PESD - Publications Page

Publications

Filter:

Filter results Close
  • expanded
  • expanded
  • expanded
  • expanded
  • expanded
  • expanded
  • expanded
  • expanded
  • expanded
  • expanded
  • expanded
  • expanded
  • expanded
  • expanded
Patrick R. P. Heller
Journal Articles

Exporting the 'Norwegian Model': The effect of administrative design on oil sector performance

Mark C. Thurber, David Hults, Patrick R. P. Heller
Energy Policy, 2011 June 14, 2011

Abstract

Norway has administered its petroleum resources using three distinct government bodies: a national oil company engaged in commercial hydrocarbon operations; a government ministry to direct policy; and a regulatory body to provide oversight and technical expertise. Norway's relative success in managing its hydrocarbons has prompted development institutions to consider whether this “Norwegian Model” of separated government functions should be recommended to other oil-producing countries.

Show body
Working Papers

NNPC and Nigeria's Oil Patronage Ecosystem

Mark C. Thurber, Ifeyinwa M. Emelife, Patrick R. P. Heller
Program on Energy and Sustainable Development, 2010 September 1, 2010

Nigeria depends heavily on oil and gas, with hydrocarbon activities providing around 65 percent of total government revenue and 95 percent of export revenues.  While Nigeria supplies some LNG to world markets and is starting to export a small amount of gas to Ghana via pipeline, the great majority of the country's hydrocarbon earnings come from oil.  In 2008, Nigeria was the 5th largest oil exporter and 10th largest holder of proved oil reserves in the world according to the U.S.

Show body
Journal Articles

The Limits of Institutional Design in Oil Sector Governance: Exporting the Norwegian Model

Mark C. Thurber, David Hults, Patrick Heller
Program on Energy and Sustainable Development, 2010 February 1, 2010

Norway has made a point of administering its petroleum resources using three distinct government bodies: a national oil company (NOC) engaged in commercial hydrocarbon operations; a government ministry to help set policy; and a regulatory body to provide oversight and technical expertise.  In Norway's case, this institutional design has provided useful checks and balances, helped minimize conflicts of interest, and allowed the NOC, Statoil, to focus on commercial activities while other government agencies regulate oil operators including Statoil itself.  Norway's relative success in managin

Show body