture and storage, reform of the clean development mechanism (CDM), Chinese energy markets, carbon markets, the future of coal and gas and global emissions, the smart grid, and a host of other topics central to the future of the global energy system. Richard and Gang are testing their latest research with some of the world's key decision markers on energy and climate and sharing Stanford and PESD insights in this global forum.
(Excerpt) According to climate scientists, averting the worst consequences of climate change requires that the increase in global temperature should be limited to 2°C (or 3.6°F). to achieve that objective, global emissions of green house gases (GHGs)—the main human cause of global warming—must be reduced to 50 percent of 1990 levels by 2050.
The key to successful climate change abatement at those scales lies in leveraging the collective actions of developed and developing countries. Cumulatively, developed countries have been responsible for most human emissions of GHGs. that picture will be quite different in the future as emissions from the developing world take over the top mantle. Given this dynamic, there is a general agreement internationally that developed countries will lead emissions reductions efforts and that developing countries will follow with “nationally ap- propriate mitigation actions.” turning that agreement into environmentally beneficial action requires close international coordination between the developed and developing countries in allocating the responsibility for the necessary reductions and following up with credible actions. However, the instruments employed so far to promote the necessary collective action have proved to be insufficient, unscalable, and questionable in terms of environmental benefit and economic efficiency.
Currently, the most important and visible link be- tween developed and developing countries’ efforts on climate change is the Clean development Mechanism (CdM). the CdM uses market mechanisms—the “carbon markets”—to direct funding from developed countries to those projects in developing countries that lead to reductions in emissions of warming gases. In reality, the experience with the CdM has been mixed at best since its inception in 2006. while the CdM has successfully channeled funding to many worthy projects that reduce emissions of warming gasses, it has also spawned myriad projects with little environmental benefits. overall, the CdM has led to a significant overpayment by developed countries for largely dubious emissions reductions in developing countries.
The capture and permanent storage of CO2 emissions from coal combustion is now widely viewed as imperative for stabilization of the global climate. Coal is the world’s fastest growing fossil fuel. This trend presents a forceful case for the development and wide dissemination of technologies that can decouple coal consumption from CO2 emissions—the leading candidate technology to do this is carbon capture and storage (CCS).
China simultaneously presents the most challenging and critical test for CCS deployment at scale. While China has begun an handful of marquee CCS demonstration projects, the stark reality to be explored in this paper is that China’s incentives for keeping on the forefront of CCS technology learning do not translate into incentives to massively deploy CCS in power plant applications as CO2 mitigation scenarios would have it. In fact, fundamental and interrelated Chinese interests—in energy security, economic growth and development, and macroeconomic stability—directly argue against large-scale implementation of CCS in China unless such an implementation can be almost entirely supported by outside funding. This paper considers how these core Chinese goals play out in the specific context of the country’s coal and power markets, and uses this analysis to draw conclusions about the path of CCS implementation in China’s energy sector.
Finally, the paper argues that effective climate change policy will require both the vigorous promotion and careful calculation of CCS’s role in Chinese power generation. As the world approaches the end of the Kyoto Protocol in 2012 and crafts a new policy architecture for a global climate deal, international offset policy and potential US offset standards need to create methodologies that directly address CCS funding at scale. The more closely these policies are aligned with China’s own incentives and the unique context of its coal and power markets, the better chance they have of realizing the optimal role for CCS in global climate efforts.
