Kyoto Protocol
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Uncertainty can hamper the stringency of commitments under cap and trade schemes. We assess how well intensity targets, where countries' permit allocations are indexed to future realised GDP, can cope with uncertainties in a post-Kyoto international greenhouse emissions trading scheme. We present some empirical foundations for intensity targets and derive a simple rule for the optimal degree of indexation to GDP. Using an 18-region simulation model of a 2020 global capand-trade treaty under multiple uncertainties and endogenous commitments, we estimate that optimal intensity targets could achieve global abatement as much as 20 per cent higher than under absolute targets, and even greater increases in welfare measures.

The optimal degree of indexation to GDP would vary greatly between countries, including super-indexation in some advanced countries, and partial indexation for most developing countries. Standard intensity targets (with one-to-one indexation) would also improve the overall outcome, but to a lesser degree and not in all cases. Although target indexation is no magic wand for a future global climate treaty, gains from reduced cost uncertainty might justify increased complexity, framing issues and other potential downsides of intensity targets.

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Program on Energy and Sustainable Development Working Paper #41
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When addressing an externality such as air pollution, regulators can control policy inputs (e.g., pollution taxes and technology standards) or outputs (e.g., emission caps). Economists are familiar with this debate, known broadly as "prices vs. quantities," but analysts of international environmental agreements have rarely focused sustained attention to such questions. Using an inventory of all international air pollution agreements, we document the historical patterns in instrument choice. Those agreements that require little effort beyond the status quo are usually codified in terms of effort, but agreements that require substantial actions by the parties nearly always deploy a cap on emission quantities as the central regulatory instrument.

We suggest that this concentration of experience with emission caps and paucity of serious efforts to coordinate policy inputs may explain why the architects of international environmental agreements appear to believe that emission caps work best. We illustrate what's at stake with the example of international efforts to control the emissions that cause global climate change. We also show that the conventional history of the agreement that is most symbolic of the superiority of emission caps - the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer - has wrongly overlooked a little-known provision that operates akin to a "price" instrument.

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Global Environmental Politics
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David G. Victor

This meeting will focus on the intersection of two crucial challenges for the organization of energy infrastructures in the developing world. First, for nearly two decades most major developing countries have struggled to introduce market forces in their electric power systems. In every case, that effort has proceeded more slowly than reformers originally hoped; the outcomes have been hybrids that are far from the efficiency and organization of the "ideal" textbook model for a market-based power system. Second, growing concern about global climate change has put the spotlight on the need to build an international regulatory regime that includes strong incentives for key developing countries to control their emissions of greenhouse gases. In most of those countries, the power sector is the largest single source of emissions. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol included mechanisms that would reward developing nations that cut emissions, but so far those systems have functioned far short of their imagined potential. A growing chorus of analysts and policy makers are expressing dissatisfaction with those existing mechanisms and clamoring for alternatives.

This meeting will offer diagnoses of what has gone wrong and what opportunities have nonetheless emerged. It will focus on practical solutions and look at the prospects for different technologies to meet growing demand for power while minimizing the ecological footprint of power generation. It will engage scholars who are studying the industrial organization of the electric power sector (and other infrastructures) in developing countries as well as those who study the effectiveness of international legal regimes. It will engage practitioners, including regulators and energy policy makers. Our aims are not only to focus on new theories that are emerging to explain the organization of the power sector and the design of meaningful international institutions, but also to identify practical implications for investors, regulators, and policy makers.

Presentations will include recent results from the research of Stanford Program on Energy and Sustainable Development. We will present the main findings from a comprehensive study of power market reform in five developing countries (Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa). We will also show the results from a detailed analysis of the greenhouse gas emissions from two key states in India and three provinces in China--a study conducted jointly with the Indian Institute of Management in Ahmedabad. In addition, we will present new conclusions from ongoing work that focuses on strategies for engaging developing countries in the global climate regime. Among the topics considered will be the prospects for accelerating the introduction of natural gas into electric power systems--especially those in China and India where the present domination of coal leads to relatively high emissions.

Oksenberg Conference Room

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Climate change is one of the most complex issues facing policy-makers today. Controlling the emissions that cause global warming will require societies to incur costs now while uncertain benefits accrue in the distant future. These conditions make it difficult to create succesful policy, yet the longer we wait the more greenhouse gases accumulate in the atmosphere. Even as a consensus grows that something must be done, there is no agreement on the best course of action.

This book takes a fresh look at the issue. It offers three contrasting perspectives, each cast as a presidential speech. One emphasizes the ability of modern, wealthy societies to adapt to the changing climate. A second speech urges reengagement with the Kyoto Protocol while demanding reforms that would make Kyoto more effective. A third speech urges unilateral action that would create a market for low-carbon emission technologies from the "bottom up," in contrast with top-down international treaties such as Kyoto.

A memorandum to the president explains the multidimensional nature of this critical issue and an extensive appendix includes scientific reports, government speeches, legislative proposals, and further readings.

