This study, which is part of a larger research project on state-controlled hydrocarbon resources, looks at the strategy, evolution and performance of Gazprom, Russia's largest state company. It explores the critical role that Gazprom plays in the Russian economy, as well as its growing and evolving role as an instrument of state.

Section 1 provides an overview of the Russian oil and gas sectors, with special attention to the history of gas as a Soviet ministry's the period when nearly all of Gazprom's legacy assets in gas fields and pipelines were developed.

Section II focuses on Gazprom as an organization, including its structure, revenues, and its activities within Russia, Western Europe and overseas. As the study makes clear, Gazprom is far more than the world's largest gas company. It is a monopoly controlled by the Kremlin, serving both economic and political agendas, as well as a multidimensional investment enterprise seeking a larger role on the world stage.

Section III looks at the "yin and yang" of Gazprom and the state, and the reasons for early privatization efforts following the demise of the Soviet Union, as well as the current "re-nationalization" of the oil and gas sectors as world prices have risen.

The developing LNG trade does not have symmetric participants. LNG buyers in continental European and Japan tend to be monopoly gas and electricity companies with incentive and financial ability to sign long-term contracts. In contrast, prospective LNG buyers in the US and the UK participate in competitive wholesale markets and regulatory oversight with disincentives for volume commitments. As a result, integrated LNG sellers use US and UK as "markets of last resort" with implications for variability in actual LNG deliveries and for the division of rents in the growing LNG trade.

This text is a working paper version of Chapter 5 in Mark Hayes' doctoral dissertation to be published in 2007 by Stanford University Press.

Growing LNG imports will impact the value of gas storage and regional price spreads. In this chapter the author describes a model that incorporates seasonal gas demand, and relevant supply chain costs that will drive month-scale LNG flows. This text is a working paper version of Chapter 3 in Mark Hayes' doctoral dissertation to be published in 2007 by Stanford University Press.

Random (stochastic) variability in gas demand and prices creates significant option value for LNG suppliers with destination flexibility. In this chapter the author describes an analytical model to value the option of cargo diversion and to draw insights about the potential for future regional price convergence. This text is a working paper version of Chapter 4 in Mark Hayes' doctoral dissertation to be published in 2007 by Stanford University Press.

Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), the national oil company (NOC) of Venezuela, is a major energy producer. Vertically integrated, the company conducts large-scale domestic exploration and production activities in both oil and natural gas, operates domestic and international refining facilities, and sells gasoline products to consumers both at home and abroad.

The Venezuelan government has relied on PDVSA to fund and implement a heavily interventionist strategy with several aims. The influx of large hydrocarbon revenues has funded Venezuelan government projects to improve social conditions, particularly for the poor. These revenues have also enabled the government to cement patronage networks and nationalize those economic sectors that might otherwise threaten its rule.

This study provides a descriptive account of how the company operates under the considerable mandates of the Venezuelan state including a brief history of PDVSA, chronicling its development from nationalization, a snapshot of PDVSA as a company today, describing its production, refining, and other operations. Following these preliminaries, the study concentrates on PDVSA's framework today, suggesting three models: PDVSA as a government revenue-provider, implementer of political objectives, and viable business. The paper also outlines PDVSA's role as an important revenuecollecting actor for the Venezuelan government and how PDVSA has become an implementing agent for the state, delivering revenues to government-selected beneficiaries and making business decisions in support of government objectives. Finally, the paper addresses PDVSA as a business.