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Books
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The Council on Foreign Relations
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David G. Victor
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0-87609-343-8
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A new currency is emerging in world markets. Unlike the dollars, ruros and yen that trade for tangible goods and human services, money exchanges hands for pollution - particularly emissions of carbon dioxide, which are caused by burning fossil fuels and are the leading cause of global climate change. Carbon credits, as they are called, are poised to transform the world energy system and thus the world economy.

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Policy Briefs
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Harvard International Review
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David G. Victor
Joshua C. House
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This chapter, by PESD fellow Thomas Heller and PESD affiliate P.R. Shukla, was published by the Pew Center on Global Climate Change in 2003 as part of their "Beyond Kyoto" series.

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Pew Center on Global Climate Change
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Thomas C. Heller
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In recent years, the U.S. debate on global warming policy has been stymied by the unachievable goals of the Kyoto Protocol. Cutting U.S. emissions by one-quarter in barely a decade, as agreed at Kyoto, was never politically feasible.

Now the Bush administration, nearly a year after pulling out of the Kyoto Protocol, has finally announced its own plan for global warming. It falls far short of a grand strategy but does take a few important steps forward.

One of them is to offer a better way to measure progress on the problem. The Bush plan sets goals in terms of "greenhouse gas intensity" -- the ratio of greenhouse gas emissions per unit of economic activity. That ratio declines as the economy grows and policies encourage people to control emissions of greenhouse gases. The administration seeks an 18 percent reduction in intensity over the next decade.

By contrast, the Kyoto approach would require the United States and all other industrialized nations to regulate their total quantity of emissions to exacting targets during brief five-year periods. Thus the Kyoto approach unwittingly pitted advocates of economic growth against those who sought environmental protection, especially in the United States. As the U.S. economy grew rapidly in the 1990s, emissions soared, and it became ever harder to devise an economic plan for meeting the Kyoto limits.

The truth is that policymakers are not able to plan compliance for Kyoto-style targets because they don't really have much control over the short-term volume of emissions. Governments can implement such policies as fuel economy standards or tax credits for carbon-free fuels, but these are most effective only over long time periods. By putting a spotlight on trends in greenhouse gas intensity over long periods of time, the new approach better matches goals with the real leverage available to policy- makers.

The administration's plan would also invest more in scientific research on the causes and dangers of global warming. And it wisely pumps new money into research on energy technologies, such as fuel cells, that may allow future generations to move beyond fossil fuels.

But the weaknesses in the plan are severe. First, it is exceedingly modest. The planned cut in greenhouse gas intensity -- less than 2 percent per year compounded over the next decade -- sounds like a lot, but viewed from the long perspective of economic history it is trivial. In the 19th century, U.S. greenhouse gas intensity rose as industrialization accelerated the burning of fossil fuels even more rapidly than the economy swelled. Greenhouse gas intensity peaked in 1917 and has been declining ever since, on average about 1.5 percent per year.

New economic activities -- such as banking and software design -- do not require the same level of emissions as old energy-intensive industries such as steel production.

The Bush plan does little to accelerate this decoupling of economic growth from greenhouse gas emissions. Even the planned cut in intensity will not stop the growth in total emissions, which will probably rise about 10 percent in the next decade.

The Europeans won't be impressed. Their greenhouse gas intensity is already one-third lower than the United States' and slated to decline more than 2 percent per year over the next decade.

A second weakness in the Bush plan is the lack of credible incentives for firms to invest in emission reductions. Clear signals are necessary because the power plants, cars and factories we build today will constrain our freedom to control emissions in the coming decades.

Rather, the plan only encourages firms to implement voluntary reductions in emissions. Firms that make cuts would earn credits that would be honored in the future, if the United States ever adopts a mandatory emission control scheme.

This voluntary system could accelerate development of a binding emission trading system for the United States, which would be a welcome step forward. In the interim, though, the voluntary approach will create a snake pit of promises and technical problems that will hamper serious future efforts to control emissions. For example, how will the U.S. government know whether a firm has reduced its emissions? A complicated and intrusive scheme to review every project might offer answers, but it would be costly and bureaucratic. Worse, this approach allows firms that happen to install technologies that reduce emissions to stake a claim on credits that would be tradable in the future. In essence, it encourages a land rush in which the dirtiest firms with the largest potential for emission reductions can seize the greatest property rights. A better approach would start with a simple, binding system today.

Third, the new plan fails to solve many of the problems that rightly led the Bush administration to criticize the Kyoto framework. Last spring the president lambasted Kyoto for setting arbitrary short-term targets. His plan is little different -- it sets vapid short-term goals, yet is silent on long-term trajectories that matter most.

Nor does the plan offer a credible reply to the administration's critique that Kyoto fails to require participation by developing countries. The administration's plan offers some additional funding to entice developing countries, but the sum total is actually much smaller than the schemes that other nations are already developing within the Kyoto framework.

The good news is that the administration has broken its silence on the important problem of global warming and offered a reasonable framework for debating policy goals. The bad news is that it offers little else.

The writer directs the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development at Stanford. He is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and author of "The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and the Struggle to Slow Global Warming."

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The Washington Post
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David G. Victor
